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The contemporary photographer, Joel-Peter Witkin, has described his remaking of some of the 
most iconic paintings in the history of art as a “divine revolt”. However, there are no attempts to 
unravel the meaning of this project nor to analyse the visual changes that Witkin has made. This 
thesis argues that Witkin’s re-creations serve to subvert the negation or diminishment of ugliness 
in art history’s depictions of the mystical, and to present the experience of ugliness as alternatively 
inherently Godly. Through engaging in the problems in philosophical aesthetics, it contrasts the 
notions “aesthetically ugly” (a quality that cannot be objectively identified and studied because it 
ascribes aesthetic non-worth) with the “ugly aesthetic”, which refers to the “perceptive-felt” 
experience of an object. By integrating descriptions of this experience of the ugly aesthetic with 
those of the early development stage of the “psychoanalytic pre-symbolic”, it provides heuristics 
with which to identify perceptual identifiers ugly objects, ugly worlds and the expression of ugly 
feelings in mystical invocations of paintings of three chosen art historical periods and Witkin’s re-
creations. In his reconstructing of the heavenly realms given Renaissance paintings of Leda and 
the Swan (1510-1515) and The Birth of Venus (1485), Witkin makes a “pre-symbolic” space with 
ugly objects to present a contrary vision of an ugly dwelling place for God. In amending the 
Catholic Baroque’s Little Fur (1638) and the Protestant Baroque’s Still Life of Game, Fish, Fruit 
and Kitchen Utensils (1646), the artist replaces mystical feelings that imbue scenes of ugly objects 
with an expression of ugly feelings themselves, thereby guiding the viewer into a full immersion 
into these objects the real site of Godly experience instead. This theoretical formulation and its 
application to the works at hand, evidence that Witkin’s work points to the mystical power of the 
ugly aesthetic to unleash a personal and collective memory of Godly reality as ontologically 
formless and mysterious, and thereby makes a case for ugliness’ value. 
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In his photographic monologue, Gods of Earth and Heaven, the contemporary American 
photographer, Joel-Peter Witkin, described his posting of an advertisement calling for models for 
his photographs: 
Pinheads, dwarfs, giants, hunchbacks, pre-op transsexuals, bearded women, people with tails, 
horns, wigs, reversed hands or feet, anyone born without arms, legs, eyes, breasts, genitals, ears, 
nose, lips. All people with unusually large genitals. All manners of extreme perversion. 
Hermaphrodite and teratoids (alive and dead). Beings from other planets. Anyone bearing the 
wounds of Christ. Anyone claiming to be God. God (Witkin, 1989, Afterword). 
What is striking here is the juxtaposition of the usually taboo with the spiritual and sanctified. This 
artist is well-known for remaking some of Western art’s iconic paintings in transgressive 
photographs that include corpses, dismembered body parts, decaying matter, socially marginalised 
people (including those with various types of deformity or transgender and intersexual identities 
or sexual perversities), alongside religious references. In his artistic reflections in Aperture, the 
artist refers to his work as a “divine revolt” (Witkin, 1985, p. 34). However, as shall be 
demonstrated below, the meaning of this spiritual rebellion is neither explained by him nor 
explored in commentaries on his work. Against what Godly ideas, presented in these artworks, is 
Witkin rebelling? What alternative view does he wish to express through his visual changes?    
This thesis aims to present the argument that this photographer’s style serves to query and overturn 
the diminished role given to ugliness in aesthetics in general, and more particularly its place in the 
mystical, in the art-historical styles of the paintings he references. Alternatively, it presents 
ugliness as the intrinsic entry point for contact with the Godly.  As of yet, no aesthetic-spiritual 
art-historical analyses of Witkin’s oeuvre has been pursued. There exist no in-depth visual 
interpretations of this artist’s work as framed through the specific concepts of “ugliness” or 
“mysticism”, nor are the details of his amendments identified or studied. Consequently, a crucial 
aesthetic-art historical conversation that is opened by his work has been overlooked. This thesis 
suggests that the dearth of such interpretations is a result of the absence of a framework with which 
to read the ugly-mystical relation in artworks. Both phenomena seem ineffable and unidentifiable. 
How can ugliness be identified in art, when it is a subjective judgment upon which there cannot 
be universal agreement? Furthermore, how might experiences of the infinite, transcendent 
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Absolute Being be brought into the limited realm of the “visible and sensible” (Osbourne, 1986, 
p. 554)? As the contemporary philosopher, Scruton (2004a) puts it, Iconoclasm, the “graven 
image” and anthropomorphism, which “… began with Moses, still rages today” (p. 124). 
Therefore, a process for uncovering divine depiction in the artwork is called for, if we are to 
decipher Witkin’s message about ugliness’ mysticism. 
 
There is evidence that, without such insights, critics do not recognise the presence of a quality of 
ugliness in Witkin’s subject matter or formal qualities. This omission occurs because ugliness is 
commonly understood to denote aesthetic badness, and it would be inaccurate to apply this term 
to the photographs, given their technical and formal mastery. Wilson (2000) writes that “[f]ans 
celebrate Witkin’s ability to make the ugly beautiful” (p. 7). Seward (1993) concurs that their 
“rendering is so beautiful, you just might say Yes” (para. 2). Mullarkey (1987) calls him a 
“visionary” with “surprising beauty” (p. 107), and the art critic Kozloff (1984) describes his work 
as a form of “disagreeable beauty” (p. 45). Beem (2008) describes his work as being “darkly 
disturbing yet exquisitely crafted” (para. 2). Wilson agrees that “despite his darkly fertile 
imagination”, much of his work is “masterfully printed” (p. 12), and, so too, does  Noble (2003), 
who reckons his technique of printing is “complex and meticulous” (para. 1).  Biles (2013) 
acclaims Witkin’s work as being “worthy and distinctive” because of the “breadth and quality of 
reproductions.” (p. 56). Critics do employ synonyms of ugliness that are neutral in judgement. 
They thereby argue that some neglected residual meaning of the term, other than its negativity, 
requires excavation. Adams (1991) goes so far as to deem Witkin’s oeuvre as exemplary of an 
entire genre of the 1980s, called the “photographic grotesque” (para. 3). Stokes (2009) maintains 
that the photographs are an instance of the “entropic Gothic of physical pathology” (p. 156), and 
Coke (1985) alludes to a quality of being both “carnivalesque” and “surreal” (p. 6). Stevens (1995), 
describes his work as so “macabre” that “even the most jaded eye must take a pause; even those 
who recoil must wonder at such a sensibility” (p. 91). 
There is a preoccupation with the idea that Witkin’s subject matter is used to shock.  The 
scandalous quality of this maverick’s ‘offensive’ work lends to criticisms of it being empty and 
‘for effect’. Adams (1991) describes it as being “melodramatic” (p. 207), and Stevens (1995) 
comments on the use of shallow histrionics, the “theatrical skills”:  he “inflates … yanking the 
bleeding images out his heart” (p. 91). He notes that it bears the “gutsy self-consciousness” (p. 
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208) of the grotesque period of the 1980s (this includes the work of Joan Fontcuberta and the team 
of Akin and Ludwig). For these critics, these photographs were a “necessary purgative of the Greed 
Decade”, which was ruled out by “politically correct revisionists” of the 1990s (p. 209). Wilson 
(2000) further considers the zeitgeist of Witkin’s style in a tongue-in-cheek website article, in 
which she lampoons the work for being “dated” (para. 43) and “post-punk” (para. 36). Although 
“we all need our fright-wig period”, she writes, “only the most fearful artists feel such a heavy, 
pounding need to express such adolescent, in-your-face ideas about life, death and morality” (para. 
51). Witkin’s work is thus “deserving of his place on the shelf with all the other fine staples of 
Goth-style shock-rock – Nine Inch Nails, Michael Gera and the Swans, all that nasty Baudelaire 
yadda yadda, black-clad ultra-serious teenaged Todesangst” (Wilson, 2000, para. 35). For 
Berkowitch (2005), these photographs conjure Milgram’s famous psychology experiment: “The 
test reveals the human indifference to suffering” (p. 19).1 However, in such readings, there is 
meagre reflection on any potential of the meaning of the viewer’s forced confrontation with that 
which disturbs or provokes, for example, or in its potential for spiritual revelation or growth.  
Ethical concerns are raised about some of this subject matter. However, this thesis will argue that 
such interpretations are blinded because they attend only to the fact that Witkin’s has photographed 
such things. They ignore complex meanings added by the formal qualities of the artwork, and 
associations implanted through art-historical references and cues. Noble (2003) writes that such 
artistic innovation “challenges the boundaries of acceptable taste” – the word “taste” having 
aesthetic or moral implications. Witkin’s work is widely described as “controversial” or 
“provocative” (Hagen, 1993; Bailey, 2017). McKenna (1989) notes: “Joel-Peter Witkin’s volatile 
photographs are considered to be the very cutting edge of the art form by some – and dismissed as 
flagrant … by others” (para. 1). For Dermer (1999), his photography of so-called “vulnerable 
subjects” is further accused of replicating the exploitative dynamics of the freak show, by which 
subjects become objects to be stared at and enjoyed as “exotic” spectacle (p. 250). While social 
 
1 Furthermore, in a short documentary about Witkin entitled Vile Bodies, Goldberg questions whether adding shock 
value in the remaking of particular paintings enhances the original message or is simply an indulgent “luxuriating in 
the gory details” (Townsend, 1998). In the case of the genre of vanitas paintings, for example, the message of memento 
mori is conveyed strongly without the addition of Witkin’s sensationalistic dead, abandoned, stitched infant bodies of 





mores forbid a “stare” at this “divine monster” or biological anomaly (from the twentieth century 
onwards), Witkin’s photography “permits us to stare openly” (Dermer, p. 251). In Beyst’s (2006) 
words, his photographs “lift the reigning taboo on deformation, illness, suffering and death of the 
freak” (p.5). Even when some of these ethical questions bear greater psychological nuance, there 
is still no attention given to the distinct visual qualities in the works. For example, Davis (1991) 
simply asserts that the artist’s use fantasy manipulates the viewer into colluding with his kind of 
Sadean abuse of power and control.  Badger (1999) declares the artist as “both a sadist and a 
masochist”, who “inflicts a sense of suffering and degradation in order to suggest his own suffering 
and degradation” (p. 141). At the same time, Badger deems him a revolutionary whose exhibition 
of perversity is a means to promote sexual liberation and reformation. He employs Carter’s notion 
of a “moral pornographer” to describe Witkin; he is an artist who strives for the acceptance of the 
logic of a world of absolute sexual license for all genders, and projects a model of the way such a 
world might work”  (Carter, 1978 as cited in Badger, 1999, p. 136). In Townsend’s BBC 
documentary entitled Vile Bodies (Townsend, 1998), the renowned photographic critic, Coleman, 
plainly notes the ethical dilemmas provoked about whether, why and how we should care for dead 
bodies.2 
Some insist that it is Witkin’s artistry that gives his photographs the power for moral revelation. 
For Millett (2008), his works may indeed be reminiscent of the medical photographs of the 
nineteenth century, through which science created images of “pathology and deviance, both 
corporeal and moral, against which mainstream society could assure its own normality” and 
“eclipse the multidimensional nature of disabled subjects, constructing disability as social 
spectacle” (p. 17). She insightfully acknowledges that it is this photographer’s carnivalesque 
design that simultaneously parades and celebrates the ‘abnormal’ body. Peres (2013) also bears 
the visual acumen to note that he “gives form to photography’s power to confront taboos” through 
the use of “dark mythological imagery” and through the quality created by “black and white prints, 
toned, bleached, containing scratches … coated with wax overlays” (p. 294). Additionally, Seward 
(1993) points to the way in which the visual quality of his “banquets” of death and dismemberment 
enables the viewer to engage in an “extreme form of multiculturalism, a respect for what is 
drastically foreign to you, even terrifying”, proposing to explain this mechanism through a 
 
2 The script of the series is written in an accompanying book entitled Vile Bodies: Photography and the Crisis of 
Looking (Townsend, 1998).  
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reference to its “elegance” (p. 108). However, sustained excavation of the mechanics of this 
language is not pursued. Further, a spiritual gravitas seems to be missing in such interpretations. 
Witkin’s style not only humanises that which is taboo but hallows it. Seward captures this in his 
description of Witkin as holy as Saint Francis of Assisi, who confronted the aversive for spiritual 
growth, “drank the pus of lepers in order to overcome his repulsion of them” (p.108).  
Other arguments assert that Witkin’s juxtaposition of morally bad subject matter and Christian 
references make his work sacrilegious. This “mixing of [so-called] sacred and profane” (Regan, 
2001, para. 1) is viewed by fundamentalists as violating the perfect goodness of the Christian God. 
One source of concern is his series Contemporary Images of Christ, in Witkin incarnates Christ, 
for example, in a masked nude boy placed perversely between his mother legs, or “a homosexual 
who wears Japanese World War II kamikaze flyer's goggles and a woman's spiked high-heel 
shoes” (Coke, 1985, p. 10).3 For Heartney (2004), the artist displays “rage at the unjust God, who 
not only refuses to show himself but dispenses death and deformity …. By revelling in the 
monstrous and repulsive, Witkin mocks God’s supposed mercy and challenges the promise of 
universal redemption.” (Heartney, 2004, p. 34, as cited in Metaxatos, 2004, p. 56). Such 
interpretations misattribute moral badness to ethically neutral, ugly subject matter, thereby 
revealing a conflation that this thesis challenges.  
This fallacy pervades other arguments that propose that the artist juxtaposes this ‘offensive’ (ugly) 
imagery as a means to reflect on the spiritual and moral decline of society at large, and not religious 
ideology itself. In her reading of the symbol of the ‘spiritual body’ in his work, Metaxatos 
references Chasseguet-Smirgel’s Creativity and Perversion (1984). This text speaks to the 
“spiritual despair” emergent in artworks in the “decadent” dawning of the collapsing Roman 
Empire, the French Revolution and the birth of Nazism in an “anal sadistic universe” based on 
biblical sacrilege and abolition of differences (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1984 as cited in Metaxatos, 
2004, p.12).  Such transgressions include “dissolute sexual behaviour” as well as “confusion 
between the sexes and generations, including androgyny and maternal incest.” Davis (1991) sees 
this reconstructed religious symbolism as a kind of end-of-Millennium bellwether for “the next, 
potentially apocalyptic world war” (p. 46). 
 
3 These refer to the two images of these series in Coke called His Mother Mary: Photographed by an Anonymous 
Galilean Photographer (1974) (Coke, 1984, p. 9) and Ecce Homo (1975). 
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In more nuanced analyses, Witkin’s religious portrayals are an accurate visual expression of an 
essential quality of Catholicism. For example, Heartney, in her Postmodern Heretics: The Catholic 
Imagination in Contemporary Art (2004), acknowledges his orientation towards “corporeal 
imagery” to a more “sensual and complex Catholic-Roman culture” (p. 33). Stevens (1995) 
describes him as alluding to “the sex-and-death-haunted spectacle of Catholicism” (p. 42). In one 
article in the Tuscan Weekly, Regan (2001) quotes the words of a letter to Witkin from an Italian 
priest: 
Your photographs (both crucifixions and pictures of the most rejected people) are … what best 
succeeds in getting into touch with the abyss of Christ’s arcanum. Be compared with your artwork 
might only Francis Bacon’s paintings or Picasso’s Crucifixion after Grunewald. … We should pray 
before your photos (para. 2). 
Still, such religious interpretations to do not demonstrate how this visionary communicates such 
messages. What is the existing point of view that Witkin wishes to subvert through a renewed 
artistic statement, and how do his visual mechanics achieve his alternative message? Surely there 
is also something that Witkin wishes to say in his referencing of the works of some of Western 
art’s most iconic paintings? Some critics notice such gestures, but do not interpret them.  Beyst 
(2006) glibly mocks his “simple paraphrasing” (para. 24) as a form of “pseudo-profound 
Witkinising” (para. 18); for Schjendahl (1995), it is a form of “coy pastiche” (p. 85). Yet, if critics 
were to execute a process of more detailed visual decoding (which includes the identification of 
the visuality of mystical and its interaction with representations of ugliness), then his work would 
be seen to participate in, and thereby uncover an already existing spiritual-aesthetic conversation 
that spans periods in art history. The meaning of the work is thus broader than a specific art 
historical period or religion, and more profound than its power to provoke.  
There is a compelling rationale for such a study. If ugliness can be shown to be designated a 
spiritual role through art, it may act as evidence for the power of art to affect the meaning and 
widespread use of aesthetic terms. Indeed, the identification of ugliness with aesthetic badness is 
one of the obstacles to studying ugliness in the history of art. Actually, in building on the work of 
the renowned aesthetician Beardsley (1981), the contemporary aesthetic philosopher Zangwill 
(2001) emphasises that, whereas some aesthetic properties “substantively” describe qualities in an 
object, beauty and ugliness are different: as “evaluative aesthetic” terms, they are words that 
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perform judgements of good and bad value respectively (Beardsley 1981, p. 9; Zangwill, 2001, pp. 
9-24). Furthermore, for Beardsley, substantive terms can be further naturally marshalled as a 
species of either the beautiful-good or ugly-bad. However, has ugliness’ ill-worth been allocated? 
And if so, how? Beardsley goes on to point out that there are ‘mediating variables’, or intermediary 
reasons, for which this negative value has been ascribed to ugliness. Pop and Widrich (2014) 
acknowledge that there remains a persistent “haunting” question of whether this badness, 
“inherent” in ugliness, has been socially constructed, as opposed to being taken as a perceptible 
“sign” or “symptom” of something gone awry or insufficient, or of an ominous, imperceptible 
reality (p.7). 
The realm of visual representation at large has certainly imbued ugliness with badness, and so high 
art is, too, a likely culprit. As Athanassoglou-Kallmyer (2003) puts it: “ugliness has become a 
marker of mundane reality, the irrational, evil, disorder, dissonance, irregularity, excess, 
deformity, and in short, the Other” (p. 281). Ugliness is rendered evermore ‘bad’ through 
cumulative re-use of it to signal social badness visually. It hereby becomes a political tool for 
segregation and control. Przybylo and Rodrigues (2018) make a case that it denotes inequalities 
and hierarchies, often serving as a repository of all that is ‘other’ (ability, race, gender, class, 
sexuality, body size, age, health, or animalism). It is also contingent and relational, taking shape 
through the comparison and evaluation of bodies. Eco’s (2007) archival survey of ugliness is 
replete with historical examples of the way in which things that are bad are made ugly: the 
moralization of monsters, the Devil, the Anti-Christ, the witch, the merciless portrayal of the 
African and Asian, the horrors of lepers and plague victims and the caricature of peasants.  
 
This permeability or malleability of the meaning of the term signals the potential for visual culture 
to have amplified or compounded ugliness’ meaning to the extent that it has been stripped of having 
a substantive quality and texture of its own, only to be reduced to an ascription or judgement of 
badness altogether. On this account, ugliness is a rich quality; it has a fixed, substantive meaning, 
which remains constant, identifiable, and extricable from the contingent associations by which it 
is given worth. Thus, this can shed light on how ugliness’ history of co-occurrence or co-existence 
with other forms of badness, particularly in the visual realm, has fixed it with this negative value. 
Has art itself paradoxically made the identification and study of ugliness in art impossible? In this 
study, the evaluative meaning of ugliness will be challenged, through revising its powers to 
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provide spiritual connection, vision and consciousness. From a theoretical perspective, the 
development of ways to identify the seemingly ineffable, and the attempt to execute and apply it 
to real examples, makes a small step to resolve a “trackless thicket” of theorising issued to attempt 
to resolve what the American philosopher Kelly calls the “aesthetic-art-art historical triangle” 
(Kelly, 2006, as cited in Elkins, 2006, p. 197). How might the ways that the artwork treats the 
aesthetic property over time, continually shift its meaning, more particularly, its badness?  As 
Widrich and Pop (2014) insist: 
Besides for being current, ugliness is very much alive in the history of art: from ritual invocations 
of mythic monsters to the scare tactics of the early twentieth-century avant-garde, and from the 
cabinet of curiosities to the identity politics of today…. Studies are needed that formulate not just 
a unitary countertradition to the canon of beauty, but help us to understand why human beings 
possess an aesthetic term that seems to negate all they want from their objects and practices (p. 2).  
It seems likely that Witkin’s art-historical changes have not been seen to enter an already-existing 
visual conversation about the mystical place of ugliness, because there are powerful philosophical 
obstacles that obstruct easy identification of both the mystical and the ugly within works of art. 
These conceptual issues must be confronted in order to develop a framework with which to 
apprehend such qualities within the works that follow. Thus, Chapter 1 poses a potential definition 
of mysticism and suggests that mystical experiences prevalent in specific religious contexts can be 
seen to express themselves through features of the corresponding art historical style, in what it 
formulates as a “mystical style”. It also addresses two significant misconceptions or ill-definitions 
of ugliness that emerge in aesthetic philosophy, and that hinder our ability to identify it in works 
of art. This semantic fine-tuning includes clarifying the thesis by defining our sense of ugliness as 
a complex, substantive quality (which the thesis calls the “ugly aesthetic”. This is differentiated 
from verdictive use of ugliness (“aesthetically ugly”) to make a judgement of badness. It also 
requires coming to terms with the commonsense idea that aesthetic qualities are not identifiable or 
worth studying as individualistic, private and subjective “perceptive-felt” experiences of objects.  
This initial philosophical work lays the foundations for the pursuit of psychological project of 
expounding the particular perceptive and felt characteristics that come together when we describe 
our experience of objects as ugly. These descriptions of experiences of ugly objects in the world, 
in turn, act as a basis with which to develop ways in which the existence of ugliness in the works 
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of art that follow can be identified, so that we may appreciate Witkin’s work through such a lens. 
By integrating textual descriptions of ugliness with theories of the psychoanalytic pre-symbolic, 
Chapter 2 provides a means for the identification of the three forms of ugliness that interact with 
mystical invocations in the comparison of the artworks that follow. These include the perceptual 
signs to identify representations of ugly objects, features by which to identify an imaginary ugly 
locus given by what is called the “geomorphological metaphor”, and a list of ugly feelings that 
may be expressed in the formal qualities of artworks.  
In Chapter 3, we show how Witkin subverts the negated role of ugliness in the Renaissance 
mystical style, through changes that place it as alternatively central. Through an in-depth analysis 
of Leda and the Swan (da Sesto, 1510-1515), and The Birth of Venus (Botticelli, 1485), it evinces 
the way in which features of the mystical style of Platonic Idealism mimic the Christian Platonic 
mystical experience of perceiving a transcendent heaven of idealised forms, which ugliness cannot 
inhabit. By using the geomorphological image to change the environment to the pre-symbolic 
mental ‘home’ of ugliness, and by photographing objects with the perceptual markers of ugliness 
(which maintains and enhances their ugliness), Witkin makes the necessary changes to present his 
ugly mysticism in the remakes of Leda, Los Angeles (Witkin, 1986) and Gods and Earth and 
Heaven, Los Angeles (Witkin, 1988).4 
Chapter 4 attempts to evidence how Witkin’s style can also be read as an extension of the merely 
instrumental role assigned to ugliness as a trigger in felt mystical experiences of the Catholic 
(Italian) and Protestant (Flemish) Baroque, to one in which ugliness feelings of these very objects 
are the mystical experiences themselves. Through an in-depth examination of the work of Het 
Pelsken (Little Fur) (Rubens, 1638) and the Protestant Baroque period’s Still Life of Game, Fish, 
Fruit and Kitchen Utensils (van Steenwyck, 1646), it shows the way in which both of these styles 
insert non-ugly mystical ‘feeling states’ into a seemingly-realistic earthly scene, in which God is 
immanent. The formal elements of the characteristic style of his revisions, Journey of the Mask, 
Helena Fourment, San Francisco (Witkin, 1984), and his Feast Fools, Mexico City (Witkin, 1990), 
will be shown to embody the networks of characteristic ugly sensation identified through its pre-
 
4 For the rest of the thesis, the titles of Witkin’s works will not include the city name. Witkin includes such locations 
as a form of subtitle. 
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symbolic in Chapter 1. They thus make the necessary changes to overturn the Baroque period’s 
diminishment of the ugly feelings in its mysticism.  
 
If such an analysis can evidence that Witkin presents a compelling case for the Godliness of 
ugliness, then it thereby illuminates the power of art as a remediating aesthetic educational space: 
a microcosm for ‘aesthetic training’, an opportunity for more refined attunement of aesthetic 
sensibility thereby bearing the possibility of correcting the impact of its own history. An art-
historical study of ugliness illuminates how art-history itself has been constructed based on 
aesthetic decisions. Since the aesthetic is larger than the artistic, these psycho-educational spaces 
have impacted aesthetic history itself. It is aesthetic art that can bequeath the aesthetic skills that 
may be transferred by the spectator into his encounter with the aesthetic perception of the 
Lebenswelt.   
 
The title of this thesis, On Rearing an Ugly Head, draws on the double meaning of the word “rear”. 
According to the first meaning, the mystical essence of the ugly experience will be said to lie in 
its disclosing or surfacing of the otherwise hidden realities of a higher, Godly, perceptual-felt 
order. According to the second meaning, Witkin’s artworks cultivate, nurture and breed an 
awakening to what will be shown to be a revelatory potential of ugliness. It is within art, and the 
history of art, that such aesthetic education is acquired. These artworks thereby afford access to an 




















 THE UGLY MYSTICAL: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGES 
 
“When a point about a poem or a musical performance is made; the concept of beauty is in the 
background” (Mothersill, 1984, p. 257). 
 
 
In his reflections on his work, the artist Joel-Peter Witkin writes: “I revolt against the mystical in 
order not to be overwhelmed and won over by it. It is unfathomable, yet I attempt to understand it. 
It is invisible, yet I try to objectify it, hoping to find revelation and truth” (Witkin, 1985, p. 184). 
The origins of this artist’s expressed desire to use the  “sacred vessel” of photography to access 
and manifest a personal vision of the Almighty, are found in his story about a disappointing visit 
to the dusty study of a dozy Rabbi who alleged to have “seen God” (Celant, 1995, p. 52). The artist 
claims this event propelled his quest to find his own notion of the mystical; to develop a “personal 
spirituality” outside traditionally religious mystical ideas (Peres, 2013, p. 294). Through an 
examination of paintings of two art-historical styles that this artist references, this thesis argues 
that Witkin’s reconstructions of quintessential art-historical paintings are an expression of this very 
spiritual rebellion. More precisely, they can be read as a visual subversion of the diminishment of 
the role of ugliness in experiences of God, in favour of the artist’s idea that it is ugliness that can, 
rather, act as the source of this sought revelation and truth.5  
 
It is not surprising that the artist’s work has not been read in this way, for the prospect of both 
identifying experiences of Godliness and of ugliness is plagued with notorious philosophical 
obstacles that we cannot overlook. How might an artist represent an experience of ineffable, 
invisible Godliness in a work of art? How can we agree on the presence of ugliness in these works 
of art, and legitimise our interpretation of these artworks, if ugliness is simply an individualistic 
judgement of aesthetic worth? The weight of such questions means that this thesis faces the task 
of tackling some notorious theoretical obstacles in order to offer a framework that we can apply to 
a study of the artworks that follow. The development of these formulations involves developing a 
 
5 Geomorphological mysticism – or mysticism of the ugly – is an encounter with ultimate truth of formlessness, 
ontological mysteriousness and monism of Godly reality. When it is called “geomorphological mysticism” we are 
referring to the perceptual components of ugly, in which we may find God. The felt qualities of ugliness, however, 
may also be seen as responses to features to Godliness (as is evident in the felt language of Witkin’s work). 
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notion of a ‘mystical style’. It also requires a carving out a sense of ugliness as a substantive 
perceptive-felt experience that we can more easily apprehend in the artwork that holds it. This 
exercise demands an engagement with the central issues of aesthetic value, and aesthetic ontology. 
Both of these concerns are core inquires in the field of philosophical aesthetics. 
 
The Mystical in the Artwork 
 
The analysis of the works that follow will demonstrate that Witkin presents a visual argument for 
ugliness as mystical by replacing the representation of specific kinds of mystical experiences 
presented in these original artworks, with qualities of ugliness. However, what is mysticism, and 
how does it appear in the works of art be analysed? The establishment of an exhaustive definition 
is challenging. The contemporary theological philosopher, Gellman (2017), provides an 
authoritative characterisation, outlining subtypes and variations of this phenomenon. According to 
him, an experience is mystical if it is a (purportedly) “super sense-perceptual or sub-sense-
perceptual unitive experience granting acquaintance of realities or states of affairs that are of a 
kind not accessible by way of sense-perception, somatosensory modalities, or standard 
introspection” (para. 4).6 
 
When experiences are mystical in this “wide sense”, there is an awareness of something “extra” 
that one witnesses in the apprehension of the world of objects; some dimension to the experience 
that cannot be a response to mere physical reality, and therefore the phenomenon we witness is  
inexplicable through the laws of science (Gellman, 2017, para. 4).  Witkin (1985) refers to the 
mystical as “invisible” and “unfathomable” (p. 184).7 There are two forms that this can take. In a 
“super sense perceptual” experience, the mystical perceives something that is not appropriate to 
ordinary sensing of the world outside; of the internal body (the somatosensory feeling of 
temperature, pain or the place of limb) or to thinking. When visiting the Rabbi, for example, the 
young photographer expected to encounter events that could only appear in the small New York 
 
6 Gellman (2017) explains: “The inclusion of ‘purportedly’ is to allow the definition to be accepted without 
acknowledging that mystics ever really do experience realities or states of affairs in the way described” (para. 7). In 
doing so, he does not subscribe to the truth that God exists, or that contact with God is actually possible. 
7 In this case, if the definition of an aesthetic experience, is a perceptual “felt” experience that cannot be explained by 
a formula in an object, then all aesthetic experiences are extra-sensory and therefore mystical. 
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room supernaturally; “flooded with light, angels, and suns…rainbows and constellations with the 
Rabbi standing, shining and larger than a mountain. His voice would be of thunder; and he would 
be of thunder” (Celant, 1995, p. 50).  
 
A sub sense-perceptual experience is an alternative, second form of mystical experience, which is 
crucial for a mystical understanding of ugliness. This phenomenon is a “pure consciousness” 
event: one in which the person experiences no sense perception, or one in which there is the 
“phenomenological content appropriate to sense perception but lacking in the conceptualisation 
typical of attentive sense perception” (para. 51).8 In this case, Witkin’s mystical experience of the 
Rabbi may have involved a meditative non-conceptual state, in which Witkin may have accessed 
the ‘essence’, ‘thisness’ or reality of the Rabbi and his desk by escaping his idea of them as a 
“rabbi” or “desk”, for example, as occurs in the Buddhist state of tathata. This transcendence refers 
to the experience of an object-less reality; perhaps when the entity of an object-unit disappears, 
and there is no distinction between the table or the Rabbi as individual things or types of things. It 
can be seen as a sub-type of super-sensory experience, when, according to Gellman, the quality of 
physical “beyondness” is, indeed, the very non-conceptual nature of the object (Gellman, 2017, 
para. 15). Gellman (2017) focuses on those mystical experiences that are “unitive”. These include 
“phenomenological de-emphasis, blurring, or eradication of multiplicity” in the perception of 
individual things, for example, in an experience of union with the nature of God. He also 
acknowledges non-unitive, “numinous” experiences where reality feels “wholly other” (para. 18).  
The difference between “extroverted” non-conceptual experiences of the perceptual (unity in the 
world) and introverted experiences as those devoid of objects or perceptual content altogether (no-
thing-ness) is also pertinent to ugliness (para. 6).9 
Following Kant’s (2000b) metaphysics, Gellman (2017) argues that this ordinary, “phenomenal” 
apprehension – this experience we ordinarily have of mere physical reality, is actually an 
illusionary or a limited view of reality. The  mystical experience enables the/some surpassing of 
this restricted apprehension to an encounter with the “noumenal” truths outside of human sense 
 
8 Gellman (2017) gives the example of Buddhist philosopher Paramaartha (499–569), who writes of the non-cognitive, 
non-sensory Buddhist experience of emptiness, and the Christian mystic, Meister Eckhart, who describes a type of 
conceptual and sensory “forgetting”, as consequent “sinking” into a “mystical oblivion” (para. 51). 
9 Gellman borrows this distinction from Walter D. Stace’s Mysticism and Philosophy (1961). 
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perception – the world ‘in itself’.10 Although this theological philosopher insists that mystical 
experiences are not necessarily linked to experiences of God, or “religious” experiences, this thesis 
will focus on varieties of mysticism that are, by definition, “theistic” experiences of God as the 
“ultimate truth” or “spiritual” reality (Gellman, para. 25). God, as Scruton (2004a) puts it, is 
“immanent within the world [of human beings], but he also transcends it” (p. 121) A mystical 
experience as an experience of God, which, in part, is an experience of his very apartness 
(transcendent, supra).11 Here, some of the qualities of theistic mystical experiences of human 
beings are seen to be logical responses to some of the properties of (the concepts of) God, for 
example, fear or awe of his omnipotence. 12  
Thus, if a mystical experience has some other extra-sensory quality that one apprehends in a 
circumstance – that gives a ‘taste’ of a dimension of Godly presence – then how are these 
experiences represented in a realm of an artwork? We need to be able to see how the paintings of 
the Renaissance and Baroque depict their unique forms of mystical experience, in order to evince 
Witkin’s substitution of them with qualities of ugliness.  
The thesis attempts to demonstrate that mystical experiences that it finds in the religious literature 
of the studied art historical periods are expressed through some of the visual elements that are 
characteristic to those corresponding art-historical styles. They can be said to form unique 
substyles called ‘mystical styles’, to each of which this thesis gives its own, distinctive name.13 
The thesis explores types of mystical experiences and corresponding kinds of mystical visual 
strategies in the chapters that follow. What this thesis names the mysticism of “Platonic Idealism” 
of the Renaissance that appears in Leda and the Swan (da Sesto, 1515-1510)  and The Birth of 
Venus (Botticelli, 1485), can be characterised as Gellman’s (2017) super-sensory perceptive 
 
10 This distinction appears in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 2000b, pp. 338-365). 
11 The “immanent-transcendent distinction” is widely contested in the philosophical literature. See Westpahl’s entry 
in the Oxford Handbook of Nineteenth Century Thought (Westpahl, 2019, pp. 111-112).  
12 For Gellman, (the concept of) God contains the property of infinitude, which means He has all properties, or an 
“inexhaustible fullness” or “plenitude” (para. 80). Indeed, as mentioned earlier, a search for representations of Godly 
experience instead of God per se, helps the thesis to avoid problems such as iconoclasm or anthropomorphism. 
Osbourne (1986) writes: “by the beginning of the eighth century the veneration of images had reached its climax and 
reaction set in. Led by the Iconoclasts or Image-breakers, the attack of the cult of images become an attack of 
images themselves. Their central tenant was that images of sacred personages must be removed from the churches 
and places of worship since their presence there inevitably became an occasion of idolatry” (p. 554).  
13 According to Gombrich (1978), “style consists of those features of the symbolic functioning of a work that are 




mystical experience This is evoked by the artist by creating a ‘vision’ of a fantastical transcendent 
otherworld and its objects in which God is thought to dwell. This mystical idea lies in contrast to 
what this thesis names the “Theatrical Realism” of the Catholic Baroque that appears in Little Fur 
(Rubens, 1638). It is, from the perspective of this thesis, also different from the “Mindful Vanitas” 
style that appears in the style of the Protestant Baroque period’s van Steenwyck’s Still Life of 
Game, Fish, Fruit and Kitchen Utensils (van Steenwyck, 1646). In the reading given here, this 
style presents a form of “felt” (somatosensory but not perceptual) mystical experiences of the 
Godly immanent from ordinary perceiving of this world. This type is not addressed directly by 
Gellman. 
In each of these styles, how these mystical qualities interact with the presence of ugliness acts as 
a source of information about the role the religious and art-historical context gives ugliness within 
these prescribed experiences of God. In a close reading of the artworks presented for discussion, 
this status is more technically referred to by this thesis as the visual “ugly-mystical relation.” 
Witkin’s replacement of these mystical styles with qualities of the ugly aesthetic, then, is what 
signals his point of view that mystical experiences arise in those ugly objects themselves. This idea 
follows a tradition of features of aesthetic experiences that have often been linked to the mystical, 
such as beauty and the sublime. 14 Ugliness is unique in that it is – or leads to – a sub-sensory 
experience. Also, as conveyed in section on the ontology of ugliness below, ugliness is a type of 
aesthetic experience, and an aesthetic experience is a “perceptive-felt” experience. The idea that 
such qualities seem as if they emanate from somewhere else other than the mere physical, deems 
them “sacred”. As Scruton (2014) writes, they offer “a passage between the immediate and the 
 
14 For example, Freud’s feelings of excitement, awe, veneration and enthrallment that go with experience 
of the idealised (loved) object in his On Narcissism (2014), are also seen to characterise the experience of 
beauty, and are thought to emerge from God as the ultimate idealised object (Hagman, 2005, p. 42). 
Hagman references Freud’s process of ‘idealisation’ in his On Narcissism (1914) and his The Ego and the 
Id (1923), where they are discussed in relation to the creation of a child’s “ego-ideal”. According to 
Freud, in early development, the child projects ideas of omnipotence onto the mother and then “merges” 
with her, and then projects the image later as his “protecting parents”. The process of separation involves 
internalising this image in creating an ideal image of the self, and narcissism. See also the Enlightenment 
philosopher Burke’s (2015) work on the sublime. For the Lutheran theologian Otto, in his The Idea of the 
Holy (1958), the sublime’s fear, awe, humility (tremendum) as well as intrigue (fascinans) is a proper super 
sensuous response to an object that is “wholly other” – deeply mysterious and therefore overwhelmingly powerful 
(Otto, 1958, pp. 5-31). More precisely, For Otto, tremendum includes the elements of awfulness, and overpowering 




transcendental … they seem to stand at the horizon of our world, looking out to that which is not 
of this world … so as to meet us face-to-face” (p. 15).  
Following this reasoning, an ugly mystical style must technically make the artwork both look and 
feel ugly.15 However, the ugly “perceptive” and “felt” dimensions of Witkin’s style will be 
analysed separately in this study. This division makes sense because, for Witkin to present ugliness 
as an alternative experience in the Renaissance, the thesis must demonstrate that his style overturns 
the perceptual qualities of this visionary mystical experience and concomitant perceptive mystical 
style. In the Baroque, the thesis must show his style to substitute in a mystical feeling language in 
order to enter the debate.  
The “Aesthetically Ugly” Versus the “Ugly Aesthetic”: A Case for a Substantive 
Perceptive-Felt Account 
If we are to examine how Witkin replaces the elements of these mystical styles with qualities of 
ugliness in order to advocate for ugliness’ centrality in experiences of the Godly, then we need to 
be able to similarly find a way to identify this ugliness in the works that follow. Actually, Witkin 
renders ugliness in three ways in art-making, which must be made detectable. These include ugly 
perceptual qualities and signs of ugly place (to substitute the idealised objects rendered in 
Renaissance visions of heaven), and ugly feelings that take the place of the other forms of mystical 
feeling in the Baroque. Here, however, we are confronted with the intellectual gravitas of a history 
of philosophical puzzles. The first is the problem of judgement: how can we identify a quality of 
ugliness in the artworks when ugliness merely means that something is bad? If we can make a case 
for ugliness as a particular and unique type of experience and not a casting of a personal verdict, 
then we are still left with the second conundrum of having to find objective criteria that make 
Witkin’s changes bear widespread appeal and interest.  
Two questions ensue. First, from a semantic perspective, is there a way in which we use ugliness, 
apart from passing aesthetic judgement? In contrast to the “aesthetically ugly”, the term “ugly 
aesthetic” is introduced as a term that describes some quality that is to be specified. However, this 
then requires an examination of the ontology of this quality itself. What kind of thing is the “ugly 
 
15 It must be reiterated that perception involves the visual in our analysis, but that it incorporates all sensory 
modalities. There can be ugly smells, textures, sounds or tastes.  
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aesthetic” a variety of, and how do we make this accessible to a third party? This definitional work 
is the basis upon which to develop accounts of the artwork’s ugly objects, formal feeling qualities 
and environment.  
Ostensibly, critics have not defined either the subject matter nor the formal qualities of Witkin’s 
photographs as being ‘ugly’, because of a pre-dominant definition of the ugly as that which bears 
aesthetic ‘ill-worth’ or ‘bad’ taste.16 Regarding Witkin’s subject matter— referring to his use of 
marginalised subjects or body parts as ‘ugly’ for example – feels inaccurate and offensive. Instead, 
as has been evidenced in the aforementioned review of the literature, richer and more sophisticated 
descriptions such as the “gothic” (Adams, 1991) or “carnivalesque” (Coke, 1985), are ostensibly 
more apt for his artistic statement.  Further, as critics have agreed, Witkin’s formal and technical 
mastery of the photographic processes are “skillful” and have great merit, which elicits the use of 
the term “beautiful” to describe the artwork as a whole (Mullarkey, 1987; Seward, 1993; Wilson, 
2000). This thesis uses the term “aesthetically ugly” in order to differentiate this common 
understanding of the term from the less understood “ugly aesthetic”, in which ugliness conveys an 
experience of a quality of/in an object. 
 
The distinction between “evaluative” and “substantive” aesthetic terms is an insight that is first 
offered by Beardsley (1982) and explored at length by the contemporary philosophers Levinson 
(2005, p. 327), and by Zangwill, in a chapter entitled The Beautiful, The Dainty and the 
Dumpy (2001, pp. 9-24). Zangwill (2001) explains that, in a “performative” sense, the words 
‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’ can cast a “verdict” on the aesthetic merit of an object (p. 19).17 
Semantically, when aesthetic terms serve this function, they operate as terms within the broader 
practice of “evaluative aesthetics”. We find the example of aesthetics as an act of coming to a 
judgement or verdict of ‘taste’, in Hume’s seminal eighteenth-century text, Standard of Taste 
(2006).18 On this account, to say something is ‘beautiful’ is to deem it aesthetically good or 
 
16 Ugly objects can be classified as subject matter, while ugly feelings are expressed through the formal qualities of 
the work.  
17 According to Austin (1962), performative words do not only describe reality but are speech acts that change 
reality by executing the very action referred to in the utterance e.g. “I promise”.  
18 Here, Hume (2006) posits the existence of a “taste organ” that he describes as ‘judging’ the ‘verdict’ of a work of 
art. He describes the seasoned critic as having a “[s]trong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, 




“aesthetic”, since being called aesthetic at all is made synonymous with being taken as beautiful. 
On the contrary, when one deems something ‘ugly’, one is saying that it is “aesthetically bad”, or 
“un-aesthetic”, where the prefix, “un-” denotes the opposite or reverse.19 Indeed, within the domain 
of evaluative aesthetics, all seemingly substantive, complex, or “thick” aesthetic terms, some of 
which are used in relation to Witkin’s work (‘grotesque’, ‘Gothic’ or ‘surreal’) or others (such as 
‘elegant’, ‘dull’, ‘cumbersome’ or ‘cutesy’) have these good or bad evaluations built into their 
meaning which marshals them as species of the beautiful or ugly (Zangwill, p. 15).20 In the realm 
of evaluative aesthetics, it seems, this judgmental function of aesthetic terms dominates: following 
Beardsley (1982), it appears impossible to engage neutrally and non-judgmentally in aesthetic 
descriptions.  
 
There are several unsettling consequences of the notion of the “aesthetically ugly”. Firstly, there 
are conceptual problems that emerge from this binary relation – if we solely reduce beauty and 
ugliness to these good/bad values, then ugliness is rendered as the pure opposite of beauty. 
Consequently, the two terms become mutually exclusive. For Lorand (1994), who does not concur 
with Beardsley’s beauty-ugly species argument, this polarised relation awkwardly relegates all 
other unique aesthetic properties, other than beauty (e.g. meaningless, kitsch, boring), to the non-
beautiful ugly . This is called the “aesthetic pluralism” argument. What about the possibility of a 
thing being ‘an-aesthetic’ or ‘non-aesthetic’, and therefore neither beautiful nor ugly? 21  Take, for 
 
19 The problem of rendering ugliness as the only opposite of beauty on the binary account above, is clarified in the 
verdictive account. If beauty is conflated with the ‘aesthetic’, the opposite of beauty is both ugliness and the non-
aesthetic. It feels unintuitive to suggest that the meaning of the term ugliness, and the term un-aesthetic (or 
anaesthetic[sic]) are synonymous.  
20 The term “thick concept” was first introduced by Bernard Williams in his 1985 book, Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy.  It was borrowed by Geertz (1973) in his notion of thick description – the anthropologist’s tool for 
describing “a multiplicity of complex conceptual structures, many of them superimposed upon or knotted into one 
another” (p. 10). A ‘thick’ ethical concept is a subcategory of an evaluative concept such as dogmatic, which 
contains a judgement and description simultaneously. For Zangwill (2001), “this parallels the issue in moral 
philosophy about so called ‘thick’ descriptions such as ‘courageous’ or ‘honest’… it is part of the meaning of the 
our judgement that we also praise it… there is an issue about whether or not we can in principle separate the 
evaluative component from a purely descriptive component” (p. 15). One solution is to determine the evaluative 
content based on the “linguistic utterance”, for evaluation is “conversationally implied” (pp. 15-16).  
21 In his Kalliphobia in Contemporary Art (2004) the American aesthetic philosopher Danto refers to a point made 
in his 1964 article entitled The Artworld and reflected upon in his Abuse of Beauty (2003).  His point is that aesthetic 
properties do not determine artistic status. In his famous “Brillo Box” experiment, he argues that there is no 
perceptual (and therefore aesthetic) difference between the Brillo boxes shown in the gallery, and those found in the 
supermarket (Danto, 2003, p.4). In so doing, he suggests that the aesthetic properties of an artwork do not determine 
whether is an artwork—are not a sufficient condition.  
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example, the number, or mathematical object, ‘3’?22 Moore (2014) also raises the problem of 
“callilogical neutrality” (para. 5), proposing that things are beautiful or ugly in different degrees 
and that some things may be neutral. There is an emptiness or thinness that transpires if we keep 
the aesthetically bad as ugliness’ sole definition. On the evaluative account, a description of the 
intersex person in Witkin’s photograph as being ugly, can simplistically be made equivalent to a 
description of that object being un-beautiful. This problem is highlighted by the sense that we do 
not always feel beauty and ugliness to be inversely proportionate: the statement “Witkin’s work 
possesses as much ugliness as can be” cannot be equivalent to saying “Witkin’s work possesses as 
little beauty as can be.” 23  
 
There is a second objection that we can make to the evaluative basis of this relation. One notorious 
problem that may obstruct the identification of ugliness in Witkin’s work is the idea, engrained by 
Kant’s Critique of Judgement (2000), of this verdict of aesthetic badness as epistemologically 
subjective and therefore individualistic and therefore “groundless” (Scruton, 2004c, p. 448). This 
problem seems to make it impossible to obtain objectively verifiable consensus for a legitimate 
scholarly analysis or a worthwhile or convincing art-historical comparison – universal 
agreement.24 This permissibility for the individual to make up his mind, implies that the truth of 
 
22 This point that aesthetic properties depend on perceptual ones is debatable. For example, Shelley (2003) argues 
that aesthetic properties can depend, too, on the affect of the conceptual: “[T]houghts can move us perhaps as much 
as sensuous forms do. They strike us with daring wit and beauty” (p. 373). 
23 There seem to be commonly shared features by which we come to easily identify all ugliness’ subtypes, that have 
more to do with a “badness”. Indeed, there is a question about the basis upon which we identify these aesthetic 
qualities as “bad”. Perhaps, following Wittgenstein (2009), the substantive forms of ugliness bear a “family 
resemblance”, that an account of the “ugly aesthetic” can begin to illuminate: “a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing” (p. 66). In his review of the concept of ugliness, the contemporary philosopher 
Moore (2014) attempts to detail and categorise the history of philosophical notions of ugliness according to their 
relation to beauty. Along with the binary account– that he shows to be prominent in Classical and Medieval accounts 
– he acknowledges a “privation” category of St Augustine, Bosenquat or perception theorists like Bullough (1912) 
or Dickie (1964) (in which ugliness is claimed to be a misperception of actually occurring beauty), and an 
“incorporative category” in Croce or Rosenkranz (whereby the ugliness is superficially described as ‘some’ 
ingredient in beauty). The recurring problem is that we still need to understand the use or meaning of this 
independent concept of ugliness there in the first place.  
24 Kant introduces a famous paradox in his Antinomy of Taste, in which he argues that despite the immediacy and 
subjectivity of aesthetic judgements, there must exist a universal sensus communis (see Scruton, 1994c, pp. 448-
449). In Elkin’s record of a conversation between aesthetic philosophers and art-historians at a conference in 2004 
called “Rediscovering Aesthetics”, the Modernist art theorist, de Duve (2006) gets to the purpose of Kant’s 
theory: “In making aesthetic judgments, we merely suppose that sensus communis exists, as a universally shared 
capacity for sharing feelings i.e. for agreeing by a dint of feeling … Kant’s Critique of Judgment formulates a 
transcendental – I say transcendental, not utopian or anything like that – foundation for democracy and peace on 
earth [good-natured laughter]” (as cited in Elkins, 2006, p. 64). 
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aesthetic statements is relative to the subject. In the artist’s work entitled Anna Akhmatova (1998), 
for example, a severed arm, which is posed to hold onto a wood-encased clock in a still life with 
grapes, might be simultaneously beautiful for him and ugly for her. No basis for such a decision 
need be provided. Also, as was mentioned earlier, the reduction of the meaning of ugliness to 
aesthetic badness has the potential to be conflated with that which has less value in general, so that 
so-called aesthetic badness becomes intertwined with the morally or ethically bad. The aesthetic, 
which really belongs to the world of ‘appearance’, leaks onto the socio-political and confers the 
segregation that is the logic of this binary relation. The aesthetic imparts a “visual injustice” to the 
world at large (Przybylo & Rodrigues, 2018, p. 3).  
 
These ideas provide evidence that we mean more when we use the term ugliness. The point is that 
we rely on the concept of ugliness. It contains some meaningful description of the world, or of our 
experience of the world, that we wish to share because we intuit it has collective understanding.25 
It is just not the same as the un-beautiful, in the same way that white cannot be captured in non-
blackness. The reason is that ugliness points to an independent quality in the world and does not 
only note the absence of beauty. In her work on ugliness in nature, Brady (2010) restates this point, 
“… it can be maintained that ugliness exists independently of other kinds of aesthetic value and 
disvalue. This needs teasing out.” (pp. 32-33). After archiving the history of the concept of 
ugliness, Wilson (1942) also concludes that there is a “need for including the problem as a positive 
part of aesthetic theory rather than treating it negatively, or not at all, as the case has been so often” 
(p. ii).26  
 
 
25 This assertion is inspired by Wittgenstein’s “private language argument” in his Philosophical Investigations 
(2009), in which he tackled the dominant idea of the “privacy” and unverifiability of the phenomenological (as is 
discussed below in the section on ontology) (pp. 181-265). Hacker (2005), explains that Wittgenstein argued that 
“language is misrepresented as a vehicle for the communication of language-independent thoughts. Speaking is not a 
matter of translating wordless thoughts into language, and understanding is not a matter of interpreting – 
transforming dead signs into living thoughts. The limits of thought are determined by the limits of the expression of 
thoughts .… A dog can want a bone, but only a language user can now want something next week.” (Hacker, 2005, 
p. 962). This independent word indicates the presence of an unearthed concept we need for use in the world; a 
concept which may have been cultivated by that outside world itself as in the aesthetically ugly. 
26 Wilson’s (1942) conclusion holds weight because of his extensive and comprehensive chronological analysis of 
ugliness, from for example, Socrates to Plato (pp. 1-6), Aristotle (pp. 6-8), Plutarch (pp. 9-11), Plotinus (pp. 11-13), 
Augustine (pp. 14-19), Burke (pp. 19-21), Kant (pp. 24-29), Schiller (pp. 26-29), Schelling (pp. 29-34), Hegel and 
Schopenhauer (pp. 34-35), Schlegel (p. 35), Rosenkranz (pp. 42-48), Nietzsche (pp. 48-51), Bozenquat, Dewey (pp. 
56-58), Santayana (p. 64) Whitehead (pp. 64-66) and Croce (p. 66), to contemporary theorists such as Dewitt Parker 
(pp. 71-73).  
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These loopholes in the evaluative account propel an investigation of this independent ‘quality’ of 
ugliness: this is the type of ugliness that is found in Witkin’s works and those he references. These 
conceptual snags validate that we need to develop an additional meaning that rests upon the 
alternative meaning of the aesthetic itself formulated by this thesis as “that which is perceived-
felt”. This definition relies on the insight that, apart from their verdictive function, aesthetic terms 
can also operate in the realm of “substantive aesthetics”, where they are names for varieties of 
aesthetic qualities. In “substantive aesthetics”, ‘aesthetic’ is a noun, that can be qualified by an 
adjective describing any type of aesthetic quality, for example, a kitsch aesthetic or a delicate 
aesthetic. In other words, beauty is but one – out of a manifold of – ways of being aesthetic (the 
‘beautiful’ aesthetic). The “ugly aesthetic” operates within this field of meaning. Such properties 
are “thick” and complex, such that they cannot be facilely cast as opposites (Lopes, 2008, p. 129).27 
 
However, we need not close off the prospect of aesthetic evaluation altogether. The beautiful/ugly 
aesthetic can act as the basis for determining whether these substantive qualities are aesthetically 
beautiful/good or aesthetically ugly/bad.  This potential interaction may forge an intriguing relation 
between substantive and evaluative meanings. Beardsley (1982) argues that an aesthetic quality is 
“one that can be independently cited as a ground of aesthetic value” (as cited in Budd, 2008, p. 
18). In fact, Witkin’s presentation of ugliness (an intersex dwarf, a dissected dead dog or obese 
beheaded prisoner) as a site or entry point into experiences/feature(s) of the God, mean that 
photographs ‘rear’ us to value these experiences for this ‘secondary’ or ‘mediating’ mystical 
reason.28 This sharpening of the meaning and revaluation of aesthetic terms throws into question 
our assumptions about beauty’s inherent/taken-for-granted goodness. In his 
 
27 For more debates regarding “aesthetic pluralism” see Lopes, 2008, p. 129). Lopes argues that Zangwill and 
Levinson believe that aesthetic concepts do not have to have an evaluative component, whereas Bonzon (2009, 
following Williams, 1985) argues that that aesthetic properties cannot pick out the “thick” non-evaluative features 
without making the evaluation. However, all “thick” concepts do have non-evaluative features, which means they 
are not perfect opposites. 
28 An intersex dwarf can be found in Portrait of a Dwarf (2006); a dissected, dead dog in The Result of War: 
Cornucopian Dog, New Mexico (1984), and the obese decapitated woman in The Capitulation of France, New 
Mexico (1982). For Zangwill (2001), within the aesthetic, verdictive properties depend on substantive properties in a 
relation of “determination” or “dependence” (p. 19). Further, if substantive aesthetic terms are also to have value 
judgements built into them, then the outlined substantive quality must provide what he calls a “reasonable 
justification” for that particular ascription of aesthetic value (Zangwill, 2001, p. 19). Zangwill criticises Beardsley 
for not differentiating between determining and reason-giving relation in his notion of “dependence”. (pp. 21-37) 
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survey, Beauty (2009), Scruton explains that beauty is valued for its own sake (p. 2).29 Danto 
(2003) concurs that “[b]eauty is but one of an immense range of aesthetic qualities, and 
philosophical aesthetics has been paralyzed by focusing as narrowly on beauty as it has. But beauty 
is the only one of the aesthetics qualities that is also a value, like truth and goodness” (p. 15). There 
is certainly a suspicion that there is some basis upon which beauty and ugliness have come to be 
conflated with goodness and badness respectively. Is the history of art’s spiritual deflation of 
ugliness cause for suspicion? 
 
The Ontology of Substantive Aesthetic Properties: The “Ugly Aesthetic” as a Perceptive-
Felt Experience 
 
In order to describe and identify this “ugly aesthetic”, we have to define the realm of the 
substantive aesthetic in general. A definition of an aesthetic property provides the basis for a 
description of the character of the ugliness, for it is one variation of the aesthetic. In philosophical 
terms, this is the question an aesthetic property’s ‘ontology’ or the nature of its existence. This is 
a fraught metaphysical/epistemological issue. Ugliness needs to be the sort of thing that we can 
commonly witness, and we need to evidence its existence in Witkin’s work if this thesis is to make 
a convincing and appealing case for his treatment of it. To reiterate, the point of this chapter is to 
provide objective methods by which we can identify ugliness in the artworks that follow. 
Differentiating the descriptive use of ugliness from the verdictive use of it, means that such 
processes need not specify ways in which to come to agree on aesthetic badness, but must instead 
propose a method by which we can verify this quality as being in the object. The problem is that 
the intrinsically experiential nature of aesthetic properties poses a threat to achieving the third-
person verifiability of a meaningful aesthetic study of artworks. Ideally, as Kant has yearned for, 
we would want to have a way on agreeing that Witkin’s dwarf, dog or foetus are ugly, in the same 
way we have a way to agree on temperature through a Celsius reading on a thermometer. 
 
 
29 Scruton (2011) also refers to Beauty’s inherent sanctity: “To speak of beauty is to enter another and more exalted 
realm – a realm sufficiently apart from our everyday concerns as to be mentioned only with a certain hesitation. 
People who are always in praise and pursuit of the beautiful are an embarrassment, like people who make a constant 
display of their religious faith. Somehow, we feel such things should be kept for our exalted moments, and not 
paraded in company, or allowed to spill out over dinner” (p. 11). 
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Scruton (2004c) insists that aesthetics is an interest in the phenomenal world: the “element of 
experiences seems to be essential” (p. 444).30 This ‘what-it-is-likeness’ or ‘qualia’ of experience 
is sensed with immediacy by the subject in relation to an object: 
 
People have to see the grace and unity of a work, hear the plaintiveness or frenzy of the 
music, notice the gaudiness of a colour scheme, feel the power of a novel, its mood, its uncertainty 
of tone .… Merely to learn from others, on good authority, that the music is serene, the play moving, 
or the picture unbalanced, is of little aesthetic value; the crucial thing is to see, hear or feel (Sibley, 
1965, p. 137)31  
 
If the existence of ugliness is determined simply by the subject’s having an experience of it, then 
this means that the truth of this experience is “immune to doubt”: we know and are always right 
about having an ugly experience if we think we are. This is true in the same way that “if I think I 
am in pain, I know it.” (Scruton, 2004b, p. 43).32 So, this ‘incorrigibility’ of the ontologically 
subjective poses a problem in developing epistemological objectivity or a universal method by 
which to identify ugliness in the chosen artworks. If aesthetic experience is private and ineffable, 
then the outside observer cannot verify it – only surmise through observing behaviour. Here, 
describing something as ugly is a statement that is as personal and intimate as communication of 
sadness. For this reason, epistemic subjectivism is often coupled with ‘relativism’ in aesthetics 
(Cousins, 1994, p. 62). This folk aesthetic or philosophically ‘naïve’, colloquial ‘beauty-is-in-the-
 
30 Scruton (2004c) goes on to write: “You respond to the look of the landscape, the sound of the birdsong, and the 
feel of the wind against your face. The term ‘aesthetic’ derives from the Greek word for ‘perception” (p. 444).  
31 A “qualia” is, for example, the way sugar tastes or the way vermillion looks, the very ‘strawberiness’ of the smell 
of a strawberry or the ‘sandpaperiness’ that is the essence of the tactile feel of sandpaper. More a more extensive 
discussion, see Tye (2018). It is important to recognize that this “perceptual” definition of the aesthetic given in this 
thesis is not water-tight or all-encompassing. As mentioned in relation to the “anaesthetic”, Shelley (2003) has 
provided an objection to the solely perceptual nature of the aesthetic here by suggesting that thoughts can act as the 
basis of an aesthetic experience. Caroll (2004) has also provided an objection to this “direct” perception by arguing 
that aesthetic properties of, for example, John Cage’s silent three-movement, 4’33, can be grasped on the basis of 
reliable description. The fact that the perceptual is phenomenological and can only be grasped based on first-hand 
experience, means that the aesthetic cannot be reduced to the phenomenological, but may include the cognitive. 
(Carroll, 2004, pp. 416-417, as cited in Gero, 2006, p. 9). 
32 Shelley (2017) describes the “immediacy principle” as a reaction to the eighteenth-century approaches. He cites an 
early expression of the thesis, from Jean-Baptiste Dubos’s Critical Reflections on Poetry, Painting, and Music (1748): 
“People taste the ragoo, and tho’ unacquainted with those rules, they are able to tell…” (as cited in Shelley, 2017, 
para. 5) and Kant’s  Critique of the Power of Judgment (2000): “I will stop my ears, listen to no reasons and arguments, 
and would rather believe that those rules of the critics are false … than allow that my judgment should be determined 
by means of a priori grounds of proof, since it is supposed to be a judgment of taste and not of the understanding of 
reason.” (Kant, 2000 as cited in Shelley, 2017, para. 8). 
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eye-of-the-beholder’ myth is based on the idea that my experience of an ugly object is that which 
makes the ugliness exist.33 What this means is that the statement, “The amputated arm in Witkin’s 
Anna Akmatova  is ugly” can only be made true for me while it is false for you. All in all, this 
situation would render the study of ugliness in this thesis as solipsistic.34 In other words, it would 
seem redundant to write about one’s experience of ugliness in these works of art, if this is simply 
an expression of my personal experience that may not be apprehended by others. 
 
One tactic that has been used in order to try and create more objective, verifiable criteria for 
aesthetic properties (so that these experiences and descriptions are relevant to a third-person 
audience) is to negate our experience and to re-establish the identity of aesthetic qualities to be 
found in some formula in the object. This would achieve epistemological objectivism. The 
physicalist philosopher Putnam (1973), attempts to reduce the identity of water to its molecular 
structure of H2O for the purposes of identification, as opposed to relying on our unreliable 
experience of it as translucent or drinkable. In the same way, aesthetic objectivism would seek 
some physical shared objective feature. Perhaps this might be a configuration of lines or proportion 
present in Witkin’s dwarf, dog or foetus – that makes those things ugly irrespective of whether we 
feel it as ugly.35 The truth resides in these verifiable facts in the same way that an apple’s being 
red might be based on a certain presence of pigment.36 We can thus link it to “aesthetic realism”, 
which posits that aesthetic qualities exist out there in the world as mass does. They have nothing 
 
33 Although this is usually used in relation to verdictive aesthetic properties (as mentioned above in relation to Kant), 
it also applies to the subjective ontology and therefore subjective epistemology of substantive ones. 
34Perhaps it could be said that more than one may find beauty in the same place. In other words, relativism (the 
notion of beauty being “in the eye of the beholder”) does not preclude the possibility of consensus or agreement of 
beholders. 
35 These ‘outside’, mind-independent properties are Locke’s “primary properties”—they are part of the thing itself 
and can be determined with certainty. 
36 This idea is based on Jackson’s thought experiment What Mary Didn’t Know (1986) about the super-scientist 
Mary, who has studied everything there is to know about red, and yet has never seen it, and hence, can be said to not 
comprehend its experiential essence. Kripke and Putnam are two theorists that form part of the physicalist project to 
classify physical things: to “carve nature at the joints” (Plato, Phaedrus, 265e), and to promote a ‘semantic 
externalism’ in which meaning is determined by variables outside of the speaker. For Kripke (2013), the experience 
we have of gold – its metallic, yellow colour and malleability – do not tell us whether the substance is true or fool’s 
gold. These “accidental properties” may sometimes offer a kind of heuristic, but the proof of identity of the object 
lies in whether it can be identified as being atomic number 79 on the periodic table of elements, and this is its “real 
essence” (pp. 44-45). Putnam (1973) makes the differentiation between the ‘phenomenal’ and ‘actual’ concept 
through his Twin Earth thought experiment, where he emphasises the true identity of water as being H2O. 
31 
 
to do with psychology and are not mind-dependent projections (Zemach, 1997).37 Examples of 
aesthetic objectivism can be found throughout history, for example, when beauty is reduced to 
principles of proportion, harmony and symmetry, in the Pre-Socratic Ancient Greek philosophers 
such Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes. These figures thought of the relationship between 
form and beauty (Eco, 2010, p. 61).38 
 
However, why would the ugliness of an object matter to us in the first place if it were not an 
experience? We really need the word ugliness to express something about our experience, as 
opposed to sharing a fact about the object. Any ‘aesthetic DNA test’ is rendered futile: we only 
want to know if the amputated arm has the ingredients for ugliness because of its power to affect 
us experientially. Moreover, there cannot be any definitive law-like relation of physical properties 
in an object and an aesthetic quality – particularly ugliness. As of yet, there have only been 
attempts to find a recipe for beauty – this resurrects Lorand’s (1994) concerns that any object that 
does not strictly conform with these criteria is rendered as first as a form of  non-beauty – and on 
some accounts, as consequently ugly (even though there are many aesthetic qualities that diverge 
from the beautiful) (p. 4).39 This re-enthrones beauty as the sole and ultimate type of aesthetic 
experience.40 
 
37 Zemach (1997) presents two arguments for aesthetic realism. Firstly, he refers to common core understandings of 
shared applications of the term beauty. Secondly, he notes the way in which science itself (premised on realism) 
employs aesthetic qualities of theoretical success, for example, simplicity or elegance. 
38 Mathematical consideration occurs in Plato’s dialogue of the Timeus (53d-54b) of 360 BC: “Now of the two 
triangles, the isosceles has one form only; the scale or the unequal sided has an infinite number”. It is continued in 
such texts as Euclid’s Elements, in such works of architecture as the Parthenon, and, again, by the Canon of the 
sculptor Polykleitos (5 BCE). The physician Galen characterises the proportions of beauty as “the finger to the 
finger, and of all the fingers to the metacarpus, and the wrist, and of all these to the forearm, and of the forearm to 
the arm, in fact of everything to everything” (Galen, n.d. as cited in Pollitt, 1974, p.15). The most familiar 
proportion in art and architecture is the Golden Section, the “section aurea” of the Romans, as a line divided up in 
such a way that, at least according to Euclid, the area contained by the smaller section and whole, equals that of the 
square of the larger section (Eco, 2007, p. 66-67). More recently, Le Corbusier developed a system of proportions 
based on the human body in his Modular (1951), closely related to the Fibonacci sequence. 
39 Lorand (1994) mentions the instances of the meaningless, boring, kitsch and insignificant as qualities that are non-
beautiful and also non-ugly. 
40 It must be acknowledged that besides for polarised categories of beauty and ugliness (non-beautiful), the 
‘sublime’ features as a predominant aesthetic category. There is a question to be asked as to whether the ‘sublime’ 
acts as third category, or whether (following Zangwill’s (2001) idea that all substantive aesthetic terms can be 
marshalled as either a species of the beautiful or ugly) it can be designated as a sub-type of the beautiful or ugly. 
Rooted in the experience of awe, which involves a two-toned experience of both pleasure and fear, the sublime 
presents a fascinating case or counterexample to Zangwill’s idea. This thesis sets this problem aside for future in-
depth consideration within a long history of discussions on the sublime. See Clewis (2018) and Ashfield and de 




Ontological relativism poses another threat to objectivism. Pop (2014) argues that the same 
features of a thing may be deemed both beautiful and ugly. 41  This duality is because our aesthetic 
experience depends on how we typologically classify those objects.42 The particular arm placed 
by Witkin in Anna Akhmatova (Witkin, 1998) may be ugly as an arm. However, whether it is an 
ugly amputated arm, human body part, living thing or thing in general, are, as Pop (2014) writes 
“further questions that need not yield affirmative answers” (p. 172).43 This leads on to the more 
extreme problem of “particularism”: it is impossible to find universal principles that (exhaustively) 
“link non-aesthetic properties to aesthetic ones in such a way that it is possible to infer from the 
presence of (a set of) non-aesthetic properties that there will be (a set of) aesthetic properties.” 
(Schellekens, 2008, p. 161).44 This is because concrete things ‘wear’ ugliness differently, so that 
rules are impossible: “the ugliness of this particular arm in Anna Akhmatova” (called UA1) (Fig. 
1) is a different variation of aesthetic property to “the ugliness of the right arm of the dog in The 
Result of War: The Cornucopian Dog” (UA2)  (Witkin, 1984) (Figure 2.). The dramatic tonality 
that renders harmoniousness in one of Joel-Peter Witkin’s photographs, may generate chaos in 
another.45  
 
41 The specificity of the general identity of the object in determining the aesthetic quality of an object is taken into 
account in the perceptual part of the perceptual-felt equation. 
42 In Plato’s Hippias Major (±390 BC), when his interlocutor, Socrates writes: “Heraclitus was right when he said that 
the most beautiful ape will be ugly when compared to human beings – and as the wise Hippias says, the most beautiful 
cooking pot will be ugly when compared with young maidens” (Plato, 1982 as cited in Pop, 2014, p. 171). 
43 Pop (2014) gives his own example: “A particular turbot I bought this morning may be beautiful as a turbot, but 
whether it is a beautiful fish, animal, living thing or thing in general are further questions that need not yield 
affirmative answers.” (p. 176). One potential objection that Pop gives to this point is that that ‘x’ may be beautiful or 
ugly as an object. As Pop writes: “For, in asserting the turbot’s participation in Beauty, we are saying it is beautiful 
“on the whole”, “in general”, “in comparison for a great many things” (p. 176). 
44 The debate between aesthetic generalists and particularists is indeed robust and unremitting. See Shelley (2017) for 
a comprehensive summary of the contributions (para. 32). 
45 Hume’s (2006) separate special “taste organ” that detects aesthetic qualities (although for him this may simply refer 
to beauty), which is separate from sensory organs although both “pick” up their various qualities immediately. Humans 
have an almost “magical ability” to feel aesthetic “energies” without having to know formula, formula which that do  








Figure 1. Witkin, Anna Akhmatova, 1998 (Chavez, 2012, para. 20) 
Figure 2. Witkin, The Result of War: The Cornucopian Dog, 1984                  




If the experiential account makes the existence of ugliness unverifiable, and the natural solution 
of objectivism is unfeasible and unsatisfying, then in what can we identify ugliness in the artworks 
that follow? Before we can answer this, we need to acknowledge that aesthetic properties are 
experiences that do depend on physical characteristics in some way, but also to recognise that no 
rule specifies how. Therefore, the notion “ugly aesthetic” as used in this thesis, takes on the idea 
that aesthetic properties supervene on sensory and physical properties. However, they are not 
equivalent or reducible to them. This form of relation between sets of properties is popular in 
contemporary philosophical literature, for example, in the work of Levinson (1999) as well as 
Pettit (1987) and Zangwill (2001; 2004). Instead, they postulate that some aesthetic 
property depends for its existence on some (set of) non-aesthetic propert(ies): 
 
A fundamental principle is that aesthetic properties are determined by, or are dependent on, non-
aesthetic properties. Things come to have aesthetic properties because of or in virtue of their non-
aesthetic properties. For example, a performance of a piece of music is delicate because of a certain 
arrangement of sounds, and an abstract painting is brash or beautiful because of a certain spatial 
arrangement of colours (Zangwill, 2003, para. 2, original italics).46  
 
The presence of an aesthetic property is something that humans can intuit within, or amongst the 
interactions of other features in an object: it depends on and emanates from this ‘base’ but 
transcends it, and therefore cannot be explained away by it. This thesis argues that irreducibility to 
the physical is what gives the aesthetic the mystical potential described by Gellman (2017). Gracyk 
(2012)  points out that an aesthetic experience depends on the “presence of ordinary perceptible 
properties, such as colours, sounds and textures”, which we can see as the lower-level properties 
from which the aesthetic properties emerge (termed the “perceptive” below) (p. 126). Further, 
those perceptible properties depend on even lower-level properties, such as the primary (physical) 
properties of the object, or chemical properties, for example, the chemical structure of the paint 
gives rise to the colour of the painting. 
 
 
46 An aesthetic property is something that we sense as ‘living’ in an object. Even in sentences such as ‘there is such 
ugliness’, or ‘there are so many uglinesses’, there is always an implicit thing we seem to be referring to that is 
‘possessed by’ ugliness. Ugliness needs to live in an ‘object’, to express itself through the object, in order to exist at 
all, because, according to the supervenience equation, it depends on the “primary properties” of the object. 
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Besides honouring this so-called “explanatory gap” (Levine, 1983), supervenience also maintains 
that aesthetic properties must be intrinsically experiential because they depend on experiential 
sensory properties for their existence but bear something ‘extra’. This added element marks the 
aesthetic as different from and of a higher order than the sensory. The phenomenological essence 
of the aesthetic means that all aesthetic experiences are psycho-spiritual and potentially mystical, 
for they cannot be reduced to physical occurrences.47 It further suggests that a description of an 
aesthetic property must attend a description of the experience of the perceptual (experience of 
lower-level supervenience base) and felt (the ‘extra’ aesthetic element that emerges from this 
experience) – this is the ontology of a substantive aesthetic property. As the American historian 
Carmichael (1972) puts it, “It might be thought that a mark of aesthetic acumen is to see feelingly” 
(p. 496).48 What differentiates the ‘delicate’ object from the ‘dreary’ one; in other words, what 
informs the system of aesthetic categorisation, are the differences in these deeper psychic 
configurations. Each aesthetic quality may consist of its own range of emotions or haptic 
sensations; those come together and co-emerge to make unique aesthetic experiences to which we 
give distinct names (of the ‘delicate’, ‘dreary’, ‘elegant’ or ‘cumbersome’).  
 
Where do such insights lead us is in our attempt to commonly find ugliness in Witkin’s works and 
those that he references? In order to honour its experiential essence and the supervenience relation, 
this thesis does not purport to provide a watertight formula for the certification of ugliness in parts 
of the artworks that follow. 49 More humbly, it attempts to refine the phenomenological description: 
 
47 This term is introduced by Levine to refer to the challenge that physicalist theories have in explaining how 
physical properties give rise to the way things feel or are experienced. This is also relevant to the aesthetic, for the 
aesthetic is a form of extra-sensory experience of an object that cannot be explained by, made equivalent to, or 
reduced to a specific set of physical criteria in an object. 
48 There is concern about the predominance of the visual in aesthetics. Diaconu (2006), for example, interrogates the 
difficulties of developing an aesthetic of touch, smell and taste. Barwich (2015; 2016) argues that modern neuroscience 
has uncovered that olfaction is not unsophisticated and “affective”, but that flavour and fragrance assessment require 
discernment and refinement. Such arguments demand that the ugly aesthetic be felicitous to the ugly smell, touch, 
sound, and taste. 
49 Here, following Zemach (1997) and Schellekens (2008), we learn how to apply aesthetic terms through a process 
of ostension after encountering paradigmatic instances. However, whereas Zemach uses this shared application of 
aesthetic terms as evidence for realism – there is a common apprehension of something existing, which is the basis 
upon which critics can disagree – it can also be said that what we are describing is a commonly understood experience 
of an object, so that once we know of a dozen or so of cases of seventeenth-century Flemish paintings generally 
considered to be particularly well-balanced and unified, it might enable us to assess which other such paintings can 
rightly be described as well-balanced and unified too (p. 133). Schellekens (2008) writes about the way in which art, 
and the accompanying criticism, facilitate the acquisition of aesthetic concepts through a process of “ostention” (p. 
132). Here, with time, we might acquire some ideas about which items are considered paradigmatic as helpful guides 
in our concept-applications. 
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it focuses on collating reports on what it is like to experience an object as ugly when one feels it 
does.50  
 
The “perceptive” part of this aesthetic equation includes a description of the encounter with the 
supervenience base of the aesthetic: one of the sensory qualities (which may include olfactory, 
auditory, gustatory or somatosensory impressions) of the object (that themselves depend on 
primary qualities that are given to us only in the experience of the object) and the conceptual 
classification of the object into a ‘type’. Empirical psychologists include two components: 
grouping the object (sensory) and recognising or identifying it (conceptual) (Weiten, 2007). 
Grouping the object requires assimilating or ‘binding’ sensory units into a unified object. This 
implies that aesthetic experience is always of an object, unlike, for example, the experience of 
pain. 
 
The “cognitive” part of the equation, on the other hand, requires the ability to  recognise the 
object as a member of a certain class: differentiating Witkin’s dog’s vegetative contents from 
an intestinal tract, or an amputated arm from a bunch of grapes, which follows insights of 
“ontological relativism”.  Following Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1990), this is 
what the British art philosopher Wollheim (2015) called the process of “seeing as”: part of 
perceiving is identifying something as a certain kind of thing (p. 140). We can reason that since 
typological classifications of objects are a primary part of the aesthetic process, aesthetic 
experiences must be intimately linked to the philosophical area of ‘ontology’– questions about the 
nature of objects and their essence. The cognitive dimension differentiates from the purely sensory 
experience, and the inclusion of the sensory-perceptive dimension differentiates it from being a 
mere “feeling”: emotional descriptions or adjectives for tone that we extend to aesthetic objects, 
such as, for example, ‘horrific’ or ‘melancholic’, as to Witkin’s work. It may also protect the 
aesthetic from the allegations of aesthetic emotivist theories, in which aesthetic terms, such as the 
 
50 The description of an experience of an object acknowledges the way in which, in aesthetics, the “reality of inner 
and outer life is criss-crossed by processes of projection and introjection” (Maclagan, 2005, p. 40). Maclagan (2005) 
attempts to make a case for the false dichotomy of inner and outer lives. He quotes Merleau Ponty “… [t]here is a 
fundamental narcissism to all vision. … He experiences the vision he exercises as coming from the side of things [and 
yet] I feel myself looked at by things … one no longer knows who is seeing and who is seen.” (Merleau Ponty, 1964, 
p. 183 as cited in Maclagan, 2005, p. 38). 
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‘beautiful’ and the ‘ugly’, are used as an expression of polarised feelings, namely pleasure and 
pain respectively.51  
 
The “felt” part of the equation is the dimension bracketed-off in the aesthetic experience that 
differentiates it from the purely perceptual. It is named the “felt” not in a general phenomenological 
sense. As Maclagan (2005) notes, the word ‘feeling’ may create ambiguity because it refers to both 
“sensation or exploration, as well as to emotion as one possible result of such processes.52 We do 
not always know what comes first, the perception, or sensation, or the emotional response” (p. 12). 
As Maclagan puts it, we can distinguish the felt more generally, through the understanding that it 
involves other psychological responses that inform how we are moved or swayed by the perception 
object in aesthetic experience. It is a feeling that somehow emerges for us from/within/amongst 
the so-called “supervening” perceptual properties. It contains the elements of the extra-sensory, 
and it is this mental/spiritual quality that often renders the aesthetic as mystical or psycho-spiritual 
at large. Some of these qualities may even be mystical experiences of God. They are: 
 
… a somewhat different range of experience from the traditional psychology of perception… [they 
are] the complex and shifting array of sensations, feelings, fantasies, thoughts and other less 
easily categorizable events of mental life that accompany all perceptions, whether we are aware of 
 
51 Here, not only are pleasure and pain artificially polarised, but the realm of the aesthetic is rendered as hedonic. For 
aesthetic feelings are complex webs: in the case of beauty, for example, the psychoanalyst, Hagman (2005), suggests 
that there may be awe, terror and even envy; in the case of ugliness, horror and perverse attraction. They also seem 
different to emotional descriptions we extend to objects, such as, for example, ‘joyful’ or ‘melancholic’ in a Bach 
fugue or a painting by Mondrian. The American perceptual theorist Arheim (2004) examines this question about 
expression in his Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye (2004, p. 447). According to Arnheim, 
these are ascribed not through a feeling in the subject, but through an analogy between the perceived features or 
“pattern of stimulus” of the object and the physiognomic features displayed by humans when in those mental states. 
For example, the pace, volume and pitch of joyful music would be higher than in melancholic music.  This emotivist 
theory seems to be the basis for Carmichael’s (1972) remark that, “[t]here is a psychic tympanum on which the ugly 
and the immoral both strike, each resounding through the other. To us they are distinguishable through the 
discriminative virtue of this tympanum, and not only they but also the fitting and unfitting, the worthy and unworthy, 
the positive and negative in everything, according to the perceptive capacity of this organ. There is a superfine pitch 
where the ugly and the immoral are scarcely distinguishable. Both are repugnancies, differing only in degree or 
complexity. A false musical note and a false witness, for example, would be so many degrees, respectively, of 
repugnancy; a wanton act and a grotesque facade, a sordid character and a desolate scene, an incongruous, confused 
deposition and a jumbled, planless household would all be commensurable. Everything would resolve into unalloyed 
repugnancy” (p. 496). 
52 Indeed, I.A. Richards (2004) expresses this well in his theory that aesthetic terms are “projectile adjectives” that 
“incite such and such feelings”. In the case of ‘gorgeous’ for example, “the descriptions of the feelings would have to 
be long and include mention of a tendency to contempt, grudging admiration, and a certain richness and fullness and 
perhaps satiation.” (Richards, 2004, “Sense and Feeling”, para. 8.) 
38 
 
them or not. This is something called the ‘psychological lining of experience’ (MacLagan, 2005, 
p.7). 
 
Maclagan (2005) emphasises that the two domains of perceptual and felt are not mutually 
exclusive. The phenomenological nature of the explanation of the ugly aesthetic means that a 
description of the perceptual is a description of the feeling of/in perceiving ugliness. Aesthetic 
experiences are complex webs of psychological phenomena, which makes them difficult to cast as 
pure opposites. This theory also allows for varying intensity: the more potent the experience, the 
more the experience is of an ugly object.53 
 
Where do these perceptive-felt qualities of ugly objects further direct us in our attempt to identify 
ugliness in the mystical conversation of the artworks that follow? The insights above mean that if 
the ugly aesthetic is a configuration of particular perceptive and felt qualities, then a description 
of these qualities will require psychological research, and not philosophical a priori “armchair” 
analysis (Schellekens, 2008, p.47).54 The architectural theorist, Cousins’ psychoanalytic theory 
insists that “[i]f ugliness is to become an object of inquiry, this inquiry will have to be conducted 
outside the scope of [philosophical] aesthetics” (Cousins, 1994, p. 62).55 It is also what Maclagan 
(2005) calls “psychological aesthetics” (p. 7). In the chapter that follows, we shall, therefore, 
assemble literary textual reports on this perceptive and felt nature of encounters.  Following the 
supervenience principle, events or phenomenon that may enable the perceptive occurrence 
characteristic of ugliness can act as a heuristic for ugly objects in the artworks. While there are no 
objective signs in the object for ugly feelings, the representational reality of artworks (in which 
subject is conveyed through formal elements) can ‘express’ ugly feelings through a formal 
language. By deepening these descriptions with a more developed theory of the psychoanalytic 
 
53 See problem of “callilogical neutrality” above.  
54 In her doctoral thesis, A Reasonable Objectivism for Aesthetic Judgement (2008), Schellekens puts forward a case 
for the collaboration of philosophy and psychology in aesthetic judgement. For her, research into psychological 
processes informing judgements can help to achieve greater objectivity. She explains the role of psychology as 
follows: “(i) the psychological assumptions connected with aesthetic practice (both descriptive and prescriptive); (ii) 
the psychological foundations of particular aesthetic evaluations; and (iii) issues about abilities and dispositions 
involved in the making of aesthetic judgements. Central to the idea of aesthetic psychology is, then, the concern of 
how the mind works in an aesthetic context” (p. 47). 
55 Sibley and Schaper (1966) write that “aestheticians encounter ranges of concepts wider than and inevitably 




pre-symbolic, we can give such an experience a ‘place’ in our psyche; a place that manifests in the 








































UGLY OBJECTS AND UGLY PLACE, UGLY FEELINGS: CRITERIA FOR THE 
IDENTIFICATION OF THREE TYPES OF UGLINESS IN WITKIN’S UGLY-MYSTICAL 
CONVERSATION 
 
“… [T]here are no truly beautiful surfaces without dreadful depths” (Nietzsche as cited in Read, 1965, p. 
51). 
 
This chapter follows the protocol outlined in the previous chapter in order to provide ways in which 
we can apprehend three necessary types of ugliness. The thesis derives these frameworks from a 
weaving of theory that must be explained and outlined before it can be applied to a complex art 
historical analysis of ugliness in mysticism in the artworks that follow. These include 
representations of ugly objects in all the artworks analysed, the “ugly place” inserted by Witkin in 
his remakes of Renaissance mystical worlds, and the expressive elements of ugly feeling 
substituted for the other kinds of mystical feeling in the Baroque. Descriptions of the experience 
of ugliness are referenced from sparse literary sources that engage theoretically with, or report on, 
ugliness, for no empirical studies exist.56 These accounts include a series of lectures 
by Cousins (1994, 1995) that have been well-cited and widely applied; the theoretical insights 
provided by literary scholar, Hepburn, in his study of ugliness in Pascali’s Island in his Enchanted 
Objects (2010); the Slovenian philosopher and cultural theorist Žižek’s references to ugliness in 
his The Abyss of Freedom/Ages of the World (1997); the late literary scholar, Adam’s, thoughts in 
his paper Ideas of  Ugly (1974), as well as those of the historian, Carmichael, in his The Sense of 
Ugliness (1972). Such accounts are primarily “perceptive” and, in order to provide the substance 
necessary for the other two types of ugliness, the chapter draws on three accounts/concepts of the 
psychoanalytic pre-symbolic. Thus, Melanie Klein’s “paranoid-schizoid position”, Jacques 
Lacan’s “Real” and “hommelette” and Julia Kristeva’s “chôra” and “abject” – are integrated as 
secondary-level sources. The overlap in descriptions with ugliness provides substantiation for the 
argument that distinct experiential features of ugliness coalesce as they do because they are 
 
56 There have, in contrast, been neuroscientific studies that examine the parts of the brain active in ugly (non-
beautiful) experiences, in a field called “neuroaesthetics”. See Kandel (2012). In Kawabata and Zeki (2004), the 
authors present research that suggests the medio-orbital frontal cortex lights up in experiences of beauty, and the 
motor cortex fires in experiences of ugliness. The amygdala is activated in both. 
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remnants of this entire mode of early relational consciousness (or the unconscious) between infant 
and (m)other.57 
Indeed, based on his understanding of ugliness, Witkin does not pronounce or understand his 
spirituality as one of the ‘ugly’. However, he refers to the ugly mysticism (defined in this thesis) 
indirectly, by describing the sanctity of his artworks as residing in the making visible of the 
“invisible” (Witkin, 1985, p. 84), the objectification of the “unfathomable” (Witkin, 1985, p. 85), 
the grappling with the “hidden” (Celant, 1995, p. 51). This chapter attempts to reveal that such 
descriptions target the core of the ugly experience. Here, the essence of the encounter of the ugly 
object is captured in the re-emergent description of the perceptual (and consequent conceptual) 
experience of having a knowable identity of a thing punctured by an underlying sense of its (or 
any object’s) mysteriousness. Like the sub-sensory experience of seeing the truth of the objects of 
this Rabbi and desk, it is an experience that is free from censoring or obfuscating prototypes of 
objects, such as ‘rabbi-hood’ or ‘deskhood’. Hepburn establishes this point in his core description 
of ugliness as an encounter with the “shattering of a phantasy of what makes up the object” 
(Hepburn, 2010, p. 219). This idea is also expressed through descriptions of the subversion of 
“interiority” and “exteriority” in the sight of the object (Cousins, 1995), of formless substance 
leaking out of its containing form, of ontological goo rupturing through a representational shell, 
of oozing wound in mask (Cousins, 1994). As Žižek (1997) writes: “the shock of ugliness occurs 
when the surface is usually cut, opened up to reveal direct insight into the actual depths of the 
object” (p. 22). For these reasons, this thesis defines ugliness as: less of the kind of thing it needs 
to be in order to be a kind of thing, and therefore anything at all. 
 
 
57 It synthesises some of these descriptions, with an awareness of Maclagan’s (2005) warning to avoid “pinning down” 
or “doing violence to” the ultimately intrinsic ineffability of their words, particularly because they are “affects” or 
non- or pre-verbal energies with a particular “feeling tone” (p. 13). The descriptive strategy used in this thesis is 
inspired by “functionalists” in the philosophy of mind. Here, ugliness will be “distinguished from other mental states 
by the network of causal relations in which they are situated … by its causes (this includes a perceptual experience of 
the object itself), its effects and relations to other mental states [some of which are phenomenal themselves and can 
be unpacked in the same fashion]. Change in any single element in the network and the character of the mental state 
changes too” (Buechner, 2008, p. 6-7).  
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Cousins explains this sub-sensory experience as an inversion of the interiority and exteriority of 
the object. 58 59 His theory is put forward as follows: 
 
If we grant that an object exists twice – firstly as a representation of itself, and secondly as its 
existence – then the outside of a thing (representation) must enclose the inside of a thing (existence). 
This proportionality [implied by Classical notions of beauty], in which the exterior ‘overcoats’ the 
interior, in which the object as representation contains the object as existence, has the necessary 
consequence of changing the nature of the distinction between interior and exterior (1995, p. 3). 
 
In the immediate discussion, Cousins insists that, for humans, this ‘existence’ is always presented 
to perception in an ‘exterior’ physical form, that not only ‘encloses’ or ‘packages’ this ‘essence’ 
beneath, but ‘represents’ that essence to the mind for conceptual ‘knowing’– the recognition of the 
object in the perceptual process that is the basis with which we classify it within the boundaries of 
concepts. These concepts of “interiority” and “exteriority” of physical form can, it seems, be 
mapped onto the respective concepts of substance and form in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, to which 
Witkin personally refers: “I believe that all my photographs are incarnations, representing the form 
and substance of what my mind sees and attempts to understand” (Coke, 1985, p. 6, italics added). 
They locate ugliness within the questions of ‘ontology’, which Hamlyn (2005) locates within the 
domain of metaphysics: an area that grapples with the “features of ultimate reality, what really 
exists and what it is that distinguishes that and makes it possible” (p. 560). Lowe (2005) concurs 
that ontology is “a branch of metaphysics … embracing such issues as the nature of existence and 




58 The exception may lie in kinds of things that Brady (2010) calls “inherently” ugly, e.g. an eel, spider or mosquito 
that embody their kind to a greater degree, the uglier they are (p. 36) 
59 Both Pop (2014) and Brady (2010), also consider the possibility that one can consider an object as beautiful or ugly 
as “an object” in a case of “apparent ugliness”. For example, for Brady, a bruise might be beautiful as a coloured mark, 
but not as a blemish on the skin (p. 36). It must be noted, however, that this definition, puts beauty and ugliness as 
opposites, and defines the aesthetic experiences as purely perceptive. In addition, the very definition of the “aesthetic” 
employed, does not include the cognitive dimension. According to the theory of the “ugly aesthetic”, an experience 
of not knowing a thing is at the heart of the ugly experience. An objection can also be made, that one is always inferring 
the identity of the object in an aesthetic experience: one cannot “sit with” thinglessness: the bruise may be “seen as” 
another object, perhaps taking on rainbow-like qualities. 
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Here, this Ancient Classical philosopher concludes that ‘being’ itself (any form of existing) 
depends on (physical) form. This form is defined as the morphology or organisation of the matter 
(e.g. the form of the dog or arm) of a particular physically-existing thing. 60 Indeed the identity of 
the object, the ‘doghood’ of the dissected dog in The Result of War: The Cornucopia Dog  (Witkin, 
1984) or ‘armness’ of the arm in Anna Akmatova (Witkin, 1998) cannot be known to the subject 
unless it has been subjected to a kind of regime of representation. For example, the identity of 
being a dog is only accessible to us through the flesh in the form of a long snout with non-
retractable claws; or of the identity of the hand through its embodiment as bones, nerves, blood, 
and muscles that make an extension from the shoulder to the elbow to the hand.61 However, more 
profoundly, Aristotle claims that the very force of being itself, cannot exist at all without inhabiting 
this physical form of the type. This means that the human mind cannot perceive the formless; in 
formlessness, there is no object there to detect. For Aristotle, without the containing physical form 
(or Cousins’ “exterior”) there is only a “bare particular”. We can think of this “interior” prime 
matter as the indeterminate qualities, substratum or gunk, which renders the object thingless and 
non-existent. In other words, for Aristotle, sub-sensory experiences are impossible, because they 
are, by definition, encounters with reality sans the discrete objects. 
  
Cousins (1995) illustrates this idea of dependency on instantiation through the metaphor of the 
face. He explains that the expression on the face signifies the meaning ‘behind’ it, the ‘essence’ of 
the human ‘depths’ being represented here. Moreover, in the case of the face, the surface and the 
depth collapse into one – the face is the epitome of expression itself. One cannot imagine 
expression without imagining the features as having that expression, so one can only think of the 
depths through the surface. For these reasons, the sight of the face is overwhelming: we intuit a 
 
60 In Aristotelian thinking, form is physical, i.e. “the matter of any item is the stuff, the material from which it is 
made, for example, the clay or iron; the form is its organization, shape, pattern given to the stuff by a craftsman, for 
example, by a potter in making a bowl” (Dent, 2005, p. 305). In fact, in his Physics,  II, 3, and Metaphysics V,2,  
Aristotle argues the form is the essence of some ‘thing’ (substance), which, after his exploration of the four types of 
course, he concludes has to do with the form (design, “formal cause”) and function (telos, “final cause”), and that is 
it the form (principle of organisation) that is the substance or essence of a thing, what gives it “being” (Aristotle, 
1961 p. 28-30; Aristotle, 2007, pp. 89-106) 
61 This is a point made by Blanchot in his essay entitled Two Versions of the Imaginary (1955), which is referenced 
by Schwenger in his interpretation of Witkin’s use of corpses: “In the first and most common version … an image is 
secondary to an object. It is a reflection of what is already there, something that comes after it, making its way to the 
subject. The second version – Blanchot’s version – realizes that we do not know the object seen except through the 




depth but cannot actually imagine it, because this essence can only be represented to ourselves in 
the facial representation. Cousin’s writes that: 
 
it is in this sense that ugliness arises as and when the interior of the object, exceeds for a subject, 
its representational exterior. It might be tempting to regard this event as a simple issue of something 
leaking or bursting out of the representational shell. … It involves the causal proposition that, as 
long as the representational order of the object overcoats its existence, it also determines the 
phantasy of what the inside is (Cousins, 1995, p. 3). 
 
This image encapsulates the ugly occurrence, and it is one that Witkin (1997) himself echoes in 
his wish to “seek the face before he was made” (p. 143). Cousins is reinforcing Aristotle’s idea 
that the way in which the human mind can only know existence itself by coming into contact with 
some kind of physical form through which it expresses it, and to only know this form through a 
concept constructed through language. Here, to extend Aristotle’s idea, we are only ever 
acquainted with formless existence (sub-sensory) at a remove – through these physical and 
conceptual conduits. This dependence implies that this ‘truth’ is hidden by the illusion and 
therefore “interior” (to the physical or conceptual surface). To return to the facial metaphor, this 
containing exterior, is actually a ‘phantasy’ of what, objectively, lies behind the face. This is why 
a wound “overmines” and “throws off” the “expressive economy” of the face, thereby rendering 
it as an illusionary veneer or a mask (Cousins, 1995a, p. 4). Thus, it seems that ugliness exposes 
us to the artificiality of our relationship to objects in the world; the sight of formlessness, or the 
truth of object-lessness, with which Aristotle does not think it possible to be acquainted.  
 
Aristotle further argues that to know anything, one has to come to know the essence of a 
particular something: an instance of the physical existence of a Labrador in New Mexico right 
now. This means that dog cannot be an example of dogs in general nor be an example of the 
concept of a dog. However, this particularism does not fit with our theory of ugliness because the 
idea of ugliness relies on the violation of typologies. Here, entities are grouped according to their 
a shared propert[ies]; the idiosyncrasy is bracketed off. The violation of the conceptual form in 
ugliness requires that this physical occurrence has an impact on the idea we have of what type of 
thing that that object is – this is why this thesis describes it as less of a thing it needs to be in order 
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to be a type of thing, or anything at all.62 For these reasons, we need to also draw on Plato’s idea 
of conceptual engagement with Aristotle’s physical objects to understand ugliness. This is contrary 
to Aristotle, because for this Classical philosopher, knowing an object, always means or involves 
knowing it as a type of thing. 63 In this Classical philosopher’s theory of universals, a physical 
thing is the earthly instantiation of this perfect, abstract structure, but only holds the identity of 
this type to the extent that it conforms to this ideal picture. 64  Plato conceives of Forms as 
distillations of the essential of features that give an instantiation its ‘level of belonging’ to 
a category (how much of a dog is Witkin’s dog?), which inspires the cognitive experience of 
ugliness.65 
 
There are thus two crucial, interrelated features of ugly occurrence that help us to identify ugliness 
in Witkin’s work, and to understand its potential to give us a taste of ultimate reality. Firstly, 
Cousin’s work explains the topographical nature of our knowledge of objects: ugliness subverts 
the spatial relation of illusionary surface and underlying, true depth of an object’s identity. As the 
twentieth-century satirist Dorothy Parker puts it: “Beauty is only skin deep, but ugliness goes clean 
to the bone” (as cited in Parris, 2016, “Kings, Queens and Commoners”, para. 15). This 
“overcoating” or “containing” function of the representative or signifying exterior of physical or 
conceptual form, is, it seems, a function of the nature of three-dimensional physical objects and of 
 
62 There would otherwise be a failure to explain why ugliness lies over unique objects that seem out-of-place. 
63 As the perceptual signs for the identification of ugliness, below, refer to the rupturing of the form of both the physical 
and the conceptual object. Indeed, in the very definition of the “perceptual dimension of the aesthetic”, the thesis 
includes both sensory and conceptual components (metaphor). However, the full meaning of Cousins (1995) account 
can only be understood through a linking of two seemingly disparate notions of physical versus conceptual form that 
are found in the theories of Plato and Aristotle, which weave through Cousins’ theory. 
64 It must be acknowledged that the use of Plato and Aristotle’s metaphysics does not cohere with the 
phenomenological account of the ugly aesthetic that is pursued. Both accounts are underpinned by realism in that they 
attempt to provide a true account of the nature of reality, and not to forms of cognitive experience. However, according 
to the naturalisation principle, philosophical theories can be psychologised: the philosophical theory of the ‘way the 
world is’ can be translated into cognitive theories regarding ‘the way human beings perceive the world’. The cognitive 
psychologists Bousfield, Cohen and Whitmarsh (1958), for example, follow Plato in this respect, because he describes 
the way that human beings organise knowledge and memories within their mind as a ‘conceptual hierarchy’. This is a 
system of classification, with layers of organisation based on categories of belonging determined by shared common 
properties between items. 
65 The ‘forms’ are only ‘forms’ on the basis that they participate in higher order form that Plato calls the “Form of the 
Good” or the “Form of the Beautiful”. Plato conceives of forms as distillations of the essential features that give an 
instantiation its ‘level of belonging’ to a category. This perhaps explains why the encounter of beauty is deemed 
‘otherworldly’ (perhaps inaccessible) – as coming from higher places; different from the ‘underbelly’ from which 
ugliness emerges. In other words, beauty and ugliness “belong to quite different registers” (Cousins, 1995, p.1). 
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conceptual prototypes that attempt to “contain” the knowledge of the “truth” of the object in a 
contained object and idea that covers up for its essential formlessness or unknowability.  
 
Thus, secondly, in this facial metaphor of inside escaping exterior container, the sight of blood and 
gore seeping out represents the encounter with that which does not ‘signify’ or mean anything: it 
is a kind of “non-signifying” interior and it “projects stuff of another order or disorder” (pp. 3-4). 
The revelation is of an object-lessness and meaninglessness that enters the perception of 
“interiority” without its representing form. This is why, for Žižek (1997), the shock of ugliness 
occurs when the surface is cut open to direct insight into the “actual depths of the object” (p. 
22). Žižek claims that this act of “spilling out” captures the ugly object that is “larger than itself”: 
its existence is larger than its representation. Žižek refers to menstruation as “an exemplary case 
of such an ugly inside spilling out” (p. 24).  
 
This insight indicates that the horror of the ugly object lies in its uncategorisably within typologies 
that organise objects – the wound-in-the-form may disrupt the ontological schemas with which we 
sort objects in the world as types of things. Hepburn (2010) explains that ugliness “designates 
something we can’t even imagine” (p. 216), and Carmichael uses the term “wanton” for the way 
in which ugliness resides in abhorrence of the “reckless, cowardly, degraded, morbid, defiled, 
depraved”, which is “repugnant to the imagination … near the nadir of aesthetic 
comprehension” (Carmichael, 1972, p. 496). So, contrary to Aristotle, thinglessness exists, and 
ugliness gives an experience of it; herein exposing the very illusion of ontological demarcation. 
 
Since the Ideal only exists as the idea, the ugly object exists in the mishaps intrinsic to physical 
instantiation. As will be evidenced in the transcendent versus immanent forms of mysticism that 
follow, ugliness belongs to a “world of ineluctable individuality, contingency and resistance to the 
Ideal” (Carmichael, 1972, p. 492). He further refers to how ugliness’ “lacking” resides in that 
which falls short of a “mark set by reason or definition”. Ugliness is of the mortal world, one of 
“deformity and defects” (Cousins, 1995). This explains why Witkin propounds finding God in the 
“strange”, “bizarre” and “disjunctive’ (Horvat, 1989, para. 36) and his claim that he wants to bring 
“God back down to earth” (Witkin, 1985, p. 9). Adams (1974) associates ugliness with “the 
particular, the expressive, and the material” (p. 59). Carmichael (1972) describes ugliness as 
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inhering in the “abortive”: failing to reach some standard in deformity, defect, mistake, the feeble, 
the sluggard (p.495), which Witkin echoes in his idea of the “okay” as boring (Horvat, 1989, para. 
36). Carmichael further includes the “awkward, incongruous, confused, inapposite, bizarre, otiose” 
(p. 495). Cousins (1994) goes on to write that in their lacking, which makes them non-ideal, “they 
are too strongly individual; are too much themselves” (p. 61).66 
 
In order to further flesh out the meaning of Witkin’s scattered spiritual aphorisms, we can correlate 
this description of the ugly experience to other theories that pertain to the ontologically mysterious. 
This numinous encounter with an unrepresentable, unknowable, and physically/conceptually 
formless (non)object, is intriguingly reminiscent in psychoanalytic descriptions of the infant’s 
experience of his world (described often as, wholly, his mother or other, that which is not him) 
during the developmental phase called the “pre-symbolic”. 67 Here, we put forward the idea that 
pre-symbolic refers to a developmental period pervaded by the characteristically ugly experience; 
perceptual abilities or language with which to symbolise or identify the object are only nascent or 
absent. 68  According to Gibeault (2005), this ability to “symbolise” is defined by psychoanalysis 
as the operation by which something comes to represent something else for someone. Aside from 
allowing one term to substitute for another, symbolisation designates the “flow of information 
between” and the very separation between subject and object, the realities of the mind and the 
outside world, and past and present” (para. 1-3).69 If we can show that the pre-symbolic reality 
surfaces with the ugly occurrence, we can designate the ugly object described by the theorists 
 
66 Such associations seem to be the reason for which Pop (2014) writes that ugliness deals with “form, fear, evil, 
proximity, and the physical” (p. 15). 
67 From this developmental aesthetic perspective, ugliness is merely an “overarching label for a matrix of 
experiences” that come together in the infant’s (subject) experience of the mother (object) in this developmental 
stage described in psychodynamic literature (Hagman, 2005, p. 2). In his Foreward to Hagman’s Aesthetic 
Experience: Beauty, Creativity, and the Search for the Ideal, Rotenberg describes that in Hagman’s “developmental 
aesthetics” in general, the “root of [all] aesthetic experience” is to be found in the “earliest somatic, perceptual and 
kinaesthetic experiences of infant and mother, that intersubjective domain.” (Rotenberg, 2005, as cited in Hagman, 
2005, p, ix). For Hagman, “the implicit procedural representations [of the mother] … possess an aesthetic quality 
that is formally complex, diverse and affectively rich. … The child organises these repeated experiences together, 
which structure their outer and inner worlds – object (other) and self (their experiences of themselves as ‘object’) (p. 
35).” 
68 It must be noted that the syncretisation and synthesis of these chosen three theories of the psychoanalytic are 
potentially problematic. There are many analyses of the convergences and divergences of these respective theories 
along several dimensions. These theorists often provide criticism for one another. For example, Barzilai (1991) 
interrogates Kristeva’s criticism of Lacan. 
69 It is the ability to use symbols that facilitates “ego formation, the awareness of separateness from object and the 
way the body becomes meaningful to the mind” (Gaddini & Limentani, 1992, p. 2). 
48 
 
above as memory of what contemporary psychoanalyst Bollas (2018) describes as a form of the 
“unthought known”. This pre-verbal, un-schematised, uncrystallised and somatic experience 
cannot (has not) be retrieved into a ‘thinkable’ thought. This is because it is formed at a time before 
the formation of such a thought (memory) through the concepts of language is possible.70 It appears 
that this reality is one in which Witkin sees the world in its Godly truth. He has often reported 
going to “regression therapy” in order to tap into an alternative state of consciousness, which 
involved time in utero, when his triplet-sister died (Marino, 2013).71 Manatakis (2019) refers to 
the idea that it is this very (ugly) linguistic or representational insufficiency that is at the core of 
his philosophy: the taboo “death, eroticism and religion” are intangible and ungraspable. For her, 
“American photographer Joel-Peter Witkin is a master of actualising ‘this’ spirituality: his 
photography turns what most of us find even hard to speak about into hauntingly dark imagery” 
(para. 11, inverted commas added). 
 
The specific concept of symbolisation is rarely mentioned by the founder of psychoanalysis, Freud, 
although it is instrumental to his workings of the unconscious mind.72 We can look to three 
psychodynamic successors whose understanding of this period is pertinent to ugliness in order to 
develop a picture of Witkin’s spiritual reality. Klein’s object-relational theory evokes the pre-
symbolic world (0-4/6 months), as one of “phantasy”, in which there are no separable “things”. 
Klein details a reality devoid of discrete units; this same spiritual experience to which the artist 
refers and attempts to re-access, and which we also attribute to the experience triggered by 
ugliness. Klein refers to a spatiotemporal inability: the child has no sense of where things (his 
body, his mother’s body, other objects) start (Watts, 2002).73 In perceptual terms, the infant has no 
 
70 In this realm of non-perception, memory of the pre-symbolic is therefore “existential” – a retrieval of a mode of 
being and “a force of dissemination that moves us to places beyond thinking” (Bollas, 2018, p. 17). The ugly object 
therefore as a form of this emerging memory, takes into account the “wordless element in the adult” (Bollas, 2018, 
pp. 3-4). In Bollas’ (1997) analysis of evocative object, he introduces the term “mnemic object” as an object that is 
“endowed with previous self-experiences” – the ugly object (p. 35).   
71 In his documentary Objective Eye (2013), Witkin states how he repeatedly sensed his antenatal sibling during his 
own regression in primal therapy (Marino, 2013). 
72 For Freud, what is repressed is symbolised by the unconscious through substitution in “symbol formation”, which 
may exist as symptoms or the products of sublimation and can be found in dreams. These symbols are mostly 
privately constructed, with the exception of universal symbols (Rycroft, 1995). 
73 Freud notices the use of symbolisation by his eighteenth-month-old grandson Ernst, in a game he called Fort/Da 
(Here/Gone) in his The Pleasure Principle (1920), in which the child used the appearance or disappearance of toys 
and string on a reel, and the word “o-o-o-o” to represent his disappeared mother (in mourning a separateness from 
her) and himself in the mirror. 
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perception of the figure-ground relationship or the organising principles of gestalt” (Watts, 2002, 
p.94).74 Instead, he merely lives through the sensations of his body; those generated from the “self” 
and those given by the body of the mother in breastfeeding, with whom he is merged (Watts, 2002). 
Within the infant’s monistic, solipsistic reality, the mother is rendered as an extension of the 
infant’s consciousness (Watts, 2002, p. 95).75 He projects these experiences onto “concrete bits” 
or part objects. For Watts (2002), Klein’s notion of the infant phantasy world is an experience 
without differentiation of outside-inside or self and other. This is what is invoked in the object-
lessness of the ugly object; ugliness is a “stain” that contaminates and blurs the boundary between 
objects and subjects (Cousins, 1994, p. 63).  
Without an ‘inside or ‘outside’, the infant uses a mixture of the “endo-psychic” processes of taking 
in (introjection) and putting out (projection) in order to keep pain and pleasure in separate 
“places”.76 In this psychoanalyst’s paper entitled Some Theoretical Conclusions: The Emotional 
Life of the Infant (originally published in 1952), Klein describes the infant’s feelings of being 
gratified such as the alleviation of hunger, the pleasure of sucking, the freedom from discomfort 
or tension, that is, from privations, and the experience of being loved are attributed to the 
synecdochic “good breast” (Klein, 2017b, p. 63). Likewise, the bad breast becomes “the prototype 
of all external and internal persecutory objects” and that therefore, every frustration and discomfort 
are attributed to the “bad persecuting breast” (p. 63).  Klein (2017a) explains that as a result of this 
“splitting” in the monistic reality (of ugliness), there is terror (p. 70). The child has to “split” this 
bad experience off into a separate mental ‘area’ because he bears a “persecutory anxiety” in which 
feels that all badness – whether pain from inside him or from his mother as the source – will engulf 
and annihilate him (Klein, 2017a, p. 64). Without boundaries separating ‘this-thing’ from ‘that-
thing’, there is a risk that all his good experiences will be “spoilt” or infected by this badness. He 
uses this mental strategy in order to fend off ominous pain and to ‘protect’ his good feelings of 
safety and pleasure (Watts, 2002). In this way, he can accumulate enough goodness to sustain him 
when this engulfing dark ‘thing’ (or feeling) re-attacks (Watts, 2002). While Klein emphasises the 
 
74 The perceptual notion a ‘gestalt’ does not reside in Klein’s work. Rather, Watts (2002), appropriates the term from 
the early twentieth century Gestalt school of psychology, to frame the infantile ‘splitting’ of the mother as (at least 
partially) a perceptual phenomenon. This idea of seeing a whole that ‘is more than a sum of its parts’ has its origins 
in Köhler (1992). 
75 This is often referred to as “primary narcissism” – the experience of the self as all there is. 
76 Actually, Klein’s theoreticisation of this reality contradicts its non-representability; she refers to this ‘thing’, 
although for the infant no such separate ‘thing’ exists. 
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schizoid defence mechanisms used by the infant to protect himself against what she highlights as 
a paranoia of invasion of badness in ugly formlessness, the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan is 
interested in the way in which the lack of objects threatens the sense of self – in particular in this 
primitive apprehension. For Lacan, the unpresentable and object-less realm is not particular to a 
developmental period, but a linguistic register called “The Real”, to which the “symbolic” (the 
realm of differential elements of signifiers, speech and language employed by the socialised 
subject), and the “imaginary” (the dimension of images – conscious or unconscious, perceived or 
imagined, employed by the ego) are intricately related (Sheridan, 2001 pp. xii-xiii).77 Lacan’s term 
“signifier” is used to refer to the form or representational shell, and “signified” to “underlying 
stuff”. For Sheridan (2001), the Real “… stands for what is neither symbolic, nor imaginary, and 
remains foreclosed from analytic experience, which is an experience of speech. … It may only be 
supposed in the algebraic x” (p. xii). Thus, if the ugly object is a non-object of this Real, then it 
confronts the viewer with a memory that cannot be represented in language Bowie (1991) calls 
this an “epistemological void” (p. 23). Levine helps us to picture this as a (non)time-place where 
“there was not yet a thing as such … Harry Potter’s World of Wizards, Lord Voldemort (Full-of-
Death) is the not-to-be-named Thing” (p. 33).78  
 
In his The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 
Experience (1941), Lacan presents the idea that the child’s first conceptual and physical object is 
that of the “I”. This “ego” is formed through his vision of his unified body in a reflection in his 
mirror stage, in order to separate from the mother (Lacan, 2001, p. 2). It thus helps us to understand 
this spiritual experience of ugliness to which Witkin refers, as one tied to our experience of our 
body. The sense of the “Real” in ugliness – reality prior to language and objects – is thus 
characteristic of the experience of the child before the mirror stage; according to Hook (2002), 
Lacan describes this as the hommelette (little scrambled person) of 0-6 months. Without perception 
of objects, and thus of his own physical body, the child’s reality comprises experience of being in 
his body: the chaotic, uncontrolled jerkiness of the limbs and sporadic reflexes aiding survival, 
 
77 It must be noted that the relation between the registers of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real, is a complex 
one – they are linked, but different. Lacan attempts to engage with this problem in his “Borromean knot” in 
his Séminaire (1974-1975). 
78 Lacan refers to Holbein’s painting The Ambassadors (1533), which incorporates anamorphosis that uses a 
perspectival technique to both disguise and reveal an object, according to different visual positions of the spectator 
(Lacan, 1964, Seminars, Book XI, as cited in Levine, pp. 49-52). 
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render a sense of fragmentation: “dissonant unified sensorium”, a “heterogeneous” centreless mass 
of needs and sensations into a representable object and concept (Hook, 2002, p. 155).79 
 
In mirroring the occurrence of ugliness, Lacan insists that the infant’s idea of this singular body of 
the self, the “representational shell” or “exterior” of the form to which internal phenomenological 
states are attributed, is actually an illusion of interior formlessness. It is a succession of phantasies 
or “lure of spatial identification”, or the “social I” or illusionary exterior that we continually 
attempt to confirm through forms of mirrors, such as the mother’s gaze, which confirms our 
singular existence. (Lacan, 2001, p.6). Lacan’s work refers to the formlessness that breaks through 
as a re-emergence of a “fleeting, unstable, incomplete and open-ended mass” that feels 
uncontrollable. Thus, the ugly object evokes the experience of the Real piercing through this 
misapprehension or misknowing (meconnaissance) of the object of the self, and the other external 
objects (the ‘not-me’), from which the self is, by definition, undifferentiated (Lacan, 2001, p. 7). 
Further, this identification of the self as a distinct ontological entity is the basis for the separation 
from the “mother”, who stands for outside reality at large. Unification with the mother/reality 
represents a state of eternal satisfaction – we are needless intrauterine, for we are fed umbilically 
before hunger sets in. We are suspended in an optimally homeostatic temperature and are 
responded to with attunement when new-born. Thus, the perceptual separation of self – of distinct, 
separate objects – is marked with a sense of loss and feeling of needing to replace plenitude of the 
time in which we experienced wholeness and continuity with our environment (Felluga, 2015). 
There is a seamless interconnectedness when no things exist and when formlessness presides. 
 
Julia Kristeva describes this sacred state/place/memory of non-objects that is brought about by the 
ugly object, as the psychic environment of the “chôra”. She derives this concept from Plato’s 
Timaeus (c 360 BC) in which the chôra (Greek for womb or receptacle) is postulated, and posits it 
as a kind of quality-less substratum or space, or a “producer or container” in which Forms (perfect 
ideals/what is and never becomes) and sensibles (earthly instantiations /what becomes and never 
is), are made. Kristeva follows Plato in presenting the chôra as an “ancient, mobile, unstable 
receptacle, prior to the One, to the Father, and even to the syllable” (Kristeva, 1987, p.5). This 
 
79 “Still sunk in his motor capacity and nursling dependence … in which the I is precipitated in primordial form (Lacan, 




follows the “Mirror Stage” (6-18 months) of Lacan, in which the self-object of the child’s 
reflection in the mirror is her first differentiation from this mother; Rose (2003) calls this cleaving 
the “vanishing point of all identities” (p. 156). As such, the chôra becomes a further metaphor for 
the larger reality of formlessness that is triggered in the sight of the nameless and unknowable 
world of objects.  
 
In contrast to Lacan, for Kristeva, the child of chôra of 0-6 months does possess the ability to use 
the proto-linguistic semiotic, material dimensions “echolalias, glossolalias, rhythms and 
intonations”: so that he may lay the inscription of boundaries at age 4-8 months, even though he 
may not be able to refer to objects (McAfee, 2004, p. 19). This means that the memory of this time, 
although not encoded into words, is inscribed with a semiotic meaning: although conceptually 
“void”, “empty” or “blank”, it is coded in physical sensation and feeling; life and death drive –
indeed for Witkin this world of mere forces materialises when he describes how, when his sister 
died in utero, he experienced “death before life” (Marino, 2013). For Kristeva, the re-experiencing 
of this intertwined state (that we take as ‘ugly’) is known as a confrontation with the “abject” 
(ugliness may indeed be the abject “object”) and the child’s process of separation from it, as the 
process of “abjection” that occurs at 4-6 months. Abjection is, too, a mechanism of separating and 
organising this threatening monistic perceptual reality, as in Klein’s schizoid defence. Using the 
haptic semiotic dimension, the infant develops the boundary between the ‘I’ and the ‘other’. 
Kristeva describes this process as the child “violently throwing out, jettisoning eject[ing] beyond 
the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable ... that which is opposed to the ‘I’” (Kristeva, 
2008, p.3). In fact, abjection is a primitive, tenuous form of attempting to separate: the “child has 
a sense of the abject (as a boundary) even before things are and drives out even before they are 





80 This is what Oliver (1993) means when she writes that the not-yet subject with its not-yet or no longer object 
maintains “itself” as the abject…. The subject discovers itself as the impossible separation/identity of the maternal 
body. It hates that body but only because it can’t be free of it. That body—the body without border, the body out of 
which the abject subject came, is impossible” (p. 60). 
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Perceptual Markers for Representations of Ugly Objects 
 
Ugliness exists in the experience of an object’s pre-symbolic unknowability penetrating through 
the surface that makes it (feel) knowable, and this, it seems, is the essence of Witkin’s spirituality. 
However, how can we use such a definition to intuit the presence of ugly objects in the artworks 
that follow? One answer is to identify processes by which this phenomenon of ugliness might 
unfold. In line with the commitment to avoiding a ‘formula’, the presence of these events can act 
as clues or heuristics for ugly objects in the artworks to be examined. Three potential signs this 
thesis suggests are 1) conceptual hybridisation through 2) loose, excessive, or abortive physical 
form or 3) contamination by other forces. These categories are not mutually exclusive, but 
conceptually interdependent.81 
  
Before elaborating, an important distinction must be made between ugly objects and 
representations of ugly objects in artwork, because there is a debate about whether ugliness is lost 
in works of art – particularly in painting.82 This “problem of sublimation” is most commonly cited 
when it comes to ugly representation in painting. Pop (2014) writes: “content is dependent on the 
form in a way that form is not dependent on the content, but only in the picture-making process” 
(p. 168). For him, one cannot say that Goya’s Los Caprichos (Goya, 1797-1799) (Fig. 3-6) is 
 
81 Conceptual hybridisation occurs through amorphousness and contamination. Formlessness may signal 
contamination.  
82 Gracyk (2012) explains artistic representation as “two dimensional visual representations of a three-dimensional 
object or arrangements of objects” and further, that pictures, by definition, “provide two-dimensional visual content 
in visually depicting how something looks” (pp. 2-3). The Surrealist painter René Magritte wrote at the bottom of his 
painting of a pipe, The Treachery of Images, “This is not a pipe”, to signal the difference between a representation of 
an object and the object itself (Magritte & Torczyner, 1994, pp. 3-4). Since these representations are created through 
the formal and material qualities of the artwork, because such qualities have their own aesthetic qualities, they can, in 
turn, affect the aesthetic of a something originally referenced or “copied into” the artwork. Maclagan (2005) writes 
that “no matter how realistic a painting is, or how impressive its subject-matter … it transforms and intensifies in its 
own particular ways” (p. 7). 
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“ugly” despite the fact that it references intrinsically “ugly” subject matter: the “form” of the prints 
is beautiful, and therefore, the artwork as a whole is not “ugly” (p. 168).83  
 
The perceptual criteria outlined below, stay with the object when it is represented, which deems 
them as reliable indicators of ugly objects in artwork. We can also look to whether the religious-
painterly ideology of art historical style prescribes inclusion of ugliness into the painterly scene. 
It must be noted that there is an exceptional type of ugliness, which Brady (2010) calls the 
“inherently ugly”, in which ugliness increases as the object becomes a more ideal version of its 
 
83 Pop (2014) references the point in his work on Bosenquat’s The Æsthetic Theory of Ugliness (1889-1890). He 
cites the way in which Velasquez had to capture the ugliness of the Austrian royal family, the Habsburgs, so that 
they would be recognisable, while the painterly handling, and the accentuation of exquisite dress, made the painting 
itself beautiful (Bosenquat, 1880-1890, pp. 42-43, as cited in Pop, 2014, p. 168). Kuplen (2015) explores the way in 
which Frida Kahlo’s painting, Los Dos Frida (1939), “skilfully beautifies the object with colours, lines and shades 
so that the disgusting depiction that remains is merely a shadow” (p. 139). In his Critique of Pure Reason (1790), 
Kant, recognised that all ugly objects (for him, those that are “displeasing”), including “the Furies, diseases and 
devastations of war” could be made beautiful (transformed) with the exception of those that arouse “disgust” (Ekel) 
(1994, p. 131). For more on Kant’s theory of ugliness, see, for example, Cohen (2013) and Thompson (1992). There 
are powerful accounts of the way in which paint and painterly representation can, indeed, embody the features of the 
ugly aesthetic, or accentuate the ugliness of the thing being represented. Kozloff (1970) writes about the paint of 
Francis Bacon, in its depiction of its “repellent subjects” (p. 163) as becoming “infected” with “pain” and “disease” 
(1970, p. 159). Likewise, he writes that Dubuffet’s “humus” of paint has a “shaggy dog” quality of “anarchy and 
disorder” (pp. 66-67). In his paper Idealism and Realism (1917), Ruckstuhl calls this a form of “modernistic 
idealism” in which forms idealised or stylised downwards are thus “uglified below the ugly in nature” (Ruckstuhl, 
1917, p. 256). 
Figure 3. Goya, Capricho No. 49: 
Duendecitos (Hobgoblins), 1799 (Widmer, 
1972, n.p.) 
Figure 5. Goya, Capricho No. 77: Unos a 
otros (What one does to the other) (Widmer, 
1972, n.p) 
Figure 4. Goya, Capricho No. 64: Buen 




typology, such as “eels, spiders, ticks, mosquitoes, mudflats, muddy rivers and burnt forests” (p. 
36). Here, perceptual signs may enhance the object’s ugliness or be part of its very identity.  
 
In this thesis, the ugly object is less of the object it needs to be in order to be a type of thing or a 
thing at all. In conceptual hybridisation, an object becomes uncategorisable through and therefore 
unknowable because it blurs the boundary of two or more conceptual prototypes, thereby 
referencing Kristeva’s abject. For Kristeva, ugliness as abject is triggered by a “threshold state”, 
e.g. life and death or human and non-human in the skin of milk, excrement or cadavers (Kristeva, 
1982, p. 2-3), that becomes the signature subject matter in Witkin’s work. This specific fear 
manifests outwardly, as objects of “abjection” are cordoned or fended off (abjected) in spatial, 
cultural and religious boundaries, which are exemplified in the exclusion of the ugly. Abjection is 
thus considered a “primer” of ritual, notions of taboo and sin. For example, “faeces, urine, vomit, 
pus, defilement, sewerage and muck” and the blood of an open wound (as used in the image of 
ugliness), are what is ejected from the living body, so that it is protected (Kristeva, 1982, p. 2). 
Menstrual blood, decay, disease and the corpse that put us on the “border of [our] condition as a 
living being are relegated as unclean and improper, perhaps ‘profane’” (p. 3).84  
 
Examples of this conceptual subversion are also found in descriptions of aesthetic properties which 
seem, as Beardsley put it, to be intuitive sub-types of ugliness. One instance is the fantastic hybrid 
being of the ‘grotesque’, such as the half-horse-half-woman of Witkin’s Night in a Small Town, 
(1997) (Fig. 6). Connelly writes: “the grotesque may be better understood as ‘trans-’ modalities 
…” (Connelly, 2003, p. 4, as cited in Žukauskienė 2014, p. 195). Following the first self-object of 
the pre-symbolic, the essence of the uncanny, as psychoanalyst Rahimi (2013) suggests, presents 
us a violation of the concept of selfhood in various manifestations, from the ‘doppelganger’, 
ghosts, de-ja-vu, alter-ego, self-alienations, split-personhood, phantoms and twins (which 
 
84 It is notable that the relationship between ugliness and Kristeva’s abject – here it is argued, that is, the ugly object 
is a manifestation of the abject – is reinforced by Pop (2014, p. 8), who argues that the 1980s style of “Abject Art”, 
which “employed ‘low’ bodily products and their simulacra, from blood to sexual fluids, attempted to “get beyond 
mere aesthetic categories”. It attempted to emphasise the importance of “aesthetic experience” and to expose the 
emptiness of conservative beauty theorists who simply want categories of the beautiful and the ordinary: “… an 
aesthetic theory that makes no room for ugliness cannot be any more complete than an ethics indifferent to evil, or a 
political theory unconcerned with injustice”, as Rosenkranz puts it (p. 9). Douglas’ classic anthropological text, 
Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (2015), is a precursor to Kristeva’s concept of 
the ‘abject’. It initiates an investigation into cultural notions of the clean and unclean and into purity, dirt, 
boundaries, pollution, fluid and waste. 
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transverse concepts of both self and no-self). We can see this in the masked head-conjoined 
womenin Witkin’s Siamese Twins, LA (1988) (Fig. 7) or the two sides of a bilaterally severed head 
with interlocked lips in his The Kiss (1982) (Fig. 8). 
 
Figure 6. Witkin, Night in a Small Town, 1997 (Witkin, 1998, n.p.) 




In the existence of physical formlessness and excessive, loose and abortive form, the ugly object 
is subject to the reality of the earthly – here it is impossible for objects to physically exist in the 
image of the conceptual ideal by which we categorise them as types. In Rosenkranz’ (2011) 
writings, ugliness emerges where there is the amorphous “faintness of a boundary where a definite 
boundary would be necessary; the ambiguity of difference where difference should appear; the 
incomprehensibility of expression where expression should be” and “the absence of symmetry 
where we would expect it hurts us” (pp. 103-105). For Rosenkranz (2011), the persistent presence 
of a differentiated object, or meaningless overabundance, that itself, has no internal differentiation, 
is “intolerable” and therefore, felt to be ugly (p. 102): “Goethe’s assertion on life, that nothing is 
less bearable than a series of good days, also applies to aesthetics. … Green is a beautiful colour, 
but only green, without the blue sky above, without glittering water between” is not.  Rosenkranz 
goes on to assert that ugliness occurs when a boundary contradicts the notion of form, a kind of 
excessive ‘fleshiness’ (p. 102). As Hepburn (2010) writes: “Ornamentation, as superfluity and 
excess, can crowd the field, and thus induct ugliness into the apprehension of the object” (p. 216). 
The exposure of body fat is prominent in Witkin’s work, for example, in the adipose rolls of a 
Figure 8. Witkin, The Kiss, 1982 (Witkin, 1998, n.p.) 
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reclining nude with a winged mask who sucks medical tubing in Sanitarium (1987) (Fig. 9), or in 
the rippled skin that ‘upholsters’ the oval upper arm of the angel-winged amputee in The Bird of 






Figure 9. Witkin, Sanitarium, 1989 (Witkin, 1998, n.p.) 





Ugliness also appears in the presence of “loose forms” – the “nebulous” and “undulating” (Nakas, 
2014). These are prevalent in Witkin’s inclusion of bleeding and decomposition. Nakas (2014) 
draws specific attention to the process of putrefaction and deliquescence to ugliness: images of 
liquidity, fluidity, humidity and of “matter changing or losing a given form” are felt to be 
“disfiguring and highly irritating”. They deviate from “ethical and aesthetic standards at large” 
(Nakas, p. 186).85 According to Hepburn (2010), it is also true that we can experience an absence 
of detail and ornamentation as ugly. Insufficient or lacking form – that fails to fill up the ideal 
configuration –  is exemplified in Witkin’s work by the presence of amputation in the absent-
armed whitewashed Greek-sculpture man of the photograph entitled Self-Portrait (Reminiscent of 
Portrait as a Vanité) New Mexico (1994) (Fig. 11. It is also visible in the beheaded, seated nude 




85 Nakas alludes to the work of the German art historian Carl Justi, who writes on the amorphousness, ‘form fatigue’ 
and ‘form hate’ that are characteristic of Impressionism and Symbolism in the early 1900s, which linked it directly 
with ugliness: “One can tell from the idea of form being shaken off all-together, from an urge towards the Unformed 
and Ugly, finally from the inconsistent selection of improper forms that contradict the object’s nature” (Justi, 1902 
as cited in Nakas, 2014, p. 186).  
 
Figure 11. Witkin, Self-Portrait (Reminiscent of 
Portrait as a Vanité) New Mexico, 1994 (Witkin, 1998, 
n.p.) 
Figure 12. Witkin, Man Without Head, 1993 (Witkin, 
1998, n.p)  
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Objects that have been ‘touched’ or ‘marked’ by other forces, such as sickness, decay and death, 
hereby appear as less of themselves or what we think we know them as. Rosenkranz (2015) writes 
that illness results in ugliness because it results in “deformation of the skeleton” (p. 45). Witkin 
regularly uses and mixes types of skeletons as his subjects, as, for example, in the mix of 
horse/wildebeest and human bones in Queer Saint (1999) (Fig. 13) and Cupid and Centaur in the 
Museum of Love (1998) (Fig. 14). Rosenkranz describes exanthems and abscesses as “parasitic 
individuals” that constrict “the essence of the organism as a unity, and because of which it falls 
apart” (p. 45). In “[e]maciation”, he writes, “a burning gaze, the pale or fever blushed cheeks … 
[t]he entire body in its transparent morbidity no longer means anything for itself, and has become 
through and through the expression of a spirit that is leaving, independent of nature” (p. 45). This 
echoes Witkin’s own view that sickness exhibits the nebulousness of soul or spirit. He refers to 
the experience of photographing an HIV/AIDS victim who was close to death: “I believe that even 
if John was dead for a few moments, or even an hour, he [his soul] could see the picture … the 
energy and the people involved (Witkin, 1997, p. 57). 
 
Witkin accentuates contamination of a distinct living object by the force of death through his 
vanitas still lives. They often mix fresh food with infectious decaying body parts: a head cadaver 
that bears a rectangular skull hollow acts as a vase for fresh flowers and is placed beside a bowl of 
salubrious Romanesco broccoli, radish, prickly pears and a glistening prawn in Still Life, 
Marseilles (1992) (Fig. 15). Miller (1997) captures the decomposition of forms of ugliness in his 
notion of “life-soup” of compost: “The having lived and the living unite to make up the organic 
world of generative rot – rank, smelling and upsetting to the touch. The gooey mud, the scummy 
pond are life-soup, fecundity itself: slimy, slippery, wiggling, teeming animal life (pp. 40-41). 
There is a “taking over” here, of Klein’s formlessness, in what Miller (1997) calls the “proliferation 




Figure 13. Witkin, Queer Saint, 1999 (Regan, 2001) 
Figure 14. Witkin, Cupid and Centaur in the Museum of Love, Marsaiiles, 






The Ugly Place: The Geomorphological Metaphor 
 
A second form of ugliness we will have to identify is that of the ugly place. Adumbrating such 
criteria does not involve defining the ugly aesthetic per se. Instead, it requires us to imagine, in a 
fantastical way, that there is a ‘world’ that can be created through the fictional possibilities of the 
alternative realm of the artwork: that Witkin helps us to see a ‘habitat’ in which objects arise, thrive 
or belong. As Coke (1985) writes: Witkin “first made sketches based on an image in his mind. 
When he found a subject that suited his preconceived notion … he would make detailed drawings 
of her in an environment he had already created” (p. 3). The conceptualisation of the ugly locale 
is necessary because the paintings of the Renaissance create mystical visions through images of 
heaven with ideal objects that rid the possibility of ugliness. If this thesis is to show that Witkin 
presents ugliness as an alternative form of mysticism, then it must demonstrate that the artist gives 
us a vision of an ugly environment and objects instead.  
 
The link between ugliness and the pre-symbolic is valuable here because the pre-symbolic gives 
us a context and ‘space’ for the experience of ugliness. The experience of ugliness mimics, and 
can thus be thought of as, a residue or relic of the infant’s non-perceptual and non-conceptual 
experience of objects in the period of the pre-symbolic (Klein’s “paranoid-schizoid position”, 
Figure 15. Witkin, Still Life, Marseilles, 1992 (Witkin, 1998, n.p.) 
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Lacan’s hommelette’s “Real” or Kristeva’s “chôra”).  However, given that there are, by definition, 
no discrete objects in this reality means that the ugly object conjures a memory of all objects (of 
reality) being ultimately formless, and thus unknowable. The explanation for this is that the ugly 
object occurs when formlessness breaks through form. This phenomenon mirrors (or even causes), 
the emergence of a memory of an entirely perceptually seamless and formless mode of 
consciousness through our perceptually organised reality that ‘covers’ it. This study argues that it 
is the experience of this alternative reality that Witkin presents as mystical through his presentation 
of ugliness.86 According to psychoanalytic theory, the mind itself is modelled topographically, 
with its own organisation and layering.87 If we were to depict the experience of ugliness as it occurs 
in this topographical diagram of the mind, then when the mind itself experienced ugliness, it would 
take on the formation of that very ugly object it was experiencing.88 This representation means that 
we can imagine the ugly object as occurring in a mental pre-symbolic ‘place’.  
 
However, how can we identify the representation of this pre-symbolic space in Witkin’s 
photographs? It is the geomorphological metaphor that helps us to make a link to this mechanism 
of ugliness in the object that is described below, and to describe a way in which this sight can 
evoke a similar action in the mind that experiences that ugly object. The Oxford English Dictionary 
(2012) defines geomorphology as “[t]he branch of geology and physical geography concerned with 
the nature, origin, and development of the physical features of the earth’s surface. Also: the 
physical features (landforms) of a particular region and the processes which affect them.” The 
 
86 Adults who are diagnosed with ‘psychotic’ personality structures are preoccupied with the very boundary confusion 
instigated by the ugly experience, because they are ‘stuck’ at this developmental period. As McWilliams (1994) 
suggests, the concerns of the pre-symbolic period include “confusion between inside and outside experience … 
[where] … one can always find both mortal fear and dire confusion” (p.59). She cites Laing’s (1965) idea of 
“ontological insecurity” (McWilliams, p. 59). Further, the psychological concept of “trauma” is an experience that is, 
by definition, irretrievable and unknowable (hidden beneath) because it is unrepresentable. In Caruth’s seminal 
Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History (1995), the trauma is a wound or gap in the mental terrain of 
the mind, around which we can only talk or walk; around which we should sacredly remain silent.  
87 In his Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud introduces his topographical model in order to introduce his idea of 
the “unconscious”. The unconscious is represented as if it is spatially below what he calls the pre-conscious and 
conscious layers of the mind, because the unconscious mind is, by definition, ‘beneath’ these levels of awareness. It 
contains the repertoire of sexual and aggressive drives or wishes that are hidden or repressed because they are socially 
unacceptable or painful (Hook & Watts, 2002, p. 75). The pre-symbolic state occurs before repression exists, and 
therefore can be thought to be a whole developmental mode of being concealed in this unconscious, under the “adult” 
conscious mind. Since the experience itself is pre-linguistic, it cannot be retrieved and thought about in the form of 
representational objects of mature perception, and is thus, following the geomorphological metaphor, the amorphous 
experiential memory layer. 




“geomorphological metaphor” is a mixed metaphor in order to liken this mental occurrence to a 
kind of volcanic suppuration. As the biblical scholar Zornberg (2009) writes: “[T]he subterranean 
power that strains against the deceptively solid eggshell of earth’s crust” (p. x).89 Here, the “form” 
of the ugly object/the reality of forms can be imagined to be like an encrusted mantle, both hiding, 
holding or even signalling (representing) the truth of formless reality, that can be envisaged as the 
vaporous, malleable, mysterious underworld from which the world became. The formlessness of 
the molten rock, or liquid amorphous compound, is symbolic of a kind of bourgeoning memory in 
the mind of a primordial perceptive reality of ontological inchoateness. Above it – both encrusting 
and hiding that experience of non-differentiation – is the older, more readily accessible “post-
symbolic” perceptual mode. Here, language allows us to distinguish the boundaries of things in 
the world, and to fit them within the bounds or parameters of a typological concept.  
 
The geomorphological metaphor helps us to distil four features by which to identify the depiction 
of ugly pre-symbolic place in Witkin’s ugly visionary mystical style: 1) the mental – as ‘place’ or 
‘store’ of memory; 2) formlessness breaking through form; 3) beneathness breaking through 
aboveness (Cousins’ (1994) “topographical” claim); and 4) older surfacing through newer. We 
explore the evocation of such features in the creation of the locale in the artwork in the formal 
qualities of the works that follow. 
 
Ugly Feelings  
 
Ugly feelings are the last form of ugliness that we must be able to identify in the artwork if we are 
to argue that Witkin’s changes are in service of the argument for the ugly mystical – he sees 
elements of God mirrored in this prism of sensations.90 Unlike the representation of ugly objects, 
ugly feelings are in the formal qualities of the artwork at large  – the way it is expressed. Since the 
“felt” dimension of ugliness is part of what makes it an aesthetic experience, the expression of 
 
89 The geomorphological image used in this thesis is inspired by Zornberg’s (2009) psychoanalytic interpretation of 
the verse “Deep calls unto deep” (Ps. 42:8), as in the “rabbinic unconscious” in the Old Testament. Zornberg writes: 
“The Hebrew word … rendered by the English “deep” is tehom – incomparably richer in association. This tehom – 
unfathomable void dense with watery voices – is one metaphor I’d like to explore. … The other is the volcanoes, 
also hidden, unknowable, heated beyond human imagining. Together these metaphors communicate the complexity 
of human unconscious life” (p. x).  
90 Following the definition of the “felt” in Chapter 1, the “feelings” expressed here are not merely emotions, which 
means that it may contradict traditional notions of expression. 
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ugly feelings in an artwork splits off the “felt” dimension of the “perceptive felt” aesthetic 
experience. In the mystical style of Catholic and Protestant Baroque, there is a mystical “felt” 
experience given in the formal qualities of the style, which Witkin must replace with an artistic 
representation of the feelings of ugliness in order to present ugliness as mystical. There are 
philosophical questions about this ‘expression’. Here, we can say the photographer transfers the 
emotions he feels to the audience so that it may arouse the feelings in them or communicates these 
emotions so that the audience can apprehend then (Gracyk, 2012, p. 23).91 This residue will be 
called the “feeling language” of Witkin’s style.92 Descriptions of the felt dimensions of ugliness 
overlap with those of the psychoanalytical pre-symbolic, thereby confirming this relationship. 
They present as a complex network that may occur in the ugly encounter as a state of ambiguous 
feelings concerning the unification with the mother or the undifferentiated world that exist in the 
pre-symbolic reality. Kristeva justifies the bifurcation of these sensations as those that have to do 
with repulsion by/avoidance of, and those of attraction to/approaching of it.  
 
We need to show that Witkin’s formal languages somehow capture feelings associated with being 
an indistinct object oneself – and merging with the undifferentiable matter of the pre-symbolic – 
appears as repulsive: the behavioural reaction of avoidance in repugnance or revulsion. The 
twentieth-century aesthetic theoretician Lipps’ theory of Einfühling explains that when one “feels 
oneself” into the ugly object, we have a “negative form of empathy”, which is a response of offence 
(Lipps, 1979, p. 377, as cited in Simpson, 2004, p.123). Cousins (1995a) discusses how the subject 
 
91 Gracyk (2012) covers the philosophical ideas concerning expression in art (pp. 22-44). A central debate has to do 
with whether expression entails to the self-expression of the artist or the arousal in the viewer. For Tolstoy (1996), 
there is a kind of infection of the emotion of the creator to the spectator – and the spectator must experience this 
emotion in order to understand that it is being expressed. This point is questionable, as it seems that someone can 
understand what is being expressed without fully feeling that range of emotion. This thesis therefore incorporates 
transference and communication as two conditions of expression. Collingwood’s (1928) theory of expression also 
adds the insight that it is the artwork that brings the emotion to the consciousness of the artist (Gracyk, 2012, p. 29). 
Gracyk asks the question of how the artwork “expresses”. One important idea is that of “metaphorical 
exemplification”. He explains that for the philosopher, Kivy (1989), an artwork does not possess sadness but may 
mimic – through some configuration of its formal properties – the appearance of some living being who is angry. It 
is, therefore, ‘angry-looking’, as if the artwork has a persona. Following Gracyk, this demands that we show that 
Witkin’s artwork possesses formal properties that ‘hold’ the feelings of ugliness because they make the artwork look 
as someone would with these feelings (Kivy, 1989 as cited in Gracyk, 2012, p. 29).  
92 It must be emphasised that the elements interpreted as part of the “feeling language” of Witkin’s felt mystical 
experience, languages can dually be interpreted to form his visionary mystical style. These elements are analysed 
separately because they must be shown to respond appropriately to the styles of the original paintings in order to 
make an alternative case for ugliness. We can combine the perceptive elements of his style and the expressive felt 
ones, to say that Witkin’s paintings present the aesthetic experience of ugliness (with both its perceptive and felt 
dimensions as the mystical experience). 
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tries to “clean it away, and when the object refuses to go, the subject retreats to a repertoire of acts 
of turning away, of hiding, and of vanishing … we block our eyes and turn away” (p. 5). The pre-
symbolic is an older reality and is likely to be attributed to the most primitive of human emotions, 
that of fear. In fact, the very meaning of the word ‘ugly’ has its roots in the Old Norse, ugglig, “to 
be feared or dreaded” (Hepburn, 2010, p. 225). The art-theorist, Read (1965), confirms that 
“[u]gliness is a physical aspect of certain objects of horror, objects that inspire fear or terror” (p. 
39). The neuroscientist, Kandel (2012), concurs that the images that the amygdala takes as that 
which is threatening, as being as ugly (pp. 390-391).  
 
According to theories of the pre-symbolic, several types of fear exist, and the ugliness of Witkin’s 
work should capture and trigger these. Klein and Kristeva mention the “death drive” that conjures 
fear of extinction or death: a state of ‘not-being’ that emerges in Klein’s paranoid fear of projected, 
ricocheting unnameable ‘stuff’ that feels to be annihilating (Klein, 2017a, p. 60; Kristeva, 2002 p. 
248).  In this world of no separation, the total badness of this “object internal and externalised” 
may invade or attack, which is the source of the infant’s schizoid attempt to “split off” this badness 
as a separate experience in the part object metonymy of the “bad breast”. According to Lacan 
(2001) (and consequently Kristeva) the ugly object implicates our own ego’s death in one’s idea 
of oneself. Following Lacan’s idea of the ego as the first gestalt object, Cousins (1994) argues that 
the experience of having the objects map onto idealised cognitive schemas mirrors a coherence 
and harmony within our experience of self (as the first object). McMullan (2010) writes that 
Cousins proposes that “the ugly object makes you realise that you are ugly” (p. 225). The ugly 
object instigates a primordial self-experience of the disintegration of Lacan’s hommelette. It 
evokes the horror of the nameless thing that is sensed within the sensations of the self, but which 
is not grouped into a single percept/concept. Pomerance, playwright of The Elephant Man, writes 
that this ugliness “makes us think that he is deeply like ourselves. And yet we are not like each 
other” (Pomerance, 1991, p. 48, as cited in Cashmore, 2016, p. 28).93 In evoking an asymbolia, the 
ugly object feels horrifyingly alienating and out-of-place. Ugliness, as this emergence of this 
“Real” into adult consciousness, is a surge of unable “mass”; this “[t]hing ... the spectral being ... 
linger[s] in the unconscious as that which cannot be named” (Levin, 2008, p. 3). As Carmichael 
 
93 Ehrenzweig (2013) explains that ugliness is found in the Dionysian, the Greek principle of chaos and wholeness 
of existence – when these “half-baked, half-inarticulate Dionysian forms are prematurely exposed to the glare of 
conscious perception” (p. 79). 
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(1972) writes, “Ultimate ugly is … a shaggy-dog experience; one escapes from it with a sense of 
absolute alienation, of being defeated at every level” (p. 498). 
 
In addition, for both Lacan and Kristeva, the “archaic mother” is a source of life-provision, but 
also ego-diffusion and engulfment that renders the ugly object as close. Ugliness, as a form of the 
abject, threatens to infiltrate our ego “skin” boundary (derived from a view of our body-as-object), 
to lure us into an undifferentiated proto-self.94 It is an invasion attached to fears of loss of autonomy 
in the union of mother/reality, of being “immobilised, paralysed, restricted, enveloped, 
overwhelmed, entrapped, imprisoned, smothered, or otherwise controlled by forces beyond our 
control” (Albrecht, 2012, para. 9). Cousins (1994) writes that the ugly object is “coming to get 
[you]” (p. 64), and that it threatens to contaminate a separate ‘space’ (resonant in Kristeva’s 
description of social boundaries of the object).95  As the composer Gagnebin says: “[U]gliness 
offends the senses but cannot be conjured away, ugliness strikes too close to the human subject 
(Gagnebin, 1984 as cited in Hepburn, 2010, p. 216).  In line with this, Hepburn (2010) claims that 
“[w]hereas the beautiful is evanescent and remote; the ugly is never far from fleshiness .… [it is] 
as close as our own bodies” (p. 216). The fear of re-encountering the Real, the impetus for the 
construction of the illusion of the “sculptural fixity of the I” ties it to fears of mutilation – the loss 
of the integrity of any organ, body part or natural function. Ugliness is the wounding of the object 
as we know it; it is a threat of a return to the state of Klein’s paranoid-schizoid “part objects”. 
 
The haptic nature of Lacan’s (2001) hommelette and the evisceration of Kristeva’s semiotic renders 
the disintegration as bodily. Since the body-self or ego-boundary is the first object, the fear of the 
emergence of the muteness of the Real connects intimately to fears of internal sensations of 
fragmentation of the self-object, which Witkin’s style will be shown to conjure.  In fact, Lacan 
(2001) describes the encounter with the Real through the same image as the “wound” in this mirror 
of self-object, to which Cousins (1994) refers in his description of the ugly object. Evans describes 
how “the anticipation of a synthetic ego is henceforth constantly threatened by his sense of the 
 
94 The “skin ego” is a term used by Anzieu (2016) to refer to that which contains, wraps, separates and synthesises 
the self or subject. 
95 This is evidenced in the politics of segregation, such as in the Ugly Laws of 1880s-1970s, in which anyone who 
was “diseased, maimed, mutilated or deformed, so as to be unsightly” was prohibited from physical spaces 
(Henderson, 2015, p. 30). Following the discussion in Chapter 1, Pop (2014) notes that ugliness is “one of the tools 
by which we organize the world” (p. 9). 
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hommelette fragmentation, which manifests itself in the images of castration, emasculation, 
mutilation, dismemberment, dislocation, evisceration, devouring, bursting open of the body, which 
haunt the human imagination” (Evans, 1995, as cited in Hook 2002, p. 166). For Lacan, losing 
one’s bodily identity and being exposed to the sight of disjointed limbs (what he calls the corpse 
morcele), or of those “organs represented in exoscopy, growing wings and taking up arms for 
intestinal persecution” (Lacan, 2001, p. 5) is a horrific reminder for an adult, of this time. They 
emerge in dreams or fantasies as dismemberment (Hook, 2002, p. 156).  
 
The pleasurable feelings that attract us to the ugly object contradict the definition of the ugly object 
as the aesthetic of pain. Baudelaire explains in Choix de maxims consolantes sur l’amor (1846)  
that “[p]leasure in the face of ugliness comes from a mysterious feeling which is the thirst for the 
unknown and a taste for the horrible” (p. 222).96  The experience of the ugly object is comforting 
for three reasons that must be simultaneously evoked by the symbolism and formal qualities that 
comprise Witkin’s feeling-language. Firstly, the ugly object feels familiar, because it comes from 
a time before the self was “abjected”. It is an ‘abject object’ because it represents a time when the 
world of objects was part of the object of the self. Secondly, “pre-symbolic” remnants remind us 
of the pleasurable dimension of unification with the mother, who provides us with a comforting 
stream of life-supply, such that we do not feel the pain of lacking and desiring. There is third 
insight offered in the application of the non-conceptual nature of pre-symbolic to the experience 
of the ugly object. Shock and horror are raw, visceral affectivity in response to the ‘unthinkable’ 
and ‘unpresentable’ ugly object. Yet this essential mysteriousness of that which is unthinkable, a 
felt, “semiotic”, ugly object, means that ugliness offers a titillating intellectual stimulation. In his 
defence of Modernism, the art critic Gombrich (1953) writes that, in encountering ugliness, “our 
mind is set in motion like a squirrel in a cage” (as cited in Taylor, 2014, p. 43).97 As Adams (1947) 
writes: 
 
What gives depth to the ugly experience is the viewer’s desperate hope that at some level or another, 
he will find a rationale for it, in the form of a controlling intelligence. He lives in the purely ugly 
 
96 The question of ugliness, then, can be thought to form part of Hume’s (1963) “paradox of tragedy” (pp. 221-230). 
Why do we take pleasure in artworks that portray pain? 
97 For Gombrich, the ugly art encounter breeds the ‘sophisticated viewer’ because it requires a kind of challenge and 
processing (perhaps of a non-conceptual object): a “chewing … it is the highbrow who prefers crunchy food, 
whereas the beginner is happy with sloppy mush.” (Gombrich, 1952 as cited in Taylor, 2014, p. 66) 
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as a dark labyrinth which absorbs his thought by continually standing at the ungainly, disconcerting 
angle, as if it were not to be grasped by thought at all – as it isn’t (p. 68). 
 
For these reasons, ugliness is frequently described as being interesting. Witkin writes: “The 
darkness within us sometimes is so dark that for me it becomes very fascinating” (as cited in 
Strauss, 2003, p. 51). The critic Kozloff (1984) confirms that this intrigue, characteristic of 
ugliness, exists in Witkin’s work: “Curiosity and disbelief, regarding not only Witkin’s 
motivations but those of his willing subjects, are obvious components in creating this almost 
involuntary sense of fascination felt by some otherwise horror-struck viewers” (as cited in Thall, 
1993, para. 16). For Eco (2007), another reason for which ugly bodies are more interesting than 
beautiful ones is because ugliness knows no bounds – its variety of permutations in the earthly 
world is fascinating, in contrast to the singularity of an ideal. As Eco states: “[W]ith ugliness there 
is an infinity of formations that can take place – you can make a giant, a dwarf, you can make a 
man like Pinocchio with a long nose (as cited in Westall, 2007, para. 4). 
 
This thesis will attempt to show that Witkin’s work presents these experiences as part of an 
encounter with the Godly; an alternative to other forms of mysticism presented in art history. Now, 
with an understanding of how we may be able to identify these three forms of ugliness, we can go 
on to examine how Witkin selects appropriate forms of ugliness to insert in these paintings. He 
hereby replaces these representations of mystical experiences with a visual invocation of a mystical 
experience of the ugly. In the next chapter, we examine how Witkin creates a vision of the Godly 
world of ugliness to replace the vision of mystical heaven of the Renaissance. Conceptual 
hybridisation, physical formlessness (excessive, loose, abortive form), and objects touched by 
other forces, which withstand problems of ugly representation, are the means to identify the ugly 
objects in this formless, hidden, old geomorphological world of the pre-symbolic. In his response 
to the Baroque, formal elements of his style will be shown to express the feelings in the ugly 
encounter and replace other depicted mystical feelings. These include repulsion, fears of 
extinction, ego death, bodily disintegration, and proximity to the body and attractiveness, comfort, 






UGLY MYSTICISM IN WITKIN’S REMAKES OF THE RENAISSANCE PAINTINGS OF 
LEDA AND THE SWAN (1515-1520) AND THE BIRTH OF VENUS (1485) 
 
“What shakes the eye but the invisible?”  
(Theodore Roethke, 1975, “The decision”)  
 
Using the insights from the last chapter, this chapter studies da Sesto’s Leda and the Swan (da 
Sesto, 1515-1520) and Botticelli’s Birth of Venus (Botticelli, 1485) and Witkin’s remakes of these 
paintings, to evidence how Witkin uproots the Renaissance’s negation of ugliness in depictions of 
sights of Godly reality, with a style that places ugliness as mystically central. The contemporary 
theologian, Brown (2004), writes that ideas of Godly experiences constellate around an 
“enchantment of place”.98 In the “Platonic Idealism” of the Renaissance, the spectator is given an 
image of a transcendent alternative reality in which God dwells with befitting-looking objects. 
Inspired by Plato’s mystical image of a transcendent reality of perfect object forms, the 
Renaissance artist – this anointed figure or ‘oracle’ – paints a vista of a supernatural place beyond 
heavens. It contains ideal objects that are ‘de-uglified’ through the removal of perceptual signs of 
ugliness.99 The chapter attempts to argue that, in his remakes, entitled Leda (Witkin, 1986) and the 
Gods of Earth and Heaven (Witkin, 1988), Witkin seems to actively place the pre-symbolic as the 
origin and residence of the ugly as a substitute and, through photography, captures objects with 
signs of extreme ugliness in their ‘habitat’. It hereby argues that, through what it calls an “ugly 
perceptive (or geomorphological) style”, Witkin rebels by becoming his own kind of “visionary” 
or sorcerer (Celant, 1995, p. 249), who makes a statement that he can “see it all” and “see God”, 
in a conversely ugly world (Mullarkey, 1987, p. 107).100 
 
98 This phrase is found in the blurb of Brown’s book, entitled God and the Enchantment of Place (2004).  Brown 
maintains that God can be experienced through cultural and artistic engagement – amongst other things.  
99 This idea of the mystical visual powers of the Renaissance artist comes from Bellori’s 1664 lecture entitled 
“L’Idea del pittore, dell scutore et del architetto (The Idea of the Painter, The Sculptor and the Architect Chosen 
from the Beauties of Nature, Superior to Nature) (Bellori, 2005).  
100 It must be reiterated that Witkin’s style at large presents ugly objects, ugly place, ugly formal feelings, all at 
once. However, in these two chapters, the elements of his “perceptual” ugly style, and his “felt” style are split. The 
perceptual elements of his style are examined as the changes made to the perceptual mystical style of Platonic 
Idealism of the Renaissance. The ugly “felt” elements of his “style” (some of which can also simultaneously be read 
as being “perceptual”) are examined as the changes necessary to make ugliness central in amended versions of “felt” 
mystical styles of the Baroque. 
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Platonic Idealism: A Vision of a Transcendent Heaven Rid of Ugliness 
 
In the paintings Leda and the Swan (da Sesto, 1485) (Fig. 16) and The Birth of Venus (Botticelli, 
1485) (Fig. 17), we can witness visual elements of the Renaissance style at work to create a 
painterly ‘telescope’ into Plato’s world of Forms. We will argue that Witkin’s changes to these 
paintings suggest that he senses that such paintings programme Christians to (mistakenly) flee 
from the spiritual ‘impurity’ of ugliness. Christians at the time of this art historical period took this 
Ancient Greek philosopher’s account of the acquaintance with the non-physical essences of all 
things to provide to be a mystical description of an encounter with God.101 
 
The Renaissance scholar and priest Ficino wrote that for man “[t]ime and space do not prevent 
him from going anywhere at any moment” (as cited in Huyghe, 1967a, p. 184). In these paintings, 
we are given an acquaintance with the Christian Platonic perfect structure of God, through a vision 
of a supernatural context and its concomitant ideal objects. Although, for the ancient Greek 
philosopher, this ‘place’ is a metaphysically separate reality, the process by which one arrives at 
it is mental – a ‘hyperouranic’ world of ideas. We can therefore argue that this renders the ‘place 
elsewhere’ as metaphor of a mystical experience, with its departure from the everyday quality of 
our stream of consciousness. Plato’s actual texts that are taken by the Renaissance claim that there 
exists a transcendent reality in which these ideal, permanent versions of objects (Forms) are 
structures grasped through heightened intellectual engagement. It is linked to a mystical experience 
because these experienced Forms achieve their very perfection in their mirroring of what is called 
the Form of the Good/Beauty/Truth.102 Renaissance Christian interpretations of Plato appropriate 
this as the ideal, omnipresent entity of God.103 As Plato describes in his “Divided Line”, it is 
through intellectual engagement (dianoia) with mathematics, and even higher-order philosophical 
reasoning (noesis), that one grasps the arcane overarching blueprint of the essences that distinguish 
the kinds of things of God’s world. Within this acquaintance, one has a super-sensuous 
 
101 Indeed, it would be simplistic to reduce the Renaissance art historical style of painting’s sole spiritual purpose. 
102 Things are more or less of a type of thing, depending on how they match up to this “ideal” picture. This appeared 
in a lecture entitled L’idea dep pittore, dell acutore et del artitetto (The Idea of the Painter, The Sculptor and the 
Architect chosen from the Beauties of Nature, Superior to Nature) ((Bellori, 2005).  
103 Here, in a neoclassical gesture, the mystical ideas of this Ancient Greek philosopher, Plato, are integrated into 
Christianity. For as, as Magee (1998) explains, “the Platonists were thought of as “Christians before Christ” (p. 29). 
The philosophical historian explains that Christianity sprouted within the period of Hellenism, and that many early 
Christian thinkers attempted to integrate Christianity and Platonism.  
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acquaintance with the Form of the Good (truth/Christian God, Republic, pp. 181-186).104 The 
abstractness of these conceptual objects does not exist in our actual spatiotemporal world.105  
 
Why is ugliness excluded in these pictures of the Godly locus? We could see the Renaissance 
Platonic Idealism as a style that creates a picture of our conceptual prototypes challenged by 
ugliness; a belief in the perfection of (our experience of) God is mirrored in the perfection of our 
abstract, ideal typologies. In fact, Godly universes are inverse to mystical images of the ugly world. 
Following his Allegory of the Cave, Plato sees encounters with material physical objects as 
analogous to the limitation of experiences of chained prisoners observing flickering shadows on 
the grotto wall. As a flawed physical instantiation of a perfect idea, an ugly object is the illusionary 
mirage of the divine order. In these paintings, we are comforted with the idea that our existing 
typological prototypes of objects do really represent the ‘true’ ontological blueprints for types of 
things in our world, and that their idealisation mirrors the ultimate perfection of God (Form of the 
Good) (514a–520a) – that we can know God in our thoughts. It is an intimacy and familiarity with 
a God that cannot be in physical incarnations that are ugly. In Witkin’s ugly mysticism, God lies 
outside these very templates for ordering reality. This is, perhaps, because his perfection itself is 
inconceivable. Bailey (2017) notes that, through his artwork, the artist “forg[es] his way into 
uncharted territory” as a person wishing to find “something that they can’t fathom but hope to see” 
(para. 9, italics added). 
 
These mystical beliefs also demand that supernaturalism must be created to make perfection 
possible and to ‘kill off’ terrestrial ugliness, for “ugliness never transcends the physical” (Hepburn, 
 
104 See, more specifically, sections 509d-511c. 
105 Cohen (2006) helps us to locate the places in which Phaedo describes the characteristics and functions of the 
forms: “unchangeable (78c10-d9); eternal (79d2); intelligible, not perceptible (79a1-5); divine (80a3, b1); causes of 
being or ‘The one over the many’ (100c); Are unqualifiedly what their instances are only with qualification (75b)” 
(para. 10). Cohen also notes that in the Timeus, there is further elaboration of them being non-temporal (37e-38a); 
they do not become, they simply are (27d3-28a3) and the Phaedrus as them as non-spatial (247c,(para. 10). With 
this in mind, is the notion of the painterly image (eikon) – of spatiotemporal sensory perception of this invisible, 
eternal, cerebral (what is called “hyperouranic”) epiphany– not paradoxical? Indeed, for Plato, the practice of art is 
antithetical to enlightenment, since, for Plato, the perception of actual things in physical reality (things that may be 
potentially ugly) is already illusionary (perception/pistis) – and art depicts that illusion (imagination/eikrasia) – as 
“doubly deceptive, for they are the illusionary semblances of [earthly] things that are illusionary semblances” 
(Magee, 1998, p. 29). However, in his eminent Renaissance lecture of 1664, Bellori anoints the artist with the power 
of Plato’s philosopher. 
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2010, p. 219).106 The ugly perceptual markers of Chapter 2 are worldly forces of time, or limited 
human conceptualisation, which create “ineluctable individuality, contingency and [a very] 
resistance to the ideal” that is Renaissance God (Cousins, 1994, p. 61). When the signs of earthly 
incarnation are removed, the object takes on inanimateness and ideality of a concept. In this version 
of mysticism, only such abiotic abstract ontological prototypes bear a perfection that adequately 
captures the pure perfection that is the essence of God.107 Ruckstuhl (1917) writes that the painterly 
transformation of objects through Renaissance idealism “lifts the mind and soul above the 
commonplace” and is thus Godly (p. 253).108 
 
Platonic Idealism, therefore, cultivates the site of an exemplary universe, by cultivating a 
supernatural world using appropriately Platonic ‘de-uglifying’ strategies of referential abstraction, 
sculptural geometricization, and mathematical principles, to give us an image of perfect and 
fictional exemplars of cerebral objects of Plato’s eternal absolute Forms. It is significant to point 
out that this otherworldliness is, at the most basic level, intrinsic to painting as artwork. A painting 
cannot evidence that the scene it presents actually occurred, for there is always a way in which the 
artist paints. The very meaning of the painting resides in the interpretation of reality in a two-
dimensional picture through the formal and material qualities from which da Sesto builds the 
representation (Leda and the Swan) as this oil on a wooden board.109 Since, the representation 
subject matter is always presented in/by these representational qualities, paintings are intrinsically 
alternative realms that present different “way[s] of seeing” (Scruton, 1981, pp. 2-3).110 
 
106 It is essential to acknowledge that theorists have debated the existence of a Form of the Ugly (White, 1979, p. 
161). This possibility is heeded to in the concept of “intrinsic ugliness” mentioned in Chapter 1. 
107 This inverse relationship does not prove the beauty-ugly binary, because substantive aesthetic properties are not 
only perceptive, but also felt. The set of feelings of ugliness are not all perfectly “opposite” to beauty. 
108 Ruckstuhl (1917) describes idealism by detailing its choice of subject matter, and formal qualities that represent 
that subject matter depicted. Idealism in art means first, the choice of a subject dealing with things and activities 
above the commonplace in nature, and second, in the representation of the subject chosen, in such a manner as to 
indicate that the artist searched for and chose such forms as are universally regarded as the most perfect of their kind 
(pp. 254-255). 
109 da Sesto’s painting is inspired by Leonardo da Vinci’s two paintings of the scene (1503-1510), which were lost 
with only the sketches remaining. 
110 For more on the nature of representation, see Gracyk (2012, pp. 1-18). For the purposes of this thesis, the 
conventional idea of resemblance will be said to pertain to representation: x represents y, because it looks like y. It is 
not, as Nelson Goodman (1976) puts it, a case of x being read in a pictorial symbol system. For Goodman, “no 
degree of resemblance is sufficient to establish the requisite relationship of reference” (1976, p. 5, as cited in 
Gracyk, 2015, p. 7). The continuum of recognising the object as a ‘thing’ through resemblance or as a ‘symbol’ can 
be mapped onto corresponding representational ideologies. In realism, x represents y by virtue of resemblance. In 




To begin with, the subject matter of da Sesto’s painting is fantastical: it is based on the Greek myth 
in which Leda, who is seduced and raped by the king of the Greek gods, Zeus, in the guise of a 
swan, on the same night as she is impregnated by her husband, Tyndareus (Littleton, 2005).111 
These sexual acts result in her bearing two children from these men. She delivers the babies in 
large birds’ eggs. This depiction of the story shows Leda caressing the flirtatious swan as she 
stands alongside her infants as they hatch from their shells (Littleton, 2005). Leda’s rendezvous 
with the swan takes place on a plateau, raised before an extensive vista that extends into the 
distance. The meeting is staged in dense scenery in ‘the middle of nowhere’ with the sight of a 
medieval village on a hill. Beyond, are scattered tree-groves stretching far into the distance. 
 
Through techniques of supernaturalism, da Sesto creates a nameless, suspended Eden, an instance 
of anti-ugly “beyond-earth-ideal” with its own/no physics (Brown Golden, 1996, p. 87). An infinite 
paradise is suggested through devices of spatial recession, such as of scale change, a vanishing 
point and of aerial perspective (Ruckstuhl, 1917, p. 53).112 The disturbed, exaggerated size of the 
enormous egg and swan, relative to the woman, defies metrological norms. Light is manipulated 
to create this place of Plato’s pervasive illuminative sun. The ground is stripped of shadows given 
by the distant solar source. Streaky rays of atmospheric refraction substituted with the suffused 
glowing yellow of illumination that touches the haloed hair of the cherub-children in the numinous 
 
111 Linda and Peter Murray’s (1985) argument is that this association between Humanism and the non-divine is 
fallacious. It was not, as Murray and Murray explain, that the school of thinkers were choosing paganism over 
Christianity. They explain that the mythological and astrological interest in the Renaissance thinkers has led atheists 
to claim some of these figures as atheistic or neo-paganistic ‘ancestry’. However, this is spurious since the 
Renaissance treated all ‘classical’ subject matter in a Christian way: “Even Botticelli’s Allegory of Spring (c.1477-
1482) has been shown to have a Christian interpretation, esoteric and elaborate as it might be” (pp. 10-11). For a 
groundbreaking survey of the transmission of pagan ideas and iconographies in the Renaissance, see Wind’s Pagan 
Mysteries of the Renaissance (1980). 111 Through the use of polytheism, the Christian-Platonic mysticism is infused 
with a philosophy of “humanism” – “Man is as good as God [is] a theme for the artist” (Read, 1951, p. 27), and the 
perfected human being becomes a symbol of Godly power. The gods of the legends of Olympus take on human form 
and the virtuosity of the artist is seen to be god-like. Levey refers to Michelangelo’s David (1504), saying “[he does 
not] require any miraculous help from God, it is he who is God” (Levey, 1974, p. 161). 
112 A vanishing point is the mark of disappearance or cessation of what can be seen in the distance and is used in 
linear perspectival rendering. Aerial perspective is the blurring effect mimicking the perception of seeing into the 
distance by depicting objects that are further away as less detailed, paler, and often in recessive, cooler colours than 
those closer to the eye. 
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penumbra. The soft blending of edges and of the light and shade through sfumato accentuate a 
“dense transparency of [still] air”, a spiritual “infusing and vibrating” (Argan, 1967, p. 120).113  
 
To create Plato’s suitably idealized (and thus non-ugly) objects, the artist uses appropriately 
cerebral Platonic techniques of referential abstraction and sculptural geometricization to create the 
perfect painterly depictions of the volumes of unchangeably impeccable Forms. It is helpful to 
reiterate that these processes naturally extract ugly markers of conceptual hybridisation and 
insufficient or blemished corporeality. Visual abstraction demands that the woman, the swan, the 
eggs and the natural context are not, as in realism, a copy of any existing objects with their unique 
and actual specifications. Bellori seems to refer to this point in his distinguished Renaissance 
lecture of 1664, in which the biographer pronounces that the artist is a “seer of the abstract 
perfection of forms who gazes upon the eternal verities and reveals them to mortal men” (Bellori, 
1664 as cited in Obsourne, 1986, p. 556).114 Through a technique of referential abstraction, the 
artist gives impossible conceptual exemplars of ‘womanhood’, ‘swanhood’, and ‘treehood’. He 
achieves this by using composites derived from the study of different objects of that kind: “he 
observes nature, mending it and integrating it with an example of beauty that does not come from 
sifting nature in whatever nature they wish to imitate, but through the selective and speculative 
sieve of the inner idea” (Wohl & Sedgwick, 2005, p. 10). As the prominent art historian Read 
(1951) puts it, he thereby eliminates the “deficiencies, excrescences and deformities of individual 
 
113 This, once again, reinforces the Allegory of the Cave as a theory advanced by Plato regarding human perception 
and the true nature of reality. The story is that of three prisoners, who, since birth, have been inside a cave and 
whose vision has been restricted to seeing only the wall in front of them. Shadows cast onto the wall of moving 
figures and objects before an outside fire become the only reality for these captives. One of these confident men, 
breaking free, recognises the ignorance resulting from this limited perception in contrast to the realm of sunlight. 
Plato likens those unlearned in the Theory of Forms to these prisoners. For him, light is a metaphor for human 
understanding and the conceptualisation of truth. Ignorance is represented by the remaining incarcerated men who 
have not seen the truth of the world. Following this, 113 Sfumato of the Renaissce (derived from the Italian “smoke”) 
is the softening of the outlines by blending colours and tones to create “ethereal” haziness or melting together 
without perceptive edges of objects (Zirpolo, 2016, p. 454). It is as if a veil or dense air is placed between the 
painting and viewer. Oil painting enables this effect. Sfumato was developed by da Vinci in order to render an object 
without using an outline so that it felt unbounded. 
 
114 The seventeenth-century antiquarian Bellori provided one of the most seminal texts in the history and criticism of 
Western art in his The Lives of Modern Painters, Sculptors and Architects (1672). The first edition (1672) contained 
biographies of nine painters (Annibale, Agostino, Caracci, Boarocci, Caravaggio, Rubens, Van Dyck, Domenichino, 
Lanfranco and Poussin Carracci), the sculptors (François Duquesnoy and Alessandro Algardi), and one architect 
(Domenico Fotanana. Bellori knew these artists personally, and the book also contains significant details about the 
relationship between Rome and France. The introduction book provides a classist theory of art; it was presented as a 
lecture Academy of St Lukes, Rome in 1664 (Bellori, 2005). 
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things – that which is ugly .… [T]he abstract idea of the forms is more perfect than in actuality ” 
(p.75)115 
The Platonically inspired techniques of idealisation employed by da Sesto, in order to manifest 
such perfection of abstract exemplars, are those articulated by the early twentieth-century historian 
Wölfflin. Through a “linear style”, objects are individually outlined and modelled in tone to make 
closed, separate, measured masses (Wölfflin, 1915, pp. 14-16).116 Such techniques give way to an 
abiotic, impervious “petrification” or “sculpting” out of organic, corporeal substance, 
 
115 An example of this abstracting and essentialising process is described in Pliny’s Encyclopaedia when in the creation 
of Helen’s portrait for the Temple of Hera, Zeus is used as the idealising technique in which he chose the admirable 
features from five women and created a composite for her image (Pliny the Elder, AD 77-79, p. xxx, as cited in 
Osbourne, 1986, p. 5). Osbourne (1986) states that “similar stories are recorded by Cicero and others; that the method 
is referred to with approval by Alberti in his De picture (1436) and that the artist Durer said that he examined some 
200 to 300 individuals for the ideal type of beauty” (p. 555). 
116 In Principles of Art History (1950), Heinrich Wölfflin distilled several criteria for defining the characteristics to 
be applied to the formal analysis of fifteenth and sixteenth-century Renaissance painting in contrast to those of the 
Baroque of the seventeenth century. 
Figure 16. da Sesto, Leda and the Swan, 1505-1510 (Krén & Marx, 2006) 
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consistencies of objects of supple flesh or permeable tissue. For this empyrean locale, there is a 
“permanence and certitude” of eternal perfection that is foreign to material and mortal earth 
(Brown Golden, 1996, p. 87). Huyghe (1967b) writes that Renaissance painting was 
 
 [u]sed to imitate the sharpest metal, and the hardest and most compact stone, and to give them a 
sort of excess of definition which confers a trenchant and in some respects, exaggerated response 
to form. A hard world of steel and flint dominates everything whose softness and fluidity might 
weaken the dominance of forms (p. 92). 
 
An ovoid for the swan’s head, spheres for Leda’s breasts, ellipsoids for mountains, and cuboids 
for the parish, are the symmetrical building blocks of these calcified geometric beings, sealed with 
plaster with even colour for perpetuity. Both bird and woman exemplify “closed form”. Despite 
the sinuous lines that describe the loose-limbed contrapposto-posed Venus, and the curving and 
twisting in the willowy-necked great bird, the boundaries of their forms are not broken by jutting 
appendages of gestural actions of the living. Instead, dynamism resides as contained within the 
streamlined volumes of the general structures. Even the playful cherubs are compacted and 
contained in a neat, triangular frame that harnesses their frolicking. There is an “absolute clarity” 
given to each object-form through an articulation of this colour and tone (that describes the light 
shining from the viewer’s left), instead of a weaving together of overlapping elements into the 
greater whole of the painting. A horizontal-vertical axis grids an almost symmetrical arrangement 
of elements so that a repetitive rhythm of curves in Leda’s full thighs and the bird’s stomach and 
the ‘s’ shaped swirling across the interlinked woman and bird create an all-pervasive compositional 
order (Editore & Conti, 1979, p. 31). Finally, da Sesto masks out any expression of vagarious 
human sentiment in this non-living world of formulated stone. Leda’s visage remains austerely 
serene with partly closed-eyes, a frozen half-smile and gentle embracing of the animal after the 
bestial rape; this penetration of the worldly by the divine as a metaphor for the imposition of 
perfection on the existing-earthly in envisaging God’s place. 
 
Another mystical Renaissance painting controverted by Witkin, The Birth of Venus (Botticelli, 
1485), further evidences Platonic Idealism’s strategies for ridding ugliness from Godly sites. For, 
as Hartt (1970) puts it, Botticelli is known as an artist “concerned less with the outer world … but 
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with the life of the spirit” (p. 270). His “exploration of the unreal was accompanied with the benefit 
of devices invented by the Renaissance to conquer the real” (p. 292, italics added). The narrative 
of Botticelli’s emblematic work is also derived from Greek mythology and depicts the fantastical 
story of Aphrodite’s arrival on the island of Cyprus (Aphrodite, the Greek goddess of love and 
beauty, becomes Venus in Roman mythology and is known as such in the Italian Renaissance). 
Legend has it that this goddess was magically spawned from the foam of her father Uranus, whose 
severed genitals were cast into the ocean by his rival son, Cronos (Hagen & Hagen, 2003, p. 35). 
Here, Venus is depicted floating miraculously forward on a large shell-boat in neverland. Other 
Pagan gods are present. To the spectators left in the upper-corner of the format, the god of the 
West-wind, Zephyrus, is winged and intertwined mid-air with the nymph Chloris, whom he 
abducts. She later transforms into Flora, goddess of flowers. With cheeks puffed out, Zephyrus 
blows Venus shoreward to be met by Flora, who personifies spring and rebirth (Hagen & Hagen, 
2003, p. 96). Wearing myrtle as a necklace and a garment sprigged with cornflowers, Flora has a 
sash of red roses, as she is poised to cast a wafting, pink cloak onto the naked, approaching 
goddess. This ritual symbolises her transition between the spiritual and physical realms at birth 
(Hagen & Hagen, 2003, p. 95).  
 
The sculptural quality that stiffens Venus in her relaxed contrapposto pose is also in the other 
figures, and in the surrounding context: the accompanying supple gods, the usually lithe trees in 
the grove are all chiselled into outlined shapes of a frontal view of a sculpture-in the-round.117 
Even the flowing garments become molded as masses. Geometric “renovation” of the otherwise 
ugly fleshy patina of the mortal body is apparent in the volumetric spheres, ovoids and cylinders 
of heads, breasts, limbs and tree trunks. Their outlines are painted-in with the medium of 
coagulating egg tempura. With its level finish given by a post-varnish gloss, it works out the 
appearance of ugly idiosyncratic biotic wear-and-tear with a durable surface-texture of silicone or 
protective plaster. The mathematically precise formations of the painting are enhanced by 
symmetry in the composition: there is a diagonal moving through the Zephyrus-Chloris couple on 
the left, and another by Flora lurching forward on the right of the centrally placed “s”-shaped form 
of Venus. Following Wölfflin, the ordering of these object masses creates a clarity absent in 
 
117 Contrapposto is the asymmetrical position of a standing on one foot such that shoulders and arms twist off-axis 
from the hips and legs. 
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ordinary perceptual experience so that each typological prototype appears unnaturally well-
fashioned to the eye of the spectator. Even the smaller “c” form details in the ocean, tresses of hair, 
and fabric-folds, are carved ridges. The mathematical proportions – derived from the classical 
Greeks Polyclitus and Praxiteles – create a perfect female form in Venus “the measurements of an 
equal distance between the breasts, between the navel and breasts and between the navel and the 
crotch” (Hagen and Hagen, 2003 p. 93).118 
 
We are taken far away from our ordinary, ugly reality to meet God’s perfection. An extraterrestrial 
space-lessness of what Read (1951) calls a “hyper-earth”, is created through shallow space of 
limited planes. Without the use of recession of scale in the waves, the ocean becomes a shallow, 
tame pond on which to float or sail (even upon a shell on which one cannot sink or be tided astray). 
Sans shadow and perspective, the figures are effortlessly airborne in suspension or flight. The 
kempt hair and lavish outfits of the characters and Venus’ porcelain body – unscathed after this 
voyage – are improbable in an incident of landing-on-shore after dangerous seafaring. Neatly-
spaced violet snippets float across the painting’s surface, as if to defy the laws of gravity.119 Wet 
ocean and dry mounds of green lawn are sundered by a line-barricade: gone is any sign of a 
transitional coastline that might pose a threat of sandstorm and elemental injury or grazing by 
granular beach sand to these mannequins-deities. 
 
118 Polyclitus developed the formula for a perfect male body, called Kalon. As Lawton (2013) writes: “To govern a 
creative process shaping physical material, the Greek sculptor Polykleitos developed a sequentially proportional 
systematic canon to extract the whole human form in correct proportions from a single base figure. The method 
begins with one part, such as the last (distal) phalange of the little finger, treated as one side of a square. Rotating 
that square’s diagonal gives a 1:√2 rectangle, suitable for the next (medial) phalange. The method is repeated to get 
the next phalange, then (using the whole finger) to get the palm; then using the whole hand to get the forearm to the 
elbow, then the forearm to get the upper arm” (para. 14-15).  
119 Violets are a symbol of modesty but were also used as love potions. 
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The finish of marblesque, obdurate morphology of the imperishable inhabitants of this magical 
place, is imparted not only through the objects described, but also from Botticelli’s allusion to 
valuable stones, which are both suggested in the images and through the use of precious pigment. 
The gesso-canvas is set with the robustness and extraordinariness of gems: “adorned with jewels 
and flowers clad in diaphanous drapery to show clearly that her eyes shine like precious stones, 
that her lips have the colour and perfume of roses” (Argan, 1967, p. 18). The foliage of the orange 
trees, Zephyrus’ features, the veins of the shells and the spirals in the roses, are gilded with a gold-
leaf luminosity of revelation (Hagen & Hagen, 2003, p. 97).  There is the expensive, exotic pigment 
Lapus Lazuli, used in the blue cornflowers of Flora’s dress, and embroidery of the cinnabar cloak 
that she holds, and in Zephyrus and Chloris’ luscious ultramarine silk. They don this Godly place 
as Plato’s everlasting kingdom reigning over earth; a power transferred to the deified power of the 
Medici merchant-wealth in Florence at that time. 
 
The myth of Venus’ birth depicted in this Platonically conceptualised artwork is Botticelli 
symbolising Christianity’s own ‘Platonic Ladder’ or celestial pilgrimage (Gombrich, 1945).120 The 
contemporary art-historian Mack (2002), explains that Venus’ name is that of the brightest star 
(she is the goddess of physical and spiritual love) and that God’s paradise of eternal salvation is 
 
120 Gombrich’s essay Botticelli’s Mythologies: A Study of Neo Platonic Symbolism in his Circle (1945) discusses 
Botticelli’s commitment to Neo-Platonism. 




believed to be located in the “sky of heavens” (pp. 225-226). For the philosopher Ficino, Venus 
“leads mortals to heaven” (Hagen & Hagen, 2003, p. 96).121 
 
Ugly Mysticism: A Photographic Descent into the Geomorphological Mindscape of Ugliness 
 
Witkin’s “divine revolt” lies in his disruption of the “de-uglifying” strategies of place and form 
that we have seen to be used by Platonic Idealism, in order to express his alternative mysticism of 
ugliness. Through an analysis of his remakes, we can demonstrate that he achieves this debunking 
of this Godly transcendence by substituting the anti-ugly supernaturalism with the 
geomorphological underworld and the objects in that context, with those that bear perceptual 
markers of the ugly aesthetic. Indeed, as we have shown above, the Platonic Godly locale is 
inhospitable to ugliness, because ugliness is shown to occur through the acts of natural forces of 
mortal perceptual limitations of earthly instantiation – Witkin titles his book as well as his own 
version of Botticelli’s painting as “The Gods of Earth and Heaven” (Witkin, 1989, italics added). 
As has been suggested above, the very idealised forms presented in the Renaissance are 
representations of conceptual schemas that become shattered in the geomorphological occurrence 
that takes place in the ugly objects of Witkin’s world. However, within the geomorphological 
metaphor, there is the idea that the very experience of this ugly object is a ‘portal’ to another mode 
of perceptual experiencing – a numinous mode of seeing  that is stowed as an experiential memory 
in the mental or psychic or in the phenomenological underworld.122 In actual fact, we can posit 
that Witkin substitutes signs of the ugly place and ugly objects into his versions of Renaissance in 
order to present the ‘otherworld’ given to us in pre-symbolic seeing as an alternative form of 
acquaintance with the Godly. This revised picture of a Godly world is what Coke (1985) seems to 
be referring to in his reference to Witkin’s “revitalised spiritual content” (p. 11).  
 
121 Hartt (1970) explains that Botticelli was commissioned to paint mythological subjects popular among Florentine 
patrons and that although his themes have had many interpretations, there is not one meaning that can be derived 
“from the same classical legends” (Hartt, 1970, p. 287). Hartt emphasises that “planetary personifications” had great 
power over human life and destiny, and that classical mythologies prevailed in the midst of Christianity, where the 
“allegorical closely paralleled that of Christian subjects” (Hartt, 1970, p. 289). Indeed, the mystical continued to reside 
in Renaissance artwork in Christian Italy of that period.   
122 Here, we can clarify a seeming paradox: the signs of ugliness are this-worldly; but the experience itself make it 
simultaneously otherworldly. The phenomenon of ugliness takes place because of spatiotemporal conditions that make 
perfect objects impossible – they are the signs that ugliness is unfolding in an object. However, its essential ontological 
originates from an earlier hidden [Godly] mental reality, in contrast to that of ordinary perception, and therefore takes 
us to an experiential “otherworld”. 
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Let us first examine Witkin’s replacement of the Renaissance idealised objects with versions that 
reflect the ugly aesthetic in the extreme: those that are strongly “perceptually marked” by 
loose/excessive/abortive form or conceptual hybridisation. In his remake of da Sesto’s painting, 
which he calls Leda, the pristine enmarbled voluptuous woman is replaced by an emaciated 
transgender male dressed up as a female. The scrawny protagonist in this “Leda-drama” appears 
as if ‘she’ has had her body of flesh eaten away or atrophied by intrusive forces of ugliness, perhaps 
by disease. This character is heroic human God and an ugly multiply-hybridised being: a male-
female, human-animal chimaera: bearing ram-horn ringlets, bird-horse-giraffe bowed legs, 
double-jointed and dark-nailed webbed-claws. She peers upward into space through a sheer eye-
mask from a gaunt face with lipsticked mouth, and his tilted head dons a legal wig of a judge. 
Another object of the Renaissance original – the lean, tall curvilinear s-shape of the swan in da 
Sesto’s version – is exchanged for a plump and excessively feathered duck, that is compressed into 
the squat form, and an into an oversized pillow it is propped on, to create one formlessly ugly, 
billowing and bulging lump. An oversized broken dinosaur-sized eggshell in the viewer’s left feels 
shrapnel-cracked. It feels scratched by the ugly earthly forces of explosive pressure or gravitational 
impact, which is distinctly different from the petal-like edges of da Sesto’s small ovals. The rigid 
cherubs of the Renaissance, comprised of ovoid and eclipse forms, are now a supine swollen infant 
with eyes balaclava-ed. Reeking of abortion or abandonment, they are befallen, as ugly objects 
are, by the spirit of death soon after birth. Witkin (1997) makes explicit that the physical mark of 
being touched or impurified by death is sacred: it is a testament to the robustness of terrestrial 
survival: “nothing is as boring as that which is okay” (p. 57). For Witkin, there is something 
spiritual about the way some thingless thing remains, despite the power of earthly corrosion (p. 
97).123 
 
The ugly perceptual markers that are identified in the objects of Witkin’s Leda (Witkin, 1986) 
(Fig. 18) recur in the subject matter of his transmogrification of Botticelli’s painting in his Gods 
of Earth and Heaven (Witkin, 1988) (Fig. 19). To create conceptual hybridity, Witkin plays with 
prototypes of real and unreal by transforming Botticelli’s idyllic landscape, which becomes an 
ersatz theatre backdrop placed on a stage. Botticelli’s waves are now hand-painted v-shaped waves 
 
123 He says this when referring to the photographing of HIV/AIDS victim, John, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Witkin 




of a sea-scaped cloth, and his flowers stuck on several large, plastic blossom cut-outs. Venus stands 
on a stylized ‘stage-set-mound’ – in her familiar contrapposto stance – in front of a replica of 
Botticelli's pleated – concave disc – mollusc shell. Besides for this painterly cross-breeding, the 
theatrical-realistic, the emphatic makeup, long black hair, implant-scared breasts and male genitals 
make this Venus intersex, and thus an ugly amalgam/subversion of sex and gender prototypes.124 
Standing in profile, Flora is a transgender female. She holds a collared cape of stiff satin or taffeta 
appliqued and embroidered with flowers, that seems too heavy to be able to be tossed over the 
alighting Venus, to conceal her nakedness. Ugliness inheres in the way in which conservative 
sexual-orientation ideals are, too, challenged here: Zephyrus, Chloris are both gay ‘boys’ – locked 
together with swatches of fabric, seemingly suspended in flight as they enter from the wings of the 
stage, probably held by theatrical apparatus. There is also a cultural fluidity in this remake of what 
is archetypally Eurocentric: both Chloris and Flora bear ambiguously Asian, Hispanic, Mexican, 
and Native American thick hair, slanted eyes and darkened skin tone. Witkin adds an entombed, 
naked man beneath the stage-platform of a timber slab, to Botticelli’s glass-slick sea. This 
memento mori in this memento vivre artwork is ambiguously alive (open-eyed, fresh-fleshed) and 
dead (buried, still). 125 The body is further perceptually marked by ugliness. Knifed by a long 
horizontal wound in this ugly, transitional state, it is susceptible to the external forces of immanent 
micro-biotic invasion in decomposition. 126 
 
124 In fact, her unique gestures of one hand on her chest (instead of on a breast) and the other on her thigh (rather than 
placed over a lock of golden hair concealing her pudenda) show confident acceptance of herself – despite her 
backward, sideways cocked head that expresses her defensiveness in front of the camera. 
125 Memento vivre – Latin for “remember that you must live”, is the opposite assertion to momento mori, “remember 
you must die”. 
126 In his article Botticelli Reimagined: The Adventure of Venus on Earth, Wright (2016) describes Witkin’s 
“photographic reenactment … with its transgender models” as a liberated message “as an up-to-date version”, as “an 
avatar for our devotion, anxieties and agendas” (para. 17).  
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Witkin replaces the medium of painting with traditional analogue photography to capture the 
ugliness of these objects as they are, and therefore achieves confrontation with the ugliness of 
these objects that is impossible in Renaissance painting. Indeed, painting facilitates Platonic 
Idealism’s concealment of ugliness because it can modify or invent the appearance of the object: 
the way in which objects are ‘fixed’ to make them ideal through an extrication of ugly blemishes 
is one example of this fictionalism.127 Photographs are what Lowenstein (2007) calls a form of 
true realism, in that they do not renovate, transform or sublimate the ugly object in the act of 
representation. This is because it is the refraction of the object’s light onto the camera, which partly 
makes its own representation. It is this mechanical process, by which, in the words of Scruton 
(1981) the (ugly) object causes the photographic representation of it. We thus believe the resulting 
photograph to evidence this Leda as having existed.128 Sontag (1979) writes: “From a real body, 
 
127 The works under consideration in this thesis predate the use of digital photography, in which there is a diminishing 
of belief in the viewer of the authenticity of the photograph as a true replication of what actually existed. Our 
understanding of Witkin’s works is that what we see in the photograph is what the artist witnessed and caught on film. 
We do not suspect manipulation by digital techniques because these are photochemical prints.  
128 Barthes (1984) writes that “the discovery, by chemists of silver halogens made it possible to “… recover and 
print directly the luminous rays emitted by a variously lighted object” (p. 81). On the Chambre obscure ou Chambre 
(vol. 3., 1975) in the great Encyclopedie, there appears an entry describing how the camera obscura produced the 
“highly amusing spectacle of images perfectly resembling objects in all their colours and movements”. It would 
enable “anyone who does not know how to draw to imitate the appearance of this with great exactitude” (Hockney 
& Gayford, 2016, p. 216). 




which was there, proceed radiations, which ultimately …. will touch me like the delayed rays of a 
star … light … here is a carnal medium” (p. 81). This insight implies that that Witkin defiantly 
enhances our confrontation with the ugliness of chimerical Leda, bulged duck, the decomposing 
corpse and the rest of the ugly objects in this scene, by drawing on the way in which the viewer 
“sees through” a photograph onto the (ugly) object as if it were an actual one (Walton, 1984, p. 
252). The qualities inherent in photography as a medium do not only mimic normal perceptual 
experience more successfully than painting. The viewer also believes in this power to document 
with veracity because it is a machine – it is a “principal recording agent” (p. 184). A photograph 
is, in the words of Lowenstein, a “mimetic object” or surrogate possession of the (ugly) reality. In 
his Camera Lucida (1984), the twentieth century semiotician and literary theorist, Barthes, invests 
the photograph with such great power to replicate the experience of the original photographed 
object, that for him, the image is an “emanation” of the object (p. 24).  It is as if the subject and 
representation are “laminated” together, such that neither object nor representation can exist 
without one another (p. 5). 
 
Photography also disturbs the subterfuge of Renaissance idealisation by enhancing the ugliness of 
these objects. The fact that Witkin photographs these extreme forms of ugliness means that he 
intensifies this ugly-geomorphological experience of encountering that which is otherwise hidden 
– psychically and therefore socially. In other words, Witkin can be seen to draw on the genre of 
“oddity photography”, because photographs enable the viewer to come face to face with what 
would otherwise be avoided, unencountered or socially sidelined because of ugliness’ scariness 
and proclaimed badness.129 As Garner (2003) writes, “the subject of [Witkin’s] photographs, 
which seem literally beyond belief, are presented as photographic fact, and Witkin has exploited 
the documentary aspect of photography to increase the discomfort of the viewer” (p. 233). 
Following the geomorphological metaphor, the qualities of the mystical in the photograph do not 
conceal the effect of the ugly, as in the paintings he references, but reveal objects that Witkin 
presents as the source of mystical revelation. Evoking the historical resonances of circus 
performance, of “freaks” or rare “miracles of nature”, Witkin’s photographs therefore, remove 
 
129 It should be noted that while Witkin works in the oddity genre (which depicts the marginalized as medical 
pathology), this genre is by no means the only ‘visuality of disability’. For example, Bender (2017) examines genres 
that illuminate the beauty of the intersex or “variant” body. Further, Bogdan (2012) examines “ordinary people 
photography”, genre that attempts to normalize a disabled person by placing him in pleasant, mundane contexts.   
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“doubt from the population’s beliefs concerning human oddities .… There was evidence that the 
phenomenon was real, and that if one bought a ticket to see it, one wouldn’t be tricked or taken 
for a sucker” (Ostman, 1996, p. 122). The ugliness of these subjects prohibits the viewer from 
staring at them out of interest or in amazement in real life.130 Beyst (2006) writes: “It is real humans 
that are photographed by Witkin and not merely self-created beings conjured up on the canvas, 
like those of Bacon (who merely let himself be inspired by photos)” (para. 21). Garner (2003) goes 
on to explain that Witkin’s “models are real-life human beings displaying practices and 
deformities that one would never dare observe at length in everyday life, yet there they are, fixed 
in the photograph for contemplation” (p. 23). 
 
While Witkin exploits the viewers trusting of the veracity of the photograph, he also draws on the 
simultaneous and potentially contradictory capacity of the photograph to amplify a sub-sensory 
ontological mysteriousness of ugliness – to enhance the thinglessness, identity-lessness and 
unknowability inherent in the experience of the ugly objects that appear in his reworked versions 
of these paintings. Here, there is an invalidation of the fictional idealism of Renaissance painting, 
which gives us a harmonious sense that the true essence of things in the world coheres to already-
existing schemas. Perhaps this is the reason why Witkin refers to the camera as an updated spiritual 
device that supersedes the medium of painting used by visionaries of the Renaissance past: “[I]f 
Giotto and Fra Angelico were alive today, they’d be photographers” (as cited in Beem, 2008, para. 
6). In her intersex signs and anthropomorphism, Witkin’s Leda is less of a male/human she needs 
to be in order to be a male/human She does not fit into schemas, and is not, using the definition of 
ugliness given, any type of thing. Thus,following Aristotle metaphysical system, cannot be a thing 
at all. Parry writes that the artist believes that photography enhances this elusiveness; that the 
“[T]he camera is a sacred vessel through which pass rays of light to the ultimate mysteries of 
existence” (Witkin, 1998, as cited in Parry, 1998, p. 184, italics added). Schwenger (2000) echoes 
this point by referring to how Witkin’s photographs of corpses call on Lacan’s “metaphysics of 
the image” by redoubling the experience of the Real and hommelette in Lacan’s “shattering of the 
 
130 The “visuality” of disability, as an instance of human ugliness, particularly in public spaces is explored at length 
by Garland-Thompson, in her Freakery: Cultural Spectacles of the Extraordinary Body (1996) where she argues 
that the freak show, in fact, encouraged acceptance and tolerance of the “anomalous”. She goes further to examine 




mirror image” (p. 400). This replication is what the photographer Arbus seems to mean in her 
claim: “A photograph is a secret about a secret … the more it tells you, the less you know” (as 
cited in Peres, 2013, p. 241). 
 
In order to understand how Witkin’s photographing of his ugly objects may make them uglier. 
However, we can draw on Barthes’ (1984) explanation of the ways in which photographs help us 
to ‘un-see’ or ‘re-perceive’ the identity of the objects. One reason that photographs may make the 
already-arcane ugly object more mysterious lies in Barthes idea that a photograph of a person 
cannot be said to represent that person, by merely replicating the physical form as it exists at a 
particular moment.131 Schwenger (2000) writes that in Witkin’s work, the image tends to surpass 
representation: in Blanchot’s words, the image “tends to withdraw the object from understanding 
by maintaining the mobility of the resemblance which has nothing to resemble” (p. 408).132 If we 
apply this formulation to Leda (1986) and the God of Earth and Heaven (1988), Witkin’s artworks 
can be said to be representations of the people in the photographs if they capture and retain the 
unique inexpressible, nebulous “being” or “aire” … of the particular human being[s] whose 
external image[s] appear in the photographs (p. 408).133 Unlike the paintings on which these 
photographs are based, in which techniques of idealising cast the subjects as anonymous 
prototypes of womanhood, Witkin’s photographs insert geomorphological formlessness into the 
 
131 It must be noted that Barthes (1984) only addresses the photographic representation of subjects. The idea that 
inanimate objects have an “aire” may be supported by animism – the idea that all things have a soul. 
132 He draws also on Blanchot, who, unlike Lacan, recognises that Witkin’s photographs of corpses (as forms of 
ugliness), draws us to the image of the object as the indispensable and only access point though we may have any 
‘object’ at all: “[I]t is through the image that we try to make of the world a home for ourselves” ( p. 401). 
133 Barthes (1984) illustrates this by recounting the personal story by which he sought to find a photograph that 
captured the “essence” of his deceased mother. He imagines a photograph of his mother embracing him would 
enliven a feeling of her within him “… the rumpled softness of her crepe de Chine and the perfume of her own rice 
powder” (p. 65). One zoomed-out picture of her despite showing him her gait and glow, did not give him a view of 
her face, and evoked nothing of the feeling of her. Indeed, Barthes does feel that he finds the “… truth of the face 
[he loved]” in the “Winter Garden Photograph” (p. 66). Here, he sees his mother at the age of five, standing 
alongside her brother, “united by the discord of her parents” (p. 69). In the photograph “the distinctiveness of her 
face, the naïve attitude of her head, the place she had docilely taken without neither showing or hiding herself, and 
finally her expression … all this constituted the figure of a sovereign innocence (… which is ‘I do not harm’)” (p. 
69). As a further example, he explains the way in which her abstract kindness and gentleness are “nonetheless 
present in the face and revealed in the photograph …” (p. 69). For Barthes, following the words of Goddard, this is 
not “just an image, but a just image” (p. 170). 
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scenes by enhancing typological non-conformity. The nameless actors of these photographs, 
dressed in the guise of Renaissance subjects, become geomorphological non-persons.134 
 
The other way in which Barthes’ theories would suggest that a photograph adds an ugly- 
mysteriousness to the ugly object is that it draws attention to the very time-bound contingent nature 
of that form as it exists on earth, and therefore of the irrepresentability of the object’s essence 
through that form. For Barthes (1984), the essence of the medium of photography is not its capacity 
to authenticate something as existing – the film theorist Bazin (1960) calls this the “mummy 
complex” (Bazin, 1960, as cited in Lowenstein, 2007, p. 155). It is instead to confirm that it had 
existed in such a form, at some time. Barthes focuses on the distinction between what he calls the 
studium and the punctum, of a photograph (p. 77). For him a good photograph does not only present 
a meaning that we can describe in terms of the subject matter – it does not only carry a political, 
linguistic, or cultural interpretation (that is the studium). Rather, the studium is disrupted by an 
element of “punctum” that “wounds, pricks or strikes like an arrow” (Lowenstein, 2007, p. 60). 
Although a photograph has a unique punctum, all photographs have what Barthes refers to as 
noeme, the “that-has-been”, and he uses the word intersum to refer to “having-been-there” but 
“having-been-separated” (p. 77). Schwenger (2000) refers to this precise contradiction: “[T]he 
subject surreptitiously involves the belief that it is alive” (p. 79). We do not see photographs as 
copies of reality but as an emanation of a past reality. When a photograph is thrown away, a life 
goes with it. For Barthes, the “lacerating” effect – the effectiveness of a photograph – lies in its 
potential to remind us of ultimate physical demise. Following the perceptual theory of ugliness, it, 
therefore, reminds us of the formlessness that withstands the illusion of physical/conceptual form. 
 
According to Barthes’ theory, Witkin’s work does not give us a “window” through which to see 
this taken-for-granted world. Instead, it mirrors an elusive alternative reality back (Barthes, 1984, 
p. 106).135 In the same way in which Platonic Idealism gives us the “otherworld” with objects 
 
134 According to the online Harper Collins Thesaurus (2019), the word nameless means (1) having no name or 
known name; (2) not easy to describe, undefinable, and synonyms are unspeakable, unmentionable, indescribable, 
abominable, horrible, dreadful, appalling, shocking, awful, terrible, frightful, alarming, terrifying, harrowing, 
unnerving, fearful, fearsome, horrid, beastly.  
135 Barthes (1984) describes the photograph as impenetrable. It reflects reality as it is but gives us its own 
representational reality. In this way, it is like the camera obscura (dark passage) or pinhole image, which is a 
primitive drawing aid that made use of a prism and presented an inverted and reverse image (Barthes 1984, p. 106).  
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modified accordingly, the contemporary artist gives us photographs that, with the use of 
“punctum”, pictures present the alternative realm of unthinkable non-objects of pre-symbolic 
experiencing. Schwenger (2000) writes: “When, through the image, we sense that region – for we 
cannot see it – we find words for it. No system of classification, no script is adequate; we falter, 
loose our place and fall silent” (p. 408). Schwenger refers to Witkin’s corpses and other subjects 
as “altogether outside, without intimacy, and yet more … mysterious than the thought of the 
innermost being, without signification yet summoning the depths of any possible meaning …” (p. 
106).136 
 
This otherworldliness extends to the way in which Witkin gives us journalistic admission to the 
world of marginalised “freaks” of the social underbelly of a psychological terra incognita, 
“through his photographs, he gives us the opportunity to infiltrate some alien land like an 
undercover agent” (Coke, 1985, p. 6, italics added). He gives us a glimpse of a “secret society” of 
an underground (p. 19), a “haunting [reflection] of a world that exists around the globe” (p. 18). It 
explains why Bailey (2017) refers to the artist as a kind of “visual Columbus”, who uses 
photography to journey and witness the otherwise unimaginable “in the same way an explorer 
might climb a mountain or sail an unknown sea” (para. 9). Through his works, Witkin amplifies 
the elusiveness of ugliness, documents and verifies its existence and takes the viewer to the very 
pre-symbolic – which is his dwelling place of God.  It is by escorting the viewer to the underground 
mental rooms of spiritual venues, that are ‘designed’ geomorphologically, that Witkin enables the 
viewer to ‘see via’ the artwork as if through a telescope or portal to this ‘new way of seeing’ that 
is an alternative to the Renaissance paradises of perfect forms (Walton, 1984, pp. 252-253). In 
direct contradiction to the illumination of Plato’s sun, Witkin’s presentation of the mysteriousness 
of objects brings “a message from that other place, the realm of dark things where different 
causalities rule and events signify in ways that we do not see clearly in broad daylight” (Stokes, 
2009, p. 165, italics added). The pre-symbolic milieu that he brings into being in his artworks have 
the distinctive features of the geomorphological. We can identify the constructed pre-symbolic 
environments that replace Renaissance supernaturalism, and hold the ugly objects, through the 
four criteria of the geomorphological ugly “place”. Those mentioned in the  last chapter were: the 
 
136 This is a point made by Blanchot that is also referenced by Barthes (p. 106). 
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mental (as a place), formlessness (breaking through form), beneathness (emerging from 
aboveness), and older (entering the newer) in the style of Witkin’s remakes. 
 
In both photographs discussed here, Witkin uses visual cues to quash the idea that God is to be 
found in a parallel universe of the firmament; to point us rather to God in a mental place within 
ourselves: a memory of the reality of things given in the pre-symbolic.137 He creates a “psychic” 
locus by limiting the gaze of the viewer through a square format to create a mental slide, which 
mimics the experience of watching a scene in one’s mind’s eye.138 This frame differs from the 
illusionistic conventions of painting in which the images on the format create an impression of 
veristic looking onto the physical world. Witkin’s use of the black border, within the frame, limits 
peripheral vision and evokes the inner experience of being contained, bordered and tapped by the 
boundaries of the skull. In his God of Earth and Heaven (Witkin, 1988), the folds of fabrics that 
fall around the actors encase them in meningeal convolutions. Instead of the light of Renaissance 
naturalistic environments, there is no source of illumination from the sun in this mostly shadow-
less place of highly contrasted stark bodies and objects: the crinkly shell against which Venus is 
cast and the texture-less, pale cut-out shapes of Leda’s droopy body, the unspeckled egg and the 
duck that is absent of feather-detail. Celant (1995) refers to the “oneiric” quality that is enhanced 
by the photographer’s use of monochromatic black-and-white film (p.15). The use of exaggerated 
shallow space renders a world in which things feel suspended in an airless “head-vacuum”. It lies 
in contrast to the divine and infinite sense of space and time in the heavens of the Renaissance, 
created through perspectival recession. 
 
 Indeed, Leda and the bird feel like embalmed thoughts, memories or symbols floating in an 
ominous preservation of semi-liquid formaldehyde or an airless vacuum: “the fluctuation of time 
and space in nightmares” (Coke, 1985 p. 6). With the recession of ordinary perception removed, 
we are given a world of limited “mental” space or storage. Witkin’s use of painted backdrops, 
juxtaposed with “real” things, emphasises the flatness on which the illusion of depth is created. 
 
137 This resounds in the way in which the photographic surrealists used techniques to convey the half-dreaming 
hypnogenic perceptual experience, which is absent in normal veridical experiencing, though, for example, the use of 
multiple exposures, sandwich printing, montage effects or mirrors to create distortions, or the rayograph to create 
flattened ground (Krauss, 1981, p. 18). 
138 A photo slide is a mounted transparency intended for projection onto a screen through a slide projector enabling a 
photograph to be enlarged and is like a single frame of a film. 
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These provide clues to certify that Witkin ‘shoots’ in an indoor studio on an eleven-acre enclave 
in New Mexico; a place of psychic withdrawal to which he brings his “stuff” (Celant,1995, p. 54). 
Witkin writes: “I want to create an enclosure, take the best elements of what I perceived, and put 
them in that enclosure. The way I can direct things that were there already, that I could design and 
establish and reconstruct.” (as cited in Metaxatos, 2004, p. 14). 
 
Thus, instead of sculpting out volumes with geometrical precision, Witkin employs formal 
techniques to enhance the formlessness in pre-symbolic experiences of Godliness. At times 
identities are eradicated through blurring, created by careening movements of the camera or the 
subject.139 Motion is the very force erased in the Renaissance to emphasise form, thereby creating 
ideal types. In Leda, Witkin scratches out the images on the negative with his own ‘spirit entities’. 
We see drip-glue fingers and eyes drawn on the back of the cushion holding the duck. Here the 
photograph itself feels as if it is opening to give birth to the ghost-like art brut figure that Witkin 
has drawn. A zigzag moves through the composition, through the drapery, the skeletal body of the 
man, down to the bent knee of the infant and through the jagged edge of the eggshell. The scene 
opens itself up as a ghost-like reptilian tail, inviting Witkin to unleash the mystical creature from 
his mental world, his hand, and from beneath the scene of the photograph, using his etched, choppy 
mark-making. The large size of the paint-splattered egg evokes the presence of an ovipositor being 
ruptured. The movement, created compositionally and through gestural marks, is a sign of 
“opening up” the hidden violence and aggression of Zeus’ bestial rape, that is sublimated in the 
stiff, zipped forms and tranquil appearance of the Renaissance version of “Christ’s love”. In Gods 
of Earth and Heaven (Witkin, 1988), scoring and lacerating onto the negative creates parallel lines 
crisscrossing the head of the entombed figure. They “swaddle” it in the indistinctiveness of a 
whirling nest. 
 
In the Christianity of the Renaissance, God is located within a transcendent realm that is imagined 
to be a “higher” heaven (both superior and in the sky), that is a perfected version of earth. Witkin 
provides a version of an underground from which the hidden ugly object surfaces from a 
subterranean psychic place, onto normal, adult perceptual experiencing. As such, Witkin’s works 
 
139 Here, Witkin points to the intrinsic spirituality of the formless and evokes the ‘spirit photography’ of the late 
nineteenth century, in which photographers such as Mumler and Hudson used double exposures to create ‘fake’ 
spiritual entities on plates. 
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evoke qualities of the earth and archaeological digging and burial, which point to his ‘alchemical’ 
mysticism. Here, a mineral-rich ground acts as the place of the origin of all things: an ultimate 
universal substance after decomposition. A coffin and a cadaver appear at the bottom of the stage 
upon which he constructs his scene for his version of Botticelli’s painting. Celant writes of the 
Witkin’s chthonic as a place of the original birth of the soul and things, and thus as the sight of the 
regeneration. Here the spirit of the physically decayed is deposited and reconstituted in its new 
form: 
 
The quality conferred by encaustic and impasto of soil projects a petrified sense … in a terrible 
discovery, in which everything is transformed into relic and thing, into an unfathomable silence 
where the crust of the cosmos ceases to breathe as life substance. Here earth and mud are not 
regenerative but serve to rather fix and seal. They enter the photographer’s body like a tomb … if 
the language of the images represents a return to earth, it also documents a descent into Hell, into 
Hades, where it frees the dead and brings them back into circulation (Celant, 1995, p. 13). 
 
The secondary frame or circular shape in Leda is an example of how Witkin’s works hold an 
organic shape within the square format of the photograph, to create a vignette. The artist describes 
his intention to “take the best elements of what [he] perceived” and to “put them in an enclosure” 
(Witkin, 1993, p. 11). This secondary shape suggests being a ‘dug out’ from the ground in which 
it exists; a catacomb that “stores” or “contains” the sacred ugly objects in the presence of Godly. 
Some of the photographs have squared-off edges and allude to buried pods, wombs, coffins, 
graves, mine shafts and mole holes. The photographs also feel touched and coloured by the earth 
– “unearthed” – so to speak. This is conveyed through the sepia tone of the work and the various 
terrestrial textures: speckles of grains of sand, mottled patches and the reticulations of humus and 
decay, light drops of water-damage and the yellow-brown flakes of rust and darker erosion fretting, 
corrosion pits or oxidation pigmentation. In Leda, the white droplets made on the surface of the 
photographic plate evoke diamonds or gems; Witkin sprinkles some of his photographs with gold 
dust to replicate the coruscations of metallic minerals in the opening of buried treasure. This 
alchemical preciousness reinforces the quality of the earthly being spiritual and mystical, as if 
excavated ‘riches of truth’. Brian (1967) suggests that “alchemical magic” is evoked, as in the 
work of Rembrandt, where his “washing” things with a kind of liquid “brown silt” (p. 261). Indeed, 
it is this “soil” or “ground” that is medium for creation for the human progenitor, Adam. This 
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biblical substance of human origin thus seems imbued with the power to endow separate and 
singular objects as simultaneously sharing an all-consuming essence.  
Plato’s Godly sphere of unchangeably perfect forms is eternally still. However, like the innermost 
layers of the earth that are molten and unformed, the ugly experience has its origins within the 
deep, more primitive mode of perception of personal psychological time. There is an understanding 
of the world and the self as conceptual and perceptual forms, is a consciousness above the pre-
symbolic. It is thus more accessible to awareness.140 The dimension of age is also extended in 
ugliness to historical time: “regression” that is “personal” and “chronological” (Metaxatos, 2004, 
p. 5). The ugly object feels “prehistoric” from an evolutionary perspective because formlessness 
is associated with simplicity, harking back to the unicellular amoeba, underdeveloped reptilian 
brain or ancient tools and cave drawings. In fact, Adams (1991) writes of the “purposely grotesque 
effect” created by the “cavernously-shaped” inside-border and dolomite texture given by the 
blotches and scratches of these works. Stalactitic and stalagmitic growths of the cavern walls 
enclosing Leda, and the rotten, wooden plank sealing the catacomb beneath Venus (in God of 
Earth and Heaven) make these womb-like capsules, and to symbolise the communion with the 
Godly Creator as a kind of primeval “birth experience” in biblical genesis (Witkin, 1992, p. 11).  
 
Apart from ageing his surfaces using chemicals, Witkin enhances the effect of oldness by his 
borrowing of stylistic devices and by making visual references to the development of early 
photography. Adams (1991) suggests the way in which the grotto-like quality that is evoked refers 
to the advent of photography: “[B]orn within the dark cave of the camera, photography offer[ed] 
a shimmering simulacrum of nature. The Grotto is the primal womb of art” (p. 206). Noble (2003) 
describes how Witkin’s works alluded to early photography: “[O]n warm toned papers, and using 
a variety of toners, his prints often have a yellowish brown old-master look” (para. 2). There are 
also references to Photographic Symbolism, an early twentieth-century movement that attempted 
to secure photography as a “fine art” form. As the critic of modern art and photography Kozloff 
(1986) states:  
 
 
140 As articulated in Chapter 1, the psychoanalytic pre-symbolic theory is on the developmental continuum and is a 
description of newborns till the age of 18 months prior to the acquisition of language. 
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the next and far more sophisticated rapprochement between photography and painting came about 
at the turn of the century. Mist-shrouded, unfocused, or chemically blurred photographs were 
attempts to sponge out the immediacy of the camera and to gain poetic resonance … aside from 
their period flavour, Steichen’s prints of the sculpture of Rodin, for instance have a great delicacy 
and mystery, graininess of the photographic tissue becoming sensuous itself (p. 290, italics added). 
 
The use of the standardised format, the way in which subjects are photographed nude and centrally 
posted, is reminiscent of ‘freak’ photography and the genre of “oddity” resurrects the oldness in 
photographic styles. Millet (2008) argues that, in this way, Witkin conjures a more spiritual time 
in history, before medical typology, when “monsters, or children born with physical defects such 
as congenital amputation, were said to be evidence of supernatural warnings, embodiments of 
divine intervention, or phenomena caused by the powers of the imagination” (p. 15). 
 
Witkin’s use of the indoor set-up as his context also references historic studio photography and its 
democratisation of the photographic portrait. His subjects do not show us an iconic Kodak smile. 
For example, Leda, with her head strained, looks upwards with a facial expression of discomfort 
and self-conscious Venus gazes away in the presence of the camera. Here there is a reference 
instead to the haunting stillness and frank, serious expressions of the people in the early twentieth-
century portrait photographer Nadar’s works. 141 This use of the repetitive format and the absence 
of colour in the photographs imbue this artist’s work with the quality of stored or archival 
memories, of private moments in universal time. 
 
Witkin expresses that his “life wish” is to be connected with a “place … [we] hope to go to, and 
hope to be”. By changing the environments and the objects of two pre-eminent paintings of the 
Renaissance period, this artist rejects the idea of alternate reality seen in the exercising of the 
highest forms of abstract reasoning; an intellectual ascendance or transcendence to a place at the 
zenith. He does so by showing ugly objects of our immediate world as surfacing remnants and 
gateways to the deep recesses of his pre-historic mental reality, a sacred nadir accessed through an 
activity of psychic descendence. Instead of planting the presence in a celestial paradise of perfect 
 
141 Witkin’s image of Helena Fourment recalls the pensive looks of the subjects of the nineteenth century studio 
photographer, Nadar. See, for example, The National Portrait Gallery’s images of Sarah Bernhardt circa 1894-1907 
or Adelina Patti (circa 1887) (Nadar, National Portrait Gallery, n.d.) 
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things that we can only imagine through cerebral exertion and which can be manifested through 
the very fictionalism of painting, Witkin gives God through the photographs these objects of our 
limited mortal circumstances. They are the conduit to Godly reality. These objects of extreme 
ugliness, otherwise hidden from view, offer us a portal into a time-bound world, which helps us to 
contrarily “un-see” that object qua its ontological categorisation, in the same way that the 
uniqueness of the ugly object pushes the viewer outside the intelligible world of sortable objects. 
This a not a picture of a world in far remove. It is a vignette of a universe inside of us, an experience 
once had. This is a way of perceiving that is retrievable, and, as will be further elaborated, mirrors 
the mysterious formlessness of God, instead of his ideality. Here, ugliness can provide illuminative 
‘seeing’. However, Witkin also presents us with the idea that such a mystical aesthetic experience 























UGLY FEELINGS IN WITKIN’S REMAKES OF THE BAROQUE PAINTINGS OF HET 
PELSKEN (LITTLE FUR) (1938) AND STILL LIFE OF GAME, FISH, FRUIT AND KITCHEN 
UTENSILS (1646) 
Saints have loved the darkness because that’s where they go to bring out people who are 
drowning. When I, as an individual, continue my journey into perception and better realities, I 
have to engage a person in darkness because I am in darkness. … You have to go to darkness to 
come out in the light (Witkin as cited in Cravens, 1993, p. 58). 
This chapter first applies the description of pre-symbolic ugly feelings to examine Little Fur 
(Rubens) (1638), and Still Life of Game, Fish and Kitchen Utensils (van Steenwyck, 1646), and 
then to Witkin’s remakes of these paintings, in order to evidence how the artist replaces the 
different kinds of mystical feelings given in the Catholic and Protestant Baroque with his style 
that, instead, presents ugly affects as mystical. In addition to commenting on the perceptive 
mystical style of Platonic Idealism, Witkin dialogues with these portrayals of the Godly as a divine 
sensation. These experiences take place from the immanent ‘this-world’, such that the ugly object 
becomes a departure point, trigger or site for the engagement of a ‘feeling-state’. What this thesis 
calls Catholic Baroque’s “Theatrical Realism”, involves a cultivating of the heightened emotion 
activated by the commonplace subject in a depiction of Godly communion. Further, in the 
Protestant Baroque’s so-called “Mindful Vanitas”, there is a superimposition of focused, 
meditative awareness of the ugly object to realise its Godly spirit. Through an examination of two 
works, Journey of the Mask, Helena Fourment (Witkin, 1984) and Feast of Fools (Witkin, 1990), 
and by means of exploration of his own geomorphological expressive process, the chapter 
elucidates how Witkin replaces these visual elements with ones that evoke the array of feelings in 
response to the ugly-pre-symbolic object: this Ultimate reality. It hereby makes the argument that 
Witkin’s “divine revolt” consists of redirecting the viewer into an immersion into the feelings of 






Theatrical Realism and Mindful Vanitas: Feeling Godliness from the Ugly Object 
 
In order to show that Witkin’s amendments to the Baroque’s paintings of Little Fur and Still Life 
of Game, Fish and Kitchen Utensils serve to promote the mysticism of ugly feelings, we need to 
demonstrate how mystical expression is inherent in Baroque art historical style. Unlike Platonic 
Idealism, what this thesis calls Catholic Baroque “Theatrical Realism’ and Mindful Flemish 
Baroque vanitas mystical forms, converge with ugly mysticism in their inclusion of the ugly object 
within their definition of the mystical experience. What is significant is that these styles are not 
“visionary” as in Platonic Idealism, with the artist as an inspired imagistic clairvoyant. Rather, 
they are “evocative”; feelings of the mystical are transposed by the artist onto the scene that 
faithfully mimics ordinary perception of the everyday world with all its ugliness. Notably the 
contemporary art historian Schama has referred to this shift in his description of the movement 
from the Renaissance’s “idealisation of nature” to the Baroque’s “naturalisation of the ideal” 
(Schama, 2009, p. 28). In contrast to the utopias of the Renaissance and their idealised objects, the 
realism of both these styles includes “subject matter dealing with things and human activities 
which are commonplace of nature” and the representation of the forms of nature in a subject 
chosen, by imitating those forms with the utmost truth to nature” (Ruckstuhl, 1917, p. 254). 
 
Given this, against what is Witkin rebelling when he remakes these works in his distinctive style? 
Whereas the changes this artist makes to Renaissance painting suggest that he is critical of 
ugliness’ exclusion in Godly panorama, Witkin’s changes to Baroque evidence his opposition to 
its inclusion as a mere catalyst for emotion. The analysis of the two paintings below demonstrates 
how theatrical or mindful qualities are inserted over or into the realistic depiction so that the ugly 
object becomes only instrumental for the engagement of these other “feeling-states” that give 
acquaintance with the Godly presence. This interpretation is the basis with which to argue that 
Witkin’s replacement of these qualities with those that capture ugly feelings are a form of 
supporting ugly mysticism. 
 
Rubens’ The Little Fur (Rubens, 1638) (Fig. 23) – which is remade by Witkin in his Journey of 
the Mask, Helena Fourment (1984) (Fig. 25) – is an example of the way in which paintings of the 
Catholic Baroque convey the mystical in the heightened emotion (theatricality) of the corporeal 
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human being who is subject to ugliness (realism). In Rubens’ painting, it is not the artist’s 16-year-
old wife Helena, standing half-clothed in the artist’s fur coat, who connects with God. Instead, the 
artist inserts sensual theatrical qualities in this scene, to convey his own numinous feelings – which 
can be interpreted as mysticism in heightened eroticism – within this sight. Caught in a snapshot 
moment, as the young woman emerges from bathing, Rubens documents Helena in the stance of 
the Venus Pudica pose of modesty, in which one hand covers her pelvic area as she seems to step 
forward, glancing momentarily at the artist, to form a serpentine “S” shape.142 Nude, but for a fur 
robe, ribbon hair-accessories in her tousled brown mop and a single pearl earring, she stands angled 
to the painter, on a vermillion fabric surface, behind a small tasselled, upholstered footstool, of the 
same bright colour as the floor. She seems to be wrapping herself in a flimsy white garment and 
heavy fur robe that she holds in such a way that both arms cross over her torso: she pushes up her 
breasts in the crook of one arm as the other clasps the fluffy cape. The adolescent muse appears to 
be both provocative and anxious – perhaps only impatient – in her need to cover her exposed body 
from the cold draught and from the gaze of her husband who paints her.143  
 
Here, there is an expressive, sensual numinosity that emanates from ugliness, but which, as we 
learn through Witkin’s work, detracts from direct, candid contact with ugliness. This idea of the 
escape elsewhere through an incendiary emotional intensity is one contextualised within the 
Counter-Reformation’s campaign to democratise Christianity and appeal to all Christians as 
candidates for mystical connection.144 In this context, the viewer is reconceived in a new 
Catholicism, broadened and democratised, to include communication with the poor and illiterate: 
the ‘populace’ who served God from earth and are included as part of its ugliness (Huyghe, 
 
142 Venus Pudica is a convention used in historical Greek and Roman sculpture and is appropriated by Rubens for 
his posing of Helena. 
143 It must be noted that this is not a characteristic street scene but is rather a documentation of the aristocracy. Despite 
its intention to appeal to the everyman, the style is employed to confer Godly powers to an increasingly powerful 
royalty and aristocracy. In fact, in paintings that are referenced by Witkin, the pictorial language of mysticism is 
appropriated in such a way that one is made to feel as if one meets God, in the presence of characters from the courts. 
Here, techniques that encourage spiritual witnessing are replaced with an intention to impress and instate awe, through 
the drama of over-the-top ostentation, in overwrought extravagance, decoration and ornamentation (Conti, 1979, pp. 
16-17). This is most strongly epitomised in the 37,000 arced Palace of Versailles Louis XIV, the “Le Roi Soleil” (Sun 
King). For these reasons, the word “baroque”, which bears its origin in the Portuguese baraco, meaning irregular 
pearl, takes on another meaning as an aesthetic term, which describes the baroque as the “heroic sweep”, “opulence”, 
“magnificence”, “pomp”, and “extravagance” (Heyl, 1961, p. 227). 
144 The Catholic Baroque is mostly set in Italy; Rubens’ work is characteristic of this style, although he is Flemish. 
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1967b).145As Schama (2009) explains, the realistic inclusion of the everyday [ugly] person in these 
works served to communicate “the possibility of redemption coming to the most unlikely and 
hardened sinner” (p. 42), thereby affirming the “personal worth and equality of any beggar” 
(Aznar, 1967, p. 234).146 Unlike the Renaissance secchezza (dryness), this portrayal of an 
emotional connection with God, further makes mystical experiences accessible to the uneducated 
or illiterate. As Clark (1969) writes: “The art of the Renaissance had appealed through intellectual 
means – geometry, perspective, knowledge of antiquity – to a small group of humanists. Yet, the 
Baroque appealed propogandistically through emotions, “appealed to man’s deepest responses” 
(Huyghe, 1967b, p. 330). In so doing it aimed at appealing to the widest possible audience, 
“winning back heretics or at least on consolidating the faith of the believers” (Conti, 1979, p. 4). 
Baroque art thus became a pastoral guide of the masses inspired by the accessibility of Jesuit 
Spiritual Exercises of that time (Curran, 1940). 147  
 
In some artworks of this period, there are scenes of the Godly being experienced by realistically 
portrayed human beings, and an attempt to induce that very feeling state into the viewer through 
theatrical techniques. Aspiring to excite the “beholder in his personal life… it came closer to the 
life of the people, laying stress on the saints, who were accessible intermediaries of the Godhead.” 
(Huyghe, 1967b, p. 330). For example, Bernini’s sculpture Ecstasy of Saint Theresa (1642) (Fig. 
20) represents “in an intensely emotional fashion, a saint in a state of mystical trance, helpless and 
swooning at the awful realization of divinity”, and portrays, as its very subject matter, the 
 
145 This agenda included reaffirming the true and honest values of Catholicism in its rebellion against Protestantism 
(Huyghe, 1967b, p. 330). 
146 Michelangelo Merisi (Caravaggio) is known for his stark realism in which he painted poor models in their 
everyday clothes and rejected the mannered conventions deployed to depict religious scenes, e.g. the elderly man 
with dirty feet as Saint Peter in Crucifixion of Saint Peter (1601). 
147 These meditative and completive rituals were developed by the mystic Saint Ignatius of Loyola and encouraged 
an attunement of the senses to facilitate deepening one’s relationship with God to serve him further (the concept of 
Magis) (Barrett, 1956). According to Wittkowwer (1956), the purpose of these exercises is to provide “a vivid 
apprehension of any given subject for meditation by an extremely vivid appeal to the senses …” (as cited in Barrett, 
1956, p. 336). Jesuit art reinforced itself on Baroque art through a “emotional appeal, so that Baroque became an 
irrepressible energy, dominating material, exploring space and striving after its fashion for the infinite” (Curran, 
1940, p. 357). The Jesuits, an order founded in 1540 by Ignatius Loyola, were dedicated to the revitalisation of 
Roman Catholicism. For 70 years it was the primary force of the Counter Reformation. Interested in the intellectual 
and artistic traditions of Classical Antiquity and Christianity, the Jesuits promulgated their beliefs by encouraging 
engagement in the arts. 
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“psychology of ecstasy and trance” (Martin, 1955, p. 164).148 This may be categorised as 
Gellman’s (2017) subtype of mystical experience in which there is a kind of “union with God”, 
involving a feeling of being “carried away” beyond oneself so that one can be enveloped into an 
infinitude; the Christian Holy Spirit (para. 24). 
This reading of an apparently secular scene’s representing an erotic mysticism, is informed by the 
way that Wedgewood (1982) interprets Rubens as referencing the biblical Bathsheba. In this story, 
King David’s desire for this woman, as she bathed on the palace roof, resulted in her pregnancy 
and her bearing Solomon. As a prominent painter for the Catholic church, royal courts, aristocratic 
 
148 More specifically, incidences of martyrdom and death (in which extreme states induced by mortal suffering makes 
visible the Godly), are often re-enacted in the Baroque: “The unspeakable agony of dismemberment, the intense grief 
and horror of the onlookers, the feral cruelty of the executioners, these things, we are compelled to admit, are the real 
subject of many a Baroque martyrdom” (Martin, 1955, p 164). 




and merchant classes, the realism of Rubens integrated religiosity with portraiture. Rubens uses 
the same style as he employs for mythological and religious narratives to depict an intimate 
bedroom encounter so that the erotic Bathsheba is presented in the guise of this flesh-and-blood 
woman. In this way, the technical devices used in invoking the presence of the mystical in classical 
and religious stories (e.g. in his Venus at the Mirror, 1613–14, or Susanna and the Elders, 1608) 
(Fig. 21 & 22) are transferred and used to invoke the feelings that are inherent in the mystical to 
the mundane.149 As a matter of fact, a macro x-ray fluorescence scan of the painting exposes a 
fountain emanating from a lion’s head, and boy’s genitals in the background, uncovering a 
lasciviousness that was literally concealed by Rubens.150 
 
 
149 This is inspired by Caravaggio’s work, which presents street personas or scenes as if they are biblical incidences. 
In his The Calling of St Matthew (1599-1600), he is not presenting a portrait of St Matthew upon his meeting of him 
but presents the character St Matthew in the guise of a peasant with dirty feet, which he selected to copy for the 
purposes of allegory (Schama, 2009, p. 23). 
150 Baroque painting has been given extra significance by macro x-ray fluorescence scanning done at the University 
of Antwerp, which gives a view of the underneath layers of paint. Through the use of these processes, researchers van 
der Snickt, Legrand, Slama, Van Zuien, Gruber and Van der Stighelen (2018) were able to see that on Helena’s right, 
is a clandestine sculpted lion’s head from which water spouted, and above it, a sculpture of a urinating boy. The 
urination alludes to Bacchus: a metaphor for an absence of control and sexual union, subverting the boundaries of 
acceptable “societal code” (Vanthienen, 2018). 
Figure 21. Rubens, Venus at the Mirror, 1613-1614, 
(Krén & Marx, 2006)  
 
Figure 22. Rubens, Susanna and the Elders, 




In addition to the use of actual subject matter, i.e. the ugly, painterly realism involves the 
representing of this woman as she actually looks: a trompe l’oeil or “tricking of the eye” 
(Ruckstuhl, 1917, pp. 253-254).151 In other words, Rubens uses visual devices to convey the 
perceptual markers of ugliness in this person of the real world. The painting employs the pictorial 
principles articulated by Wölfflin (1915) in his analysis of the Baroque.152 In contrast to the 
sculptural forms of the Renaissance, the highlighting of the ugly perceptual markers of the 
fleshiness of her form is achieved through attention to conveying her mottled, dimpled skin thereby 
displaying the wish to “identify with life at its most authentic” (Huyghe, 1967b, p. 330). In 
Wölfflin’s “painterly style”, the ‘wobbly’ flaccidity of this form of her body is created by the 
replacement of the rigid outlining of the volume with the application of the ‘screen-and-passage’ 
technique – Rubens makes her a flesh-and-blood woman by refraining from tightening her body 
and smoothing it down. Here, parts of objects contrast with their backgrounds, while others blend 
with it through tonal similarity or intense light contrast or chiaroscuro.153 Helena’s pale, opalescent 
skin is set off against the darkness of the background, while her hair and the fur and fabric meld 
with it. She stands askew to the picture plane so there is foreshortening in her corpulent arms and 
legs, her forearms, her angled bunion-feet, hunched shoulders and non-frontal face, which create 
ugly malformation through asymmetry. The vulnerability and permeability of this ‘wonky’, 
knobby and soft body are accentuated by ‘recessive space’ emphasised by the perspective in the 
stool and in the floor. A further sense of ugly formlessness or ‘spilling out of the sculptural’ is 
evoked through the way in which the fur coat simultaneously blends with the shadowy space and 
flounces close to Helena’s body, thereby creating Wölfflin’s “open form” and alluding to ugly 
animal-woman typological ambiguity. This woman is susceptible to being ‘touched by’ time: the 
 
151 There are two degrees of this realism as described by Ruckstuhl (1917). The first is that, in the Baroque, there is a 
faithful commitment to capturing, in the painting, what is perceived by the eye in reality, of recording a true visual 
experience of this world. In this sense, it is antithetical to idealism. However, it must be noted that the realism of the 
Baroque is not a ‘naturalism’ (different from Ruckstuhl’s “naturalistic idealism”), as Schama (2009) casually 
describes. In naturalism, it is the beauty of the natural world that is selected to be preserved in the painting for 
admiration (perhaps in an almost romantic gesture). Rather, the Baroque is committed to recording, and portraying all 
aspects of reality, irrespective of their aesthetic quality. This is particularly true with the choice of the human subject 
– the poor, sickly, and street dwellers – in short, the ugly, are given full importance for it is to the populis to which 
the church wishes to appeal. 
152 This explanation is found alongside the principles of the Renaissance used in the last chapter, as Principles of Art 
History (1950) is, indeed, an analysis of the pictorial shifts that occur from the Renaissance to the Baroque. 
153 Chiaroscuro is the technical term used to describe the contrast of light and shadow employed to achieve 
modelling and a dramatic effect. 
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angled stance, the slippery s-shape and her slightly raised right foot creates suspended movement 
with the potential to shift in an instant. 
 
Rubens uses realism to enhance the distracting drama of sensual contact with ugliness. Here, the 
artist uses small paint dabs to make Helena’s frizzy hair, to embroider gold brocade, to describe a 
knot in a ribbon and the highlight on a pearl, in order to create an illusion of close contact (Lawson, 
2006, p. 165). Through “relative clarity” created through his distinctive flurried brushwork, 
Rubens captures a quality of clandestine peaking and attends to capturing the fine nuances of her 
countenance, to enhance the effect of her provocation for the viewer. Her eyes make intimate 
contact; there is a side-glance of mischievousness and her pursed lips make a coquettish half-smile. 
A depiction of such vicissitudes of affect is part of the Baroque fascination with the earthly change 
that makes ugliness: “revolutions of time”, which include cycles of existence, of creation and 
destruction, or the sexual vacillation implied in this painting (Martin, 1955, p. 170). 
Figure 23. Rubens. Het Pelsken, The Little 




Then there are the purely theatrical elements of the Baroque style, used to enhance the sexual thrill 
and to sublimate the uncomfortable ugliness, so that its illuminative potential is missed. There is 
a sense of Rubens having directed Helena’s position – which must have been a lengthy pose for 
his documentation – or, he must have exaggerated this suggestive stance for his interpretation. Her 
arms crossing her body sustain the contrapposto as it drapes the sloped pelvis with the artist’s pelt 
cape and gossamer-like negligee wound around her hand, as it incipiently falls from her body, 
rendered through the artist’s mastery of translucency, in which he is able to make dark tones visible 
through paler topcoats. By pulling the hair strands through marks of fiery oranges and mahoganies 
of the coat into the background to encircle the young woman’s body, and by implanting her on a 
scarlet rug with a plush cushioned-stool (pushed onto the floor, in a heated moment), Rubens 
extends the sumptuous textures into the painting as a whole, permeating it within intimated 
sensations of skin and sheets. The blushing-red of the carpet and the flush purple browns of the 
coat line the painting as a whole. 
 
Rubens further intensifies this warmth through Baroque backlighting, which simultaneously 
invests the sanctified sexuality of this woman – in all her honest ugliness – with devout energy. 
Helena’s physical form is laminated with the amatory surface glow so that the viewer is protected 
from real confrontation: her “shape and texture are conveyed enough through the interplay of 
tones; the whole surface shimmers with points of light” (Wedgewood, 1982, p. 142). What is more, 
the use of chiaroscuro or “Hollywood lighting” (Hockney & Gayford, 2016, p. 172) – an 
“exaggerated contrast of light and shadow” – matches the intensity of mystical feeling, whether 
extreme states of pleasure or pain: the “dramatic, violent, tormented” (Conti, 1979, p. 42). In this 
moment, with her illuminated curls, Helena becomes a kind of angelic vehicle by which one can 
be absorbed into God via the connection through the permeable female body. Rubens suspends 
Helena in a non-gravitational space: the wave-like line and the vanishing of the “limitations of the 
perpendicular” by which Helena ‘flies’ with a freedom of psychological and spiritual expansion, 
achieving a merging with God (Fleming, 1946, p.125). As Fleming (1946) writes of this style, “the 
active lines in its painting … all exist at the expense of serenity … and complete plastic unity. 
They are always elements of the fantastic, the illogical, the imaginative” (p. 128). Other 
illusionistic devices to create a theatrical “suspension of disbelief” enhance the here-and-nowness 
of the overwhelming, thrilling entrancement. Schama (2009) explains that instead of perceiving 
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the distinct planar foreground, middle-ground distance as in Renaissance painting, Baroque 
paintings break the frame between picture and viewer, thereby cultivating a stage-spectator view. 
From here one can feel the drama of the enticement of the scene right before one’s eyes: “it created 
a space in which the subject and the spectator may be joined in a specific and sometimes dramatic 
moment in time” (Osbourne, 1986, pp. 108-109). The effect is partially due to the alla prima 
painting in which the artist works directly from the model and precisely paints what he sees onto 
the canvas without preparatory sketches.154 
 
Witkin not only protests against the portrayal of the fallible humans as the “revelatory body” 
(Elkins, 2004, p. 103), but also rebels against the Protestant Baroque’s use of the ugly material 
items as a meditative object through which anima (Godly breath or spirit) is revealed. Witkin’s 
changes show us that this form of engagement with ugliness is superficial and evasive. For, in this 
subgenre of realism, called vanitas painting, depictions of ugly objects marked by the forces of 
life, decay or death, are suffused with qualities that encourage a quiet contemplation of items that 
are marked by the signs of the transience of mortal life (Brion, 1967). The inclusion of everyday 
domestic objects of this world is, as in the Catholic Baroque, inspired by a desire to appeal to an 
increasingly democratised art market emerging through the power of trade and the consequent rise 
of the merchant class in Flanders. However, in contrast to Theatrical Realism’s portrayal of the 
Catholic idea of emotional expansion as a means to envelope Godly infinitude, this “Mindful 
Vanitas” mystical style is inspired by Protestant Calvinistic ideas of manifesting Godly grace. Such 
“grace” emerges immanently through mindful penetration of these concrete objects through hands-
on physical contact, inspired by principles of hard work, pragmaticism and modesty.155 Ardnt 
(1979) asserts: “It is not enough to know God’s word; one must also practice it in a living, active 
manner (p. 40).”156 She describes rituals that enable a “marital-union” with the Almighty, through 
the sharpening of sensitivity to perception of the self and surroundings. She implies the practice 
 
154 The advent of oil painting enabled the wet-on-wet or alla prima (Italian meaning ‘first attempt’) direct method of 
painting in which layers of wet paint form the image. Hockney and Gayford (2016) describe the immediacy and 
spontaneity of this process in which the vitality of the subject is directly infused by the artist into the work through 
the artist’s keen perceptive skills and technical prowess. 
155 In Catholicism, intense suffering and martyrdom is expressed in practices such as ceremonial sacrament and 
confession. In Protestantism, God is loving and “merciful” and offers a share in the divine and adherence to specific 
principles ensures salvation (Joseph, 1990, p. 493).  
156 The Protestant or Calvinistic work ethic is a concept that emphasises that hard work, discipline, modesty and 
frugality indicate a person’s subscription to values espoused by that faith. 
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of a way of finding God in meditation on what is ugly subject matter, because of an idea that “[t]he 
full intensity of the moment … an object, like the body, like nature herself, has a spirit which is 
augmented, rather than diminished, or destroyed by time” (p. 262, italics added). Animism is at 
play here: Godly spirit is to be found within the innermost essence of physical objects of this world. 
Brion (1968) writes (of Vermeer): 
 
the act of pouring milk into a jug, reading a letter, fingering a necklace, looking at the sky or a 
flower, or listening to footfalls in the street became a symbol of the intensely lived moments, as if 
the finite had attained all possibilities of the infinite (p. 262). 
 
This idea resounds in the mystic Frank, who writes God’s “word” is hidden within us, as well as 
in the stuff of the world and is revealed to us through tender engagement with his creation.157 
Mystical moral epiphanies are said to emerge from this cultivation of attention to the mortality of 
the ugly objects: messages from God about the transience of pleasure and the preciousness of life 
in fleeting time (momento mori), acquisitiveness and vanity. 158 According to the National Gallery 
of Art (2007), these paintings aimed to fend off acquisitiveness for an increasingly wealthy Dutch 
trading society. It would warn them of the futility of their materialism and secularisation as a result 
of their geographic and intellectual exploration (p. 29). 159 Petit (1988) explains that the message 
of the vanitas was more pertinent than that of a mere still life, and it thus became an significant 
sub-genre: “[A]ny still lives which deal with the contemplative life, practical life and the life of 
pleasure … the passage of time and the passage of life … and the hereafter and the resurrection… 
fall under the category vanitas” (p. 17). 
 
 
157 This is a form of Gellman’s (2017) “super sensory” experiencing: seeing God within one’s apprehension of the 
physical object.  
158 In their account of the Protestant Baroque, the National Gallery of Art, Washington, notes: “There was the influx 
of exotic products like porcelains, silks and spices from India, Sri Lanka, Japan … the Dutch East India Company. 
This was accompanied by an intellectual exploration that led to an increasing secularisation of society. Descartes, an 
émigré from France, for example, found a fertile environment in the Netherlands for ideas that recast the relationship 
between philosophy and theology, and opened the door to science. Publishing of materials such as maps, atlases and 
musical scores flourished (p. 29).” There were important discoveries in astronomy, optics, botany, biology and 
physics. These affected the style – the kinds of everyday objects – depicted in these still lives. 
159 Mander (2007) insists that the artist himself subscribes to an etiquette of discipline and restraint. “Do not waste 
time. Do not get drunk or fight. Do not draw attention by living an immoral life. … Painters belong in the 
environment of princes and learned people. They must be polite to their fellow artists. Listen to criticism even that 
of the common people. … Thank God for your talent and do not be conceited. … Finally, eat breakfast early in the 
morning and avoid melancholia” (p. 41). 
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Although Witkin does not directly reference van Steenwyck’s Still Life of Game, Fish, Fruit and 
Kitchen Utensils (van Steenwyck, 1646) (Fig. 24), he refers to this genre in his Feast of Fools 
(Witkin, 1990) (Fig. 26) by giving us a vanitas-inspired mix of amputated hands and arms; ripe 
and decaying grapes; pomegranates and fresh seafood as a table spread. Through the sub-realistic 
conventions of the genre of realism, he includes objects of the ugly aesthetic in the scenes, such 
that the display of objects is marked by forces that make them less typologically ideal. Van 
Steenwyck paints the everyday domestic kitchen table-top with an arrangement of kitchen 
paraphernalia and foodstuffs. Juxtaposed with brass, ceramic and basketry vessels are fruit, fish 
and fowl. The ugly aesthetic is embedded in the limp birds and lifeless aquatic creatures as well 
as the imperfect grapes and blemished peaches. These organic objects represent the visitation by 
the extrinsic spirit of life-death, and, alongside the immutable plates and bowls on a solid surface, 
are accentuated as changeable organic matter.160 
 
Figure 24. van Steenwyck, Still Life of Game, Fish and Kitchen Utensils, 1646, (ArtUK, n.d.) 
The artist employs realistic Flemish oil painting techniques to capture the perceptual markers of 
ugliness. There is indeed a description of the physical lifecycles of the objects: the slender divisions 
between life, death and resurrection that make each object less of a thing they need to be in order 
 
160 Like a typical still life of this period, these objects overlap as if naturally left behind, an array of things that 
would normally be found together – perhaps in a particular room in a house, which contributes truthful depiction of 
everyday reality, here, in the kitchen. Vanitas paintings are grouped according to a system of classification informed 
by ways of designing rooms or scenes of daily life in a household. “Kitchen, banquet, peasant, interior, and fish 




to be a kind of thing or thing at all. Healthiness, freshness, vigour, sickness and decay are imparted 
through mimesis of textual qualities of iridescence, translucency, wetness, pallidness or dryness. 
This “glorification with substance” is achieved through monochrome underpainting and multiple 
layers of glazing varnish, which fashion “pearl-like” or “rough, coarse” pigments to convey the 
“regularity of time” (Brion, 1967, p. 262). Coarse russet marks on different-sized peaches indicate 
rotting; shiny spots on a bunch of grapes connected to stalky tendrils make them feel recently 
picked. Indented dark dots of the urn’s oxidised metal contrast to the raised follicle marks of the 
half-plucked pheasant skin. The tension between the alive-dying-dead of the real ugly object is 
accentuated through the contrast between flopping, wilting, drooping of the vulnerable fleshy and 
stiffness of the durable abiotic kitchenware – the earthenware, stoneware and brass – on the sturdy, 
wooden apron-table. The anaemic pheasant and the five small feathered birds fall curvilinearly and 
are arranged so as to hang off the side of the table in atrophy pre-rigor mortis (a postmortem 
rigidity). The torpedo forms of the water-glimmered fish, which propel their movement, are 
reduced to limpid, overlapping arched flaps on a platter. These close placements of the objects 
suggest an intermingling and cross-contamination of life and death. 
Indeed, some of these objects are placed by van Steenwyck in the scene because they are 
conventional iconographic vanitas symbols for mystical truths. Putrefaction stands for the ultimate 
Godly truth of the “state of affairs” of the mystical experience: that “beauty ends at the skin”; 
exotic and domestic objects point to the futility of acquisitiveness, while the grapes represent the 
Eucharist (Petit, 1988, p. 18). However, van Steenwyk also inserts qualities to induce a hypnotic 
calmness that leads to such insights, a kind of sedation amidst the horror of the ugliness. These 
mystical mindful stylistic elements in the realm of the painting, in keeping with the mystical 
ideology and philosophy of Protestantism, encourages delicate communion with these ugly objects 
of vanitas and, by consequence, introspection of the self. Here, the standard Dutch still life scale 
of the painting, which is only 36cmx46cm, facilitates a delving into the items: it does not 
overwhelm the viewer but inspires “contemplative vision of the depts of reality” (Brion, 1967 p. 
225, italics added). The creation of shallow space – by placing the objects against a flat, neutral 
wall-seeming surface – and the mottled whites and beiges, to fit in with the array of objects in their 
variation of yellow hues, pulls the viewer’s eye into a direct gaze. With observation hooked into 
the objects themselves, van Steenwyck encourages a visual caressing and infiltration of the surface 
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volumes through the interplay between hollowed and filled-out circular curvatures. In this 
pyramidal composition, the top of the empty metal pole forms the pinnacle of the triangle, such 
that the viewer’s eye journeys from coiled ‘well’ through to the recurring convex convolutions; 
skipping over ugliness.   
A further gentle meeting with the ugly object is incited through the way in which the birds are 
made to hang over the table, which creates a feeling that they may fall into another (our personal) 
space. Barolsky (2007) writes: “We delight in the skill of the artist’s composition, the weaving of 
disparate objects into a whole, the ordering of things, we enjoy the tromp l’oeil of the dead bird 
that spills over the stone seemingly into our space” (p. 37). There is movement in this still life, 
which cultivates a protective experience of looking, and lends to the vanitas message of the 
“pregnancy of each instant [that] creates voluptuous intimate immobility, which is, at the same 
time, action” (Brion, 1967, p. 252). This mode of attentiveness with the object itself is enhanced 
in the use of fine, controlled brush marks and muted colours, often created from natural pigments 
(that had to be used modestly by the artist who has personally ground them).  They lend to an 
engagement that is “[e]xpectant, meditative, contemplative, listening to exterior sounds and an 
interior voice” (Brion, 1967, p. 262). 
 
Witkin’s Substitution of a “Feeling Language” of Ugliness 
 
The detailed analysis of the paintings of these two styles provides evidence that Baroque paintings 
present ugliness as only an access point or springboard for other feeling states in which God can 
be found. We can see that the formal qualities that capture Catholic theatricality or Protestant 
‘mindful serenity’ are painted into or ‘over’ representations of ugly objects. With this point 
established, it becomes apparent that Witkin replaces these expressive features with ones that 
symbolise or embody the network of feelings in encounter with the ugly pre-symbolic object. This 
gesture of stylistic replacement suggests that he opposes other styles by precluding the “felt” 
dimension of ugliness in their versions of the Godly encounter. They provide evidence that this 
spiritual visionary wants to instead draw his spectator into previously avoided fullness of feeling 
of the ugly objects depicted – an Einfühlung – and to hereby redirect them to this ugliness as that 




Here, in his capturing of mystical ugly feelings, Witkin is not only a visionary of transcendent 
realities, but a conduit of divine presence for the spectator. Following the philosophical accounts 
of artistic expression outlined by Gracyk (2012), the artist externalises ugly feelings in visible 
qualities of the artwork (as a ‘receptacle’).161 His methods of art-making are all appropriately 
“geomorphological” so as to be immersed in his own mystical pre-symbolic feelings, and enable 
what Maclagan (2005) calls “sensorial leakage” of them in the language of the artwork (p. 40).162 
163 We can include these occult ugly processes (sometimes ugly artworks of various mediums in 
their own right) in the analysis below. They are executed in spiritual-psychic non-places: his 
cloistered studio embodies his mental underground, and he scouts for otherwise concealed props 
and subjects to create an installation; a suitable mise en scène in which he can enact a further 
psychologically and energetically cathartic ‘happening’ or performance. Witkin enters his 
darkroom in order to ‘bring to light’ enigmatic forms through the act of developing the photograph 
in printing, and to further unleash primordial marks from a similarly murky place in his psyche 
through drawing and etching – sometimes in techniques of photogravure as in Feast of Fools 
(Witkin, 1990). 
 
161 This means experiencing the feelings himself such that he may put these in the artwork, hopefully so that the art 
object further mirrors these sensations back to him and transmits on to his audience (pp. 26-29). The definition of 
expression here is a compilation of Tolstoy and Collingwood’s theories of expression, which are often placed in 
opposition to one another. According to Gracyk (2012), for Tolstoy (1996): “Art is the activity of intentionally 
selecting combinations of movements, lines, colours, sounds and other materials in order to transmit to others the 
same felt emotion that one has personally experienced. An artwork is an intentional combination of movements, 
lines, colours or sounds and other materials in order to transmit to others the same felt emotion that one has 
personally experienced” (Tolstoy, 1996 as cited in Gracyk, 2012, p. 26). Gracyk provides several objections to the 
suggestion that the artist himself has to personally experience the feeling in order to express it in the artwork. He 
provides Collingwood’s (1938) theory as an alternative: “Art is the imaginative activity of shaping material until it 
expressed emotion, which consists in the artist’s bringing a feeling into consciousness as a definite emotion. An 
artwork proper is an imaginative creation that expresses emotion by bringing it into the consciousness of its creator. 
More generally, an artwork is any material externalisation that permits an audience to experience that same 
imaginative combination and to likewise express the same emotion (p. 29).”  
162 It must be reinforced that these are not emotions, but ‘feelings’ in a vague sense, some of which bear cognitive 
content.  
163 In contrast to Collingwood (1938), the thesis argues that the artwork needs to not actually “inject” the feelings of 
ugliness into the spectator in order to be expressive. Rather, we need to be able to see how they could induce such 
feelings. Such evidence is provided in this thesis through an analysis of the way in which Witkin’s style can 





Figure 25. Witkin, The Journey of a Mask: Helena Fourment, 1985 (Coke, 1985, p. 38) 
Figure 26. Witkin, Feast of Fools, 1990 (Witkin, 1998, n.p.) 
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Journey of the Mask, Helena Fourment (Witkin, 1984) and Feast of Fools (Witkin, 1990) (Fig. 25 
& 26) are both artworks that are made in Witkin’s secluded photographic warehouse in New 
Mexico described by Cravens (1993): the hermetic physical space that acts as an embodiment of 
this pre-symbolic. It is an apt atelier in which he locates object trouvé (found objects) and 
appropriate subjects of extreme ugliness, that thereby that provoke his geomorphological 
‘shamanistic entrancement’, before he photographs. In this ‘Abrahamic test’, he scours the 
everyday environment and even ventures into the New Mexico mortuaries where he seeks to obtain 
unclaimed bodies to surface these humans into public sight.164 A first act of rebellion against these 
mystical invocations involves stripping the artwork of the Baroque feelings that occlude and 
repress the perceptual signs of ugliness. In a geomorphological gesture, he draws out the ugly 
meaning from perceptual qualities of the objects that appear in the Baroque versions, but which 
are subdued or hidden by their expressive formal qualities. He thereby undoes the occluding 
painterly spiritual subterfuge.  
 
In Journey of the Mask, Helena Fourment (Witkin, 1984), for example, Witkin heightens the play 
on ugly aesthetic human-animal form, from which Rubens’ salaciousness detracts. The 
photographer does so by laying bare the painting’s bestial, predatory sexuality, that is tempered by 
the cultivated velvetiness to express a kind of ‘regal’ or dignified spiritual eroticism. Here, the 
maltreated, intersex person in a cellar-cage replaces the voluptuous woman in a plush, aristocratic 
bedroom; a shrunken animal skin takes the place of a luxurious coat. The mottled effect of this 
flimsy piece of hide (with a loose seam that falls behind the subject’s back and shoulder) echo 
discoloured skin, legs and exposed genitalia. Together with the rough, bushy or thorny tactile 
qualities created by the scratches on the negative, and the mottled shadows of night-time prowl 
given through effects of graffiti and spraypaint, it alludes to the African savannah and the 
aggressive rough-and-tumble quality of a manly-beastly territory. Likewise, in his Feast of Fools 
(Witkin, 1990), Witkin confronts the viewer with a spectrum of degrees of aliveness kept at bay 
 
164 In the documentary Vile Bodies (1997) Witkin negotiates with a legless vagrant on the street and recruits a 
woman with malformed legs at an exhibition opening. Parry (1998) describes Witkin’s practice of riding the New 
York subway in order to scout for bearded women and thalidomide victims, and how he “worked for years as a 
maitre d’hotel in Albuquerque, in the heart of the multitude” (Parry, p. 180). Witkin was expelled from the 
University of New Mexico for inappropriately borrowing the dissected heads that he used in The Kiss (1982). The 
artist had to deal with legal and ethical issues as a kind of sacrificial “Abrahamic” test. He also worked with his 
assistant Beth Love to find “change objects” (le hazard objectif) that are an “intimation of almost mystical 
intimation in the universe to which the surrealist must be open” (Malt, 2014, p. 204). 
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by Steenwyck through meticulous Protestant Baroque filling-in. He uses the recurring surface of 
bloody porous tissue of the wound as a kind of visceral point of entry into the real, ugly experience 
of cross-contamination between kinds of things in decay in vanitas. Amputated feet and a hand, 
molluscs and fruit are bound by this texture in a decaying webbed heap, where things touched with 
a force of death lose their identity, spawning other micro-organismic life: a “cycle of eternal 
recurrence” of reincarnation (Miller, 1997, p. 40). 
 
The perceptual markers of ugly are enhanced by the other qualities that suffuse the remakes with 
the pre-symbolic feelings of the ugly aesthetic. This excludes representations that examine the 
iconography of the ‘phallic’ mother in Witkin’s oeuvre.165 Indeed, obstetric references abound in 
Witkin’s work, but this attention to mere subject matter does not honour the “mother” as a 
metaphor for the monistic reality against which one struggles in the experience of the formation 
of objects of one’s identity (Grosz, 1989), and objects at large.166 This union with this symbolic 
‘mother’, is, for Witkin, a picture of ultimate reality, and the fullness of this experience must be 
embodied in his work – leaked from the ugly objects into the qualities of the artwork at large – in 
order to be catalysing and revelatory. Such an experience is far more complex than the mere 
expression of differing emotional ‘volumes’ as in the Baroque. Following the pre-symbolic, this 
haptic lining of higher consciousness involves both avoidance and attraction to higher reality: both 
painful fears of annihilation, ego-death or engulfment, bodily disintegration, haptic closeness and 
evisceration, as well as pleasurable familiarity, and fascination of the unknowable object and 
satiation.167 
 
Parry (1998) describes Witkin as a terribiltà (p. 185), a term used to refer to the sublime terror of 
Michelangelo’s religious work. Indeed, these photographs arouse ugliness’ primitive dread and 
anxiety that ripples through all three pre-symbolic accounts; this for Witkin is an appropriate God-
fearing to that which is omnipotent and all-encompassing. Unlike the cathexis Catholic states of 
 
165 Metaxatos’ (2004) analysis is an example of many instances in which psychoanalytic interpretations bear what 
Maclagan (2005) calls an “iconographic prejudice” (p. 10). The artistic representation of pre-symbolic “mother” is 
hypostatised as a presence of the woman who looks like Kristeva’s “monstrous” or “phallic” mother, as Witkin uses 
the masked pregnant female in works such as Wife of Cain (1981). 
166 The maternal is the “ambivalent principle”, which “stems from an identity catastrophe that causes the Name to 
topple over into the unnamable that one imagines as femininity, nonlanguage or body” (Kristeva, 1986, p. 162). 
167 An evocation of these dimensions in a feeling-style involves avoidance of an ontological merging of objects in 
Klein, and the self-with mother in Lacan and Kristeva, or those of attraction to it. 
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sex or torture, Witkin feels God in an inexorable primal fear as a base state bestowed by a Creator. 
He expresses a yearning “… to create a link between the person posing in the picture and the mind 
of the viewer that always associates it with danger, and the condition of danger, of being afraid” 
(Witkin, 1997, pp. 37-38). In both Journey of the Mask, Helena Fourment and Feast of Fools, we 
find the formation of landscapes of natural danger zones stamped as ghost-structures on the 
compositions of the work, hereby harking back to primal and instinctual fight-or-flight responses. 
As the emotional theorist Walton (2004) writes, “to our very early ancestor, the world was an 
intimidating haunted place in which violent storms, the threat of fire, unfathomable disease and 
suffering all had an awesome power over him” and so he invented the gods (p. 2). 
 
Witkin crafts this response to the all-powerful through the watermarking of perilous mountainous 
pyramidal formations of the homo sapien natural world. These rising landforms grid and dominate 
the composition with a grandiosity of cosmic creation, a “crowning of pyramids in a gesture of 
benediction” (Parry, 1998, p. 176). Transgendered Helena is placed centrally in this parody of 
Ruben’s version, such that an implied triangular directionally is created from the bottom corners 
of this square format to head ‘peak’, the play on treacherous precipice. In Feast of Fools, a once 
gentle curvilinear composition is made into decaying formations of rocky ridges, ledges and 
saddles in its craggy juttings. The configuration of Witkin’s array of objects in this still life peaks 
at the index finger of the amputated hand and descends through the hazardous sliding line of a 
fibula to a narrow cool of this pile of amputated human limbs, fruit and seafood tentacles. The 
fibers of disembodied tissues of the feet and arms in this heap avalanche down. Drip-glue fingers 
become glaciers in cavernous negative spaces, in which distress is induced through allusions to 
hyperthermia. The ‘tablecloth’ that ripples beneath the ‘stew’ at the bottom of the artwork evokes 
dangers of vicious seas of the diluvial in water with marks of spraying-spits. Nearby reticulations 
make wave-crests of the biblical Flood or the plasmic volcanic flames of the Sinai burning bush. 
In place of van Steenwyck’s steady urn in the top-right, a clench-fingered hand appears, to be 
grabbing for help or pleading for mercy above, during drowning, sinking and falling. The forms 
and textures of this stacked smorgasbord hereby evoke a landscape of the Romantic sublime 
painted by Schopenhauer: “a large scale to the battle of the trading elements, in the storm of 
tempestuous oceans where the mountainous waves rise and fall, dash themselves furiously against 
steep cliffs and toss their spray high into the air, the storm howls, the sea boils, the lightning flashes 
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from the black clouds, and the peals of thunder drown the voice of storm and sea” (Schopenhauer, 
1976, p. 464).  
 
There are more evocations of primordial spiritual fear of the pre-symbolic in Witkin’s Journey of 
the Mask, Helena Fourment. There is a build-up of long, uncontrolled marks that scathe Ruben’s 
sensual or van Steenwyck’s tempered oil paint. He achieves this in his gestures of ‘psychic 
automatism’, through which he lets loose his unconscious handwriting of amorphous forms – the 
Sadean nirvana of escape from the ego that is achieved through purgation (Badger, 1999). For the 
artist, the “mark is the primal gesture, the internal connection between the caveman and the 
cosmos” (Coke, 1985 p. 7). With his special “box of tools” (razor blades, pins, needles and 
chemicals) for abrades, scratches, scores and stains the negative (or copper photogravure plate) of 
the photographic print before developing it onto paper (Parry, 1998, p. 180).168 Witkin’s 
‘calligraphy’ made with the quickness of desperation, evokes attempts at scratching as an escape 
from a cell of life-threatening punishment: “There is for me in this situation a strange, terrible 
sense of being forced to view the events in rooms of asylums or places of torture” (Manatakis, 
para. 9). They have the psychiatric quality of the swollen lashes of self-harm or whipping, alarming 
incisions or desperate gouging. Both the once-slithering Helena tableau and the locomotive 
residues of the still life (e.g. the undulating octopus tentacles), are frozen in portending terror in 
the photographic still-frame.  
 
There are very particular fears in the pre-symbolic in which Witkin finds God. How does the artist 
conjure these? For Klein, the pre-symbolic infant deeply fears death from annihilatory forces that 
are actually projections of its own internal “death drive”; if fears that the object against which it 
rents rage, will retaliate. “[T]he child bears a paranoia that all the pain comes from the outside and 
will attack and destroy him (Rycroft, 1995, p. 31)”.169 Death is so inextricable with ugliness; that 
is also a perceptual marker of an ugly object.170 The artist describes his photographs as a kind of 
“parting” or final image: “I want … my photographs to be as powerful as the last thing a person 
 
168 Photogravure is a process whereby a photographic negative is transferred to a metal plate and is then etched as 
intaglio printmaking copper plate printed onto etching paper.  
169 As Klein describes in her Development of the Child (1921): “The destructive impulse projected outwards is first 
experienced as oral aggression. I believe that oral-sadistic impulses towards the mother’s breast are active from the 
beginning of life, though with teething the cannibalistic impulse increases in strength” (Klein, 2017a, p. 5) 
170 Walton confirms that this fear is our prime and primordial; that we “…tread warily in the presence of death”. 
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sees or remembers before death” (Witkin, 1995, p. 13, italics added), as if they are invested with 
the finality of extermination by God as Final Judge. In contrast to the facile display of skin rotting 
in the Baroque still lives, Witkin plummets us into the unthinkable terror of disappearance and 
nothingness, of non-existence determined by the higher powers, via the sensations of extra-
terrestrial vastness and emptiness of floating in outer space. This spiritual infinitude at physical 
‘ending’ is given in the astrological talcum nebula created in the photogravure process, that are 
made to float on the bottom left-right of the still life photographic plate as eschatological debris. 
The abstract mark is elemental; as if units of Creation and remnants of Destruction: simultaneously 
evoking geomorphological soil granule speckles, solar flares or sprinkled stars of the Milky Way. 
They speak of the Godly breath as enlivening Adam as first man; pure air as the leftover of death; 
vaporous spirit, a last death inhalation. We find this air in Pope’s (2012) poem about Witkin’s 
rendering of human parts as objects in his still lives in which there is extraction of the respiration 
of the living: 
 
I could tell that it was human, 
past tense. And was 
it the transformation 
that cut off my breath? 
The sudden shift from 
appendage to ornament? 
Or was it the knowledge 
 
that this is something death 
could be no chorus, no reunion 
of voices, but simply, through the act 
of dissolution, becoming something, 
to suck away 
the sacred breath (Pope, n.d. as cited in Chavez, 2012, para. 8-9, italics added). 171              
 
 
171 Pope’s poem is a reflection on Witkin’s work entitled Still Life with Mirror (1998), which contains an amputated 
foot with five embedded steel nails, beside a bunch of asparagus in front of a silvered piece of glass (Pope n.d. as 
cited in Chavez, 2012, para. 7). However, the same occurrence of the mixing of inanimate and living can be applied 
to this still life. 
118 
 
An élan vital of the sparked marks that make tiny dynamic galactic explosions, or kinetic sprouting 
seeds, is terminated in the still frame of the photograph. Death is evoked in the hollowed-out 
spaceship capsule shape of the vignette inside the square format of both photographs, organic 
pentagonal or oval outlines that hermetically seal the subject matter into a kind of airless vacuum, 
making the generating and sustaining of life impossible here.  
 
In the work of Lacan and Kristeva, it is not the termination of our life itself that we dread in our 
primaeval forms of experiencing, but the dissolution of the fantasy of self as separate – the “ego 
identity”. According to Lacan, this separate imago of unity, cohesion and fixity given through 
narcissistic identification of the various forms of “mirrors”, is the means by which we develop the 
fantasy of coherent, stable and whole self in the Imaginary Order, which is held in language 
through the word “I” in the Symbolic Order. However, ugliness shatters this fantasy of the “mental 
permanence of the I” (Lacan, 2001, p. 3 – in its exposure of the illusion of typological perception 
and conceptualization – by drawing us closer to the inexpressibility of material reality; to the truth 
that all that exists is an unnamable and unbounded fragmented set of phenomenological sensations 
of the hommelette’s Real, that is also evoked by the ugly object. Alienation looms when we realise 
this Lacanian méconnaissance (misrecognition) of having “constituted ourselves through 
identification with the external counterpart” (Hook, 2002, p. 169). Indeed, the realism of the 
Baroque is an extension of this illusion; a replication of the world as we see it. In contrast, Witkin 
triggers the ontological dissolution of the self by cultivating an anonymous exchange between the 
seer and represented seen, hereby evoking Lacan’s idea of the “gaze” of the m/other as a form of 
mirroring our coherent “I” (Hook, 2002, p. 158). Witkin’s photograph of Helena is called Journey 
of the Mask “evoking the mystery of the Godly face”, for Witkin claims to create the “egoless” 
being (Manatakis, 2019, para. 8) in which spirit substitutes constructed substance. Perhaps this 
acquaintance with the boundlessness of God-given soul through depersonalisation is what Coke 
(1985) is referring to when he writes: “To understand or sense what Joel-Peter Witkin is doing, it 
is best to put on a mask, as one might do during the carnival season, and go amongst the strange 
players in his surreal world” (p. 7, italics added). Witkin describes his mystical quest as one in 
which he attempts to “seek the face before [he] was made” (Witkin, 1998, p. 22). Acts of ‘looking 
away’ are distinctive in the subjects of these works: “Real art, real art … takes you out of yourself” 
(Beem, 2008, p.2, italics added). Helena wears one of the photographers ubiquitously utilised 
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toreador masks onto which he glues a crucifix and the freshly stitched, swollen, post-mortem infant 
is blindfolded, which points to abortion or abandonment.172 Through the posing and ugly leitmotif 
of masking (sometimes with balaclavas, scarves or large hats), he creates objet de curiosité, which 
provoke effects of  defamiliarisation of ‘self’ and ‘other’: they obstruct the seer’s sense of being 
seen and are thus known as the mysterious “object [that] stares back” (Elkins, 1997).173  
 
In the course of his work, Witkin stages these photographs in which he blindfolds, belts and  hoods 
his subjects as a kind of strangulation of the limited physical body to exorcise a formless (ugly) 
spirit (Metaxatos, 2004, p. 15).  “Eric” and “Carl”, who were subjects in his photographs, explain 
that Witkin “does not go out of [his] way to make you feel comfortable” (as cited in Cravens, 1993, 
p. 57). According to Witkin, interaction with subjects and subject matter in his work are a kind of 
“play therapy”, through which he uncovers his own unbound and unknowable spirit to transpose 
in the photograph. He writes that “[e]veryone that I photograph, alive or dead, is really myself: I 
see myself in them. They represent the mysteries and majesties that I have to fulfil, not by way of 
any kind of physical union, but through a psychic one, by way of images” (Witkin, 1985, p. 37). 
He (1985) describes these “intense mediations on psychological impulses and ritualistic instincts, 
which stimulate extreme forms of behaviour” (as cited in Cravens, 1993, p. 40), which enable a 
lifting of the mask of his subjects and of himself.174 In an interview in 1985, he notes: 
 
The only photographer whose work strongly influenced me was August Sander … he was able to 
go behind the mask of each [subject] with the most straightforward use of the medium. To me, 
people were only masks. My interests would not be to reveal what the individual subject chose to 
hide, but instead, to make qualities of the hidden more meaningful (Witkin as cited in Coke, 
1985, p. 36) 
 
 
172 We see this same toreador mask in, for example, Journeys of the Mask: The History of Commercial Photography 
in Juarez, New York City (1984) and Self Portrait (1984). He also masks the subjects of Siamese Twins, Los Angeles 
(1998) and Melvin Buckhart: Human Oddity, Florida (1985), and uses a blindfold in Woman and Dog, New Mexico 
(1976). 
173 Millett (2008) writes that through the techniques of “theatrical spectacle”, in which the body is “spotlighted, 
placed on pedestals, and framed in excessive stage sets”, the viewer is encouraged to engage in the “voyeuristic 
access” to questionable “diagnostic” (knowable) objects (p. 8) – “all photography may be said to solicit a stare” (p. 
10). The Object Stares Back (1997) is the title of the renowned art critic Elkins’ book in which he examines how 
looking is distorted by vision and often informed by unconscious agendas. 
174 As noted by several critics, his sadism and masochism are seen as attempts to unleash the unconscious forces and 
to access parts and primordial sensations (see Metaxatos, 2004, pp. 11; 72-72). 
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Decomposition calls on the monistic scriptural image of “dust onto dust”. In the Feast of Fools 
still life, Witkin heightens the sense of the melding of all things, through his mélange of parts of 
different cadavers. In upholding ethical integrity, the artist only photographs unclaimed bodies (or 
corpus delicti).175 In Pope’s poem, definite articles replace personal names: “… but I could watch 
the ragged muscle/ end, the place where the bone emerged/ white-grey, from the flaccid base” 
(para. 6, italics added). There is a lost-and-found quality to the odd objects that he collects with 
his assistant Beth Love: “I’d go to the flea market and pick up crazy things there for my 
photographs, like chains and strange stuff ” (Beem, 2006, p. 2).  He excludes his viewer by keeping 
the names of these rare beings confidential. While some of the titles of the photographs include 
the names of the subjects, many of them bear pseudonyms of exotic circus acts (e.g. Melvin 
Buckhart, Human Oddity, Florida, 1985), or else, when named after the original painting, the 
subject literally “becomes” the person who initially posed – this woman is named “Helena”. 
 
Fear of this engulfment by the “mother” – Godly reality at large – is the basis for repulsion of the 
ugly object. For Kristeva, the pre-symbolic represents the child’s subsummation with the mother’s 
chôra; a “terror that disassembles” the self (Kristeva, 2008, p. 267). Our separation through 
abjection is our “earliest [attempt] to release the hold of the maternal entity even before existing 
outside of her .… It is a violent, clumsy breaking away, with the constant risk of falling back under 
the sway of a power as securing as it is stifling” (Kristeva, 2002, p. 239).The ugly abject object, 
“takes the ego back to its source on the abominable limits from which, in order to be, the ego has 
broken away” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 15). It calls on an emanationism: the idea of all flowing from a 
single source that conforms with Gellman’s (2017) extroverted non-conceptual experiences of the 
perceptual (unity in the world). We know Witkin goes back ‘here’ because he describes his process 
as a form of “gestation”. Indeed, critics comment on his “sadomasochism” because the 
paraphernalia of torture in his photographs bear their origins in the milieus of incarceration or 
medical experimentation, in what Badger (2019) calls the artist’s “chambers of horror” (para. 2). 
There are the signs of being ‘locked up’ throughout his works, and Helena’s room is a prime 
example of such an invocation of hostage or prisoner. Two white lines converge behind Helena as 
signs of a bulletproof vault door of gunmetal steel; reinforced concrete surfaces with their 
punctures emulate gunshot holes. In contrast to the Baroque extension of colour to the end of the 
 
175 Corpus delicti – corpses as a result of criminal acts. 
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canvas, a cultivated liberty in a ‘flight’ off the frame, in Witkin’s world, subjects are locked within 
the scene’s interior shapes. With no suggestion of doors or openings, he is confined with ugliness 
– with the all-consuming inexorable omnipresence of God. 
 
Lacan’s experience of self-disintegration engendered by the ugly object is instigated through adult 
experiences of Lacan’s corpse morcele, the body torn in pieces, or “fragmented body” (Lacan, 
2001, p. 5). This self-thinglessness threatens the emergence of the time of the dissolution of all 
other things, including the self. To reiterate Evans’ (1996) explanation: 
 
In the mirror stage, the infant sees its reflection in the mirror as a whole/synthesis [a perception 
which contrasts with] the perception of it its own body… as divided and fragmentary… However, 
the anticipation of a synthetic ego is henceforth constantly threatened by the memory of this sense 
of fragmentation, which manifests itself in images of castration, emasculation, mutilation, 
dismemberment, dislocation, evisceration, emasculation, devouring, bursting open of the body, 
which haunts the human imagination (p. 67). 
 
Witkin evokes this horror presence of mutilated and amputated subject matter in Feast of Fools. 
He further provokes fear of castration through the sight of a nude intersex Helena, which evokes 
trepidation through identification with the subject matter. More evocative is the employment of 
his graphic ‘wounding’ and what can be called a resultant visual language of butchery or 
lumbering. In practice, Witkin goes to the “hellish pit” (Parry, p. 184) of his darkroom so that he 
may have “monastic communion with chemicals, darkness and wounds” (Metaxatos, p. 13). Marsh 
(2003) writes that “the way in which the body is represented in many of these examples is 
predicated on the idea of revelation and a process of catharsis” (p. 216). Schwenger (2000) 
describes a kind of “mutilation” of the “skin” of the photograph for what Metaxatos describes as 
“violence” done to the image – renders forms remade and manipulated through chemicals such as 
bleach, potassium, ferricyanide and selenium (p. 407). Witkin destroys the forms in the photograph 
itself so destructively that he is “forced to rebuild the image” (Metaxatos, p. 11). He “dodges” and 
“burns in” to unleash these forms of the world before “things”. “I decide how I’m going to – in a 
primordial way – change the look of the negative to basically mystify it and make it my own. It’s 




In Feast of Fools, serrated edges of feet and arms – and uprooted capillaries – provoke the terror 
of limb-hacking or a wood-chopped cadaver. Voros (2004) poeticises the textures of this exposed 
anatomy through analogies to woven or laced, hacked woodland parts “… exposed tree roots’ very 
convolutions, withered jewelweed’s clumped ganglia and thread filament and fiber/ gobs of rot, 
radiant viscera made visible/ the stripped branch naked as a bone, ironwood’s torqued muscle…” 
(pp. 82-83). Sensations of primordial disintegration, this “… muck/ where great weight/ fell” are 
further intensified through the photographer’s use of repetition and interlocking of forms in this 
still life. Exotic molluscs and crustaceans are entangled in amputated, wounded feet and hands and 
brim with lacey, porous tissue like rotting cheese. This is enhanced by a surrealistic ambiguity of 
vegetable/animal life parts: “pellet and cluster, berry studded/ … scatterings of teeth” (Voros, 
2004, p. 82); the “black bejewelled flesh” (p. 83). The textures of meat pervade Witkin’s work, 
often as “binding agents”. The negative spaces of the still life are filled by this gore-cord Parry 
(1998) notes that Witkin feels an affinity to Kinnell’s poem, The Bear (1968), in which the hunter 
pursues a shamanistic quest for identification with the non-human (p. 183). After eating a bear’s 
raw flesh, the protagonist tears the body open – this wound of the ugly object – and falls asleep in 
the carcass, the “wound” of the object, as in ugliness. Parry explains that Kinnell discovers the 
“enduring odour of bear”. He eats bear “turd sopped in blood” (stanza 3) … and finally discovering 
the bear’s carcass, “hacks a ravine in his thigh”, “tears him down his whole length” and climbs 
into the wound (stanza 4, as cited in Parry, p. 183). All the while he dreams of becoming the bear 
and being wounded and dying his death, “of lumbering flatfooted/ over the tundra”, of being 
“stabbed twice from within”, no matter which way he lurches, whatever “parabola of bear-
transcendence” or “dance of solitude” (stanza. 5). When rising to walk, his blood splatters a trail 
behind him. He awakes bearing the ugly hybridity of feeling half-bear, half-man. 
 
This “evisceration” is connected to the ugly object feeling “close to the body”, for it comes from 
a time in which there was no object and the ugly object was thus once part of us and every single 
object. Klein concurs that there is only “sensate experience” lived through the body (Watts, 2002, 
p. 94). Witkin creates a sense of (threatening) nearness through the qualities of infectious disease. 
In Feast of Fools, in particular, runny droplets spurt influenza. The scale of these photographs 
(28x34cm for Feast of Fools, 85.1x77cm for Journey of the Mask; Helena Fourment) encourage 




The ugly pre-symbolic object characteristically incites both repulsive, painful sensations and 
attractive, pleasurable ones. These include the intellectual stimulation of the ineffable ugly object, 
a sense of comfort in both the ugly object’s familiarity, and the satiation of needs through 
connection to the maternal source. There is an eerie sense of former acquaintance that Witkin 
cultivates through the forging of uncanny ambiguities on all levels of his work – whether in the 
abstract mark, the hybridisation of form, the effect of remaking. A déjà vu strikes simply because 
these are remakes of iconic masterpieces. He also implants a sense of the spectator “having owned” 
or “stored this photographic scene” as a phantom memory, or as a private prophetic vision. The 
artificial frontal lighting of the objects in these two photographs simulates an experience of the 
viewer having stumbled across the lost objects of a storeroom cellar or basement with a flashlight 
in hand. Adams writes of the “eye-level” or vis-à-vis (face-to-face) effect of this work, as if we are 
“given”, or un-consentingly “called unto” the truth of an image made of “congeal[ed] light” 
(Adams, 2013, “Se Faire Être Une Photographie”, para. 15).  
 
It is the indeterminacy and enigma of the pre-symbolic ugly object that generates cognitive 
exploration and intellectual excitement from the vantage of the adult spectator. As the architectural 
theorist Bayley (2013) writes, although beauty may be conflated with the good, ugly may be 
associated with the interesting (p. 35).176 Witkin achieves this through an exaggeration of 
amorphous formlessness through tonal contrasts. There is a dearth of information cultivated by his 
excessive use of shadows in the background in which there is an exaggerated contrast between the 
detail in the light foreground and background imbued by depth of field. He manufactures such 
effects through rubbing the negative and using filter techniques in printing, in which he encounters 
a revelation of primordial darkness as enlightenment. He shows these depictions of amorphousness 
of spirit to others in the photographic product “through the integration of dark and unction – the 
process of ‘photographicus’, which makes the breadth of latent light visible, and of my spirit, the 
dark poem of myself” (Witkin, 1998, p. 15). 
 
 
176 Bayley (2013) mentions this insight in a discussion of the Post Modernist’s “apotheosizing” of interesting 
architecture (pp. 235-239). 
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The image itself stops the spectator in his ‘intellectual tracks’. He is left wondering what visual 
information Witkin holds back in his “cultivated darkness”. The pleasurable dimensions of this 
union with the mother in the pre-symbolic are simultaneously at play through visual allusion of 
these to exemplary works. Of course, Lacan’s sense of plenitude of the infant – the absence of 
“need” because of the automatic satiation by virtue of a connection to the mother’s body, described 
by Felluga (2015) – is apparent in the sense that this still life is rotting as a thrown-away excess. 
This sense of this Godly “fountain of provision”, is furthered by the idea that the subjects and 
objects that he uses to make up these images are things unwanted, and therefore unneeded, in a 
world of surplus. The artist heightens such sensations through repetition of signs of oozing or 
leaking in his photographs. In his Feast of Fools, the fluids of the living flesh spill outside the 
boundaries of the body, in a mix of blood, puss, fruity drink, the slime of sea creatures, and fall 
underneath in the sea of the liquid table upon which these juicy things dissolve. While at once 
claustrophobic cages, these cavernous depressions may, at a second glance, act as hollowed-out 
cocoons of the divine sanctuary of God as ‘shepherd’. Rubens’ Helena would have to sleep 
standing within this thin canvas. In contrast, Witkin’s subject can rest in the corners of a sheltering 
church dome; his still life rests on the think-inked sumptuous blackness of a night-time pillow. 
Once a bare, Flemish background for kitchen tasks, it now lulls both subject and spectator. While 
evoking terror, these etched marks ambiguously make a pine-needled nesting; and placenta-like 
viscosity created by the oil-based printing ink cosset these two scenes in a protected photographic 
cytoplasm of the gloss finish of the print. 
 
The literary scholar Reed (2017) writes: “Saints are simply those who put themselves on the line 
… with Witkin we recognize something unspoken, felt, dreamed, some condition of being as he’d 
put it …” (p. 58, italics added). In these two photographs, Witkin invites us into a maelstrom of 
sensations from conditioned being and seeing. This is a long-lost pre-symbolic past replete with 
the presence of Godliness, which he retrieved in the very making of these photographs. This 
personal educing, through performing within a constructed ugly installation, cathartic engagement 
with subjects, and his own automatist drawings and printing rituals, charges the photographic with 
a mystical sensation so that it is an artefact and trigger for his ‘disciples’. In finalisation, this 
photographic ‘sorcerer’ seals this photograph as a ‘hallowed art d’ object’. He “signs” the print 
with stains of coffee, tea, egg, soy and he prints through “torn, water-misted, crumpled tissue paper 
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onto precious warm-toned Portinga paper” (Metaxatos, 2004, p. 12); he embalms the print, hand 
buffing it with encaustic molten beeswax to memorialise it as a relic and preserve it as a talisman 
(Metaxatos, 2004, p.27). For, through such transfigurations, Witkin has “offer[ed] spectators 
































This thesis has tried to show how Joel-Peter Witkin’s remaking of several iconic paintings from 
different phases of the Western canon represents a determined effort to foreground the importance 
of ‘ugliness’ in the mystical encounter, and to hereby counter the aesthetic rejection of ‘the ugly’ 
at large. In order to make this claim, this study examined how the changes that Witkin makes to 
selected paintings of Renaissance, Catholic and Protestant Baroque, serve to replace these styles’ 
portrayal of Godly contact, with features that instead present ugliness as mystical. In response to 
the Renaissance paintings of Leda and the Swan (da Sesto, 1515-1520) and The Birth of Venus 
(Botticelli, 1485) – where mystical techniques of Platonic Idealism were shown to work to create 
a vision of transcendence of an otherworld that negates ugliness – Witkin created an ugly world 
with ugly objects as the locus of God. In his amendments of the Catholic and Protestant Baroque 
paintings of Little Fur (Rubens, 1638) and Still Life of Game, Fish, Fruit and Kitchen Utensils 
(van Steenwyck, 1646) – where the thesis revealed that mystical techniques portray mystical 
feelings that detract from the ugly subject or object – Witkin was shown to insert painterly qualities 
that made the mystical sensations reside in this ugliness itself. 
  
In order to proceed with such an investigation, Chapter 1 addressed philosophical challenges that 
may obstruct identifying mysticism and ugliness in artworks. The notion of representing God is 
fraught with concerns of iconoclasm and anthropomorphism. Thus, this thesis looked to the 
portrayal of mystical experiences of the Godly, which we defined as a “super- or sub-sensory 
unitive” experience, in which one or more features of that experience could be seen as a logical 
response to a property of (the concept of) Godliness. It purported that mystical experiences popular 
in religious contexts could be seen to be held in the paintings of the corresponding art historical 
style of that time. With this in mind, the thesis identified the characteristic visual features of the 
art historical style that worked to convey such an encounter – here, a Renaissance vision or a 
Baroque feeling of God – as a sub-art-historical style termed a “mystical style”. 
 
However, if we were to gauge the role designated to ugliness in such portrayals, and to recognise 
Witkin’s shifted depiction of it to mystically central, we had to find a way to identify ugliness in 
these works of art. This required overcoming two central, interconnected quandaries: how could 
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the presence of ugliness be reliably identified with the universal agreement if it is a subjective, 
relative truth? Even if the word ugliness could be taken to describe an aesthetic experience, how 
could we objectively verify the phenomenological to make ugliness identifiable and amenable to 
scholarly interrogation? A primary step was to differentiate between the thin “evaluative” sense of 
ugliness as a judgement of aesthetic ill-worth (termed the “aesthetically ugly”), from the “thick” 
substantive sense in which it is used to refer to a variety of aesthetic experience (the “ugly 
aesthetic”). However, as the philosopher Beardsley (1982) clarifies, one can make an argument for 
the aesthetic worth (aesthetic beauty) of the quality of the experience of the ugly aesthetic. Indeed, 
the potential for features of the ugly experience to interface with qualities of witnessing the 
Almighty – this idea posed visually in Witkin’s work – is one circuitous or intermediary argument 
for its value. The thesis further countered the aesthetic objectivist effort to locate the identity of 
such an experience as some formula to be found in the physicality of the object, through the 
insights offered by ontological relativism and particularism. Instead, it honoured the intuitive 
phenomenological essence of the aesthetic and correspondingly the non-law-like principle of 
supervenience. This principle included the physicality of the object in the experience within 
making the aesthetic reducible to it. As such, an aesthetic experience was taken to be a certain 
quality of perceiving (sensing and conceptualising) an object with an accompanying array of 
feelings. A description of the perceptive-felt network required that empirical reports of such 
private experiences be further sourced and collated. 
  
Thus, in Chapter 2, some reflections and theoretical accounts from various literary sources were 
integrated with theories of the psychoanalytic pre-symbolic. This interconnection was warranted 
because this thesis demonstrated how descriptions of the infantile mode of perceptual 
consciousness of the first object of m/other mirrored those of ugliness accurately. It outlined 
criteria for the identification of the ugly object, the ugly world and ugly feelings in these artworks, 
as a means to explore the ugly-mystical conversation between the selected paintings and Witkin’s 
remakes. The chapter distilled the perceptual dimension of ugliness into the phenomenon of the 
mysteriousness of the identity of the object: the ugly object ruptures our sense of knowing it, or of 
knowing any object at all, as the object is less typologically adherent. This occurrence may 
manifest in physical and conceptual formless leaking through a containing representative form. 
The ugly object brings forth the threat of the re-emergence of Klein’s “paranoid-schizoid” position 
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of unlocatable badness; the wordless sensations of self-disintegration of the register of the Real of 
the infant as hommelette or union with abject mother in the semiotic chôra.  
  
Heuristics by which to identify the object in the artwork were said to include conceptual 
hybridisation, and insufficient or excess physical form or elemental contamination. These 
withstand ugliness’ potential sublimation through the medium of painting. The ontological 
formlessness presented in the sight of the ugly object thus signals a memory of all objects being 
perceptually indistinct and conceptually uncategorisable. Hence, we could distil ugliness as a 
geomorphological occurrence in the experienced object, and the mind doing that experiencing, 
which means the ugly place must be mental, formlessness, hidden and old. Ugliness’ integration 
with psychoanalytic theory also helps to clarify the sensations of ugliness, and the ugly reality, as 
those that are typically characteristic of this period: fear of annihilation, ego death, engulfment, 
alienation, familiarity, evisceration, interestingness, satiation and comfort. We cannot find such 
features in the artwork’s perceptual mimesis of an object. Rather, we find it in the elements of 
expression of feeling that is cultivated by the formal qualities of the work.  
  
Chapter 3 compared two Renaissance paintings and Witkin’s remakes of them. In so doing, it 
demonstrated how Witkin replaces the Renaissance vision of a supernatural otherworld and 
quixotic objects, with an ugly geomorphological place and ugly objects, as a means to present 
ugliness as a portal to a Godly place. In the Renaissance paintings of da Sesto’s Leda (1515-1520) 
and Botticelli’s The Birth of Venus (1485), the Christian experience of transcendence into the 
world of ideal forms through intellectual focus is created by a mystical style called Platonic 
Idealism. These two paintings give the spectator a glimpse of the look of an abiotic, heavenly 
otherworld world of ideal objects engineered with the geometrical precision cultivated through the 
fictionalism of paint, that they may access themselves in intense exercises of cerebral exertion. 
Supernaturalism is cultivated through the use of perspective to create spacelessness, the 
manipulation of light to enhance luminosity, and the depiction of unrealistic facts of scenes from 
Greek mythology. Techniques of idealisation of objects – “de-uglification” – is achieved through 
the use of geometry to fashion impossible mathematically-perfect, immortal, petrified physical 
forms. This idealisation is enhanced by techniques described by Wölfflin (1932, pp. 14-16), 
namely, the “linear” presentation of form (in which forms are articulated through outlines and 
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contouring), “closed form” (in which masses are contained or ‘compacted’), “multiplicity” (the 
presentation of individual forms that comprise a scene as distinct from the whole), and “absolute 
clarity” (where “composition, light and colour” serve to exaggerate the definition of each form, 
irrespective of their appearance to the eye in normal perception) (pp. 14-16). These techniques 
cancel out the ugly perceptual markers: there are no blemishes on these unrealistic objects, no 
malformation, no signs of mortality. We are given the message to ignore or avoid the ugly object, 
for we have to escape from the earthbound panorama of the dishevelled and deficient in order to 
envision true, or Godly, reality. 
  
It was demonstrated that Witkin’s Leda (1986) and Gods of Earth and Heaven (1988) invert this 
strategy in their presentation of phantasms of a mental underworld of the geomorphological, from 
which experience of the ugly object originates. They contain the concomitant objects that bear the 
perceptual markers of the ugly aesthetic. In the sourcing of this concealed subject matter, Witkin 
draws on the genre of oddity photography. He exploits qualities of the medium of the photograph 
to set up a candid confrontation with that which is otherwise obscured, and to simultaneously 
amplify an “ugly” uncategorisable nature or ontological mysteriousness. He uses 
geomorphological style consisting of those that are mental (composition or gaze, bordering, studio 
light, monochrome, shallow space), formlessness (formless found objects, sharp contrasts, moving 
images), beneath (textures, organic shapes, perspective/shot) and age (“pastiche” references to 
early photographic periods such as Symbolism, freak and early portrait photography). 
  
Chapter 4 compared Baroque paintings and Witkin’s remakes, and sought to demonstrate how 
Witkin replaces mystical feelings that arise in the face of the ugly objects with qualities of ugly 
feelings themselves, thus advocating for mystical sensations to be located in the depths of the ugly 
object itself. The Baroque paintings of Rubens’ Little Fur (1638) and van Steenwyck’s Still Life 
of Game, Fish, Fruit and Kitchen Utensils (1646), present the viewer with spiritual scenes made 
from the anointed stuff of the this-worldly through realism. However, these paintings overwhelm 
the ugly object with a transfixing feeling that is accessed from the ugly object. Thus, the quotidian 
ugly is made merely instrumental in the activation of other quixotic mystical feelings. In the 
Catholic Baroque painting of Little Fur, we find the dramatic egalitarian idea of the suffusion of 
the omnipresent Godly in the commonplace and pedestrian through the mystical style of Theatrical 
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Realism. The ugly object is included the scene through the realistic techniques of Wölfflin such as 
the “painterly” presentation of form (where objects look “merged” and are apprehended not as 
“solid, tangible bodies”, but a “shifting semblance”), and “open form” (in which elements of an 
object unit may extrude). A heightened sensation through the expression of the artist’s sensual 
feelings are expressed in the use of colour, mark and textural qualities of the scene, stage-like 
composition, framing and lighting. We are thereby instructed to find ourselves in his own real ugly 
body-as-earthly object through the ugliness of the portrayed subject. We are encouraged to feel 
into the strong vicissitudes of corporeal sensation as if radiating pulsations of awful yet redemptive 
Godliness that are transmitted in the intensity of affect. 
  
Similarly, a spiritual seeker of Protestant Netherlands is brought to a table-display – to meditate 
on a terrestrial spread in van Steenwyck’s Still Life of Game, Fish, Fruit and Kitchen Utensils 
(1646) through the techniques of the Mindful Vanitas mystical style. The artist is entranced into a 
state of grounded meditation on these ugly objects, by a calm serenity induced by the surface of 
containment and reticent quality of painterliness, which depict objects with signs of ugliness, and 
may lead to an awareness of the fragility of life, and connection with the self. However, it protects 
him from ugliness’ experiential depths. The ugliness of the object is captured through the mastery 
of textures and forms that describe the contrasts between aliveness, and perceptual signs of decay 
or death. The use of small-scaled canvases and techniques of shallow space, spotlighting, stillness, 
controlled brush marks and muted colours encourage present attention and immersive union with 
the physicality of the object. It is through this meditation on the ugly object that the subject may 
derive divine, moral insight into the truth of his own necessarily terrestrial existence. 
  
In Witkin’s Journey of the Mask, Helena Fourment (1984) and Feast of Fools (1990), the artist 
substitutes the array of these other mystical-feeling qualities for one that expresses the ‘felt-
dimension’ of the very ugly objects that are given, yet hidden, in these scenes. In this way, he 
guides the viewer into an encounter with ugliness as the full source of mystical encounter. He 
reacts against the Baroque treating the perceptual dimension of ugliness as a kind of visual anchor 
point for other feeling-states prescribed as mystical. Witkin embodies this mystical psychic 
descendance in his own entranced state self-activated through appropriately “geomorphological” 
or rituals of performance art. He uses installation, and psycho-automatist drawing and printing to 
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assist in the streaming of his incited ugly feelings into the artwork – into a mode of visual 
expression that can, in turn, transmit it to the viewer. The chapter evidenced the rebellion against 
non-ugly Baroque feeling-states by reading elements of Witkin’s formal language in his remakes 
as evocations of the distinctive emotional features described in the dimensions of the pre-symbolic 
“felt”. Fear is emitted and aroused through suggestive watermarks of perilous natural settings; the 
terror of nothingness in death through suggestions of infinitely empty outer-space; the threat to 
sense of self through a cultivation of anonymity of subjects and objects through a masked gaze; 
the horror of bodily mutilation of the non-object of physical self, through textures of meat and 
graphic cuts and engulfment through marks of incarceration. Familiarity is cultivated through 
illusions of uncanniness and the pleasure of intellectual irreducibility through obfuscation of 
shadow and depth of field. Furthermore, the plentitude of the maternal source is suggested through 
the patina of spillage and maternal comfort through techniques that conjure a nest or bedding. 
  
Thus, this comprehensive study of Witkin’s visual conversation with these art-historical styles 
gives us evidence that Witkin makes a case for the inherent mysticism of the ugly by demonstrating 
the ways in which he does so. Yet, the question arises as to why this visionary intuits ugliness as 
mystical. To return to the proviso laid out by Gellman, how does ugliness provide a super- or sub-
sense perceptual unitive experience, which mirrors some of the properties of (the concepts of) 
God? The source of ugliness’ mysticism is made more apparent when one can integrate the four 
features of the geomorphological features of ugliness, with Witkin’s own spiritual reflections and 
extrinsic mystical sources. 
  
The formless reality awakened by the ugly object is at the core of this explanation. Ugliness 
becomes a point of contact of the lurking memory of a monistic, indivisible Godliness – the 
‘object-lessness’ of reality itself – that is frighteningly formless and unknowable. Ugliness is thus 
the experience of ontological mysteriousness. It brings a sub-sensory monism of extroverted 
mysticism, in which there are no separate perceptual objects, and all things that comprise reality, 
are ‘one’. These are responses to the ultimate formlessness of the omnipresent and omni-capacious 
Godly. The comparative theologian Wilson (1991) asserts that God is, consequently, “beyond any 
human concept, hidden and inscrutable” (para. 4), which is related to “apophatic mysticism”. Here 
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“nothing can be said of objects or states of affairs which are mystical experiences” – perhaps except 
for the very reality of their “formlessness and the ‘unknowable’” (Gellman, 2017, para. 32).177 
 
The idea that God is formless, and therefore unthinkable and mysterious as ‘an object’, appears in 
Christian and Jewish accounts of mysticism that Witkin studied for his own Master’s thesis. For 
example, Kabbalistic terminology for God is En Sof (‘without end’), a term intended to convey the 
“infinitude that is both ever-present in the world and yet utterly transcendent” (Lancaster, 2016, p. 
26). This idea appears in the artist’s musings and in descriptions of his work that are scattered 
throughout this study. Its prevalence corroborates that he thinks of formless experience of ugliness 
as an emanation of the attributes of the Divine. The ontological arcaneness explains why Parry 
writes that for Witkin “the camera is a sacred vessel through which pass rays of light, clues to the 
ultimate mysteries of existence” (p. 184, italics added). Witkin (1985) himself believes that “the 
mystical is unfathomable yet [he] tr[ies] to objectify it”. For, for herein lies the source of 
“revelation and truth” (p. 185). Parry describes that for Witkin, the photographic process is a kind 
of “enlightenment”. It is a pulling up of what is dark and concealed within him, to the surface light, 
which, in turn, illuminates the viewer. Witkin writes that he works from this submergence in 
“confusion towards clarity” (Horvat, 1989, para. 45). As Cravens (1993) quotes: 
Saints have loved the darkness because that’s where they go to bring out people who are drowning. 
When I, as an individual, continue my journey into perception and better realities, I have to engage 
a person in darkness because I am in darkness .… You have to go to darkness to come out in the 
light (p. 58). 
It also seems to be what Coke is referring to when he writes that “whilst photographers deal with 
what is known, Witkin gives us glimpses of the unknown as he sees it” (Coke, 1985, p. 18).  
 
177 Within the metaphysical philosophical tradition, this relates to Kant’s noumena, which are objects or events that 
exist outside sensory/perceptual apprehension; are part of reality as it exists “in itself” (Beck, 2005, p. 694), which is 
the very extrasensory essence of mysticism. Wilson (1991) cites examples of this as a dimension of different belief 
systems. In the African spiritual tradition, in Pygmi Zairean, it is written, “Who can make an image of God? He has 
no body.” In the Muslim Qu’ran (6:103) it says, “No vision can grasp Him, But His grasp is over all vision; / He is 
above all comprehension” (as cited in Wilson, 1991, para. 8). In the ancient Sanskrit Kena Upanishad (2:1-03), it is 
claimed “I cannot say that I know Brahman fully. Nor can I say that I know him not. He amongst us knows Him best 
who understands the Spirit of the Words ‘Nor do I know that I know him not.” Wilson cites a poem written in the 
Tao Te Ching: “[I]t is called formless form, thingless image,/ It is called the elusive, the evasive, confronting it, you 






Hence, while attempting to access and configure the Godly world through his photographs, Witkin 
advocates the very incomprehensible recondite and abstruse nature of God: this is “a place we 
cannot know” (Metaxatos, 2004, p. 9). This idea of concealment is implicit in the mysticism 
involving a revelation of God: the idea of his “self-disclosure of God to humanity” (Priest, 2009, 
p. 816). Cousins (1994) speaks of the “topographic relation” (p. 63) of hidden and hiding in the 
mind.178 However, the ugly object is considered to be a relic of the hidden personal memory pre-
symbolic period. Witkin’s spiritual nostalgia for the purity of primitive perception is revealed in 
the way he organises his early memories according to this ugliness. Apart from the death of his 
sister in utero, other noted memories include the rancid flesh of his grandmother’s amputated foot; 
the decapitation of a small girl in a motor vehicle accident at age six, and his first sexual encounter 
with an intersex person at a freak show.179  
 
In this geomorphological, ugly mysticism, this earliness evokes the attributes of the true world – 
before creation. These layers of the earth are the amorphous lava of the origins of the universe and 
prehistoric life. Cosmogenic narratives about pre-world chaos support the idea of the actual 
formless world being ‘earlier’. Greek mythology describes void as existing before as two recurring 
forms of indistinctness: the first is the idea of “primordial waters”. The second is that of 
“primordial darkness”, both of which are separated or bounded by earth or light. Examples of these 
occur in Hinduism and the Judeo-Christian Old Testament.180 Moreover, the idea of early 
formlessness is subsumed within geomorphological theories themselves – a molten earth of the 
Hadean Eon, 3.5 million years ago, that was covered by a crust after cooling during the Eoarchean 
Era. That God is described as formless suggests the idea that the earlier universe was itself in a 
state that closely resembled the nature of God himself. Here the ugly object reminds us that all 
 
178 Cousins’ (1994) topographical claim is that of older surfacing through newer. In terms of the object, this relation 
between that which hides and that which rises up takes on a “topographic relation”: it is a “formless” layer 
underneath the surface of the earth. 
179 Witkin (2007) describes how he experienced the “rotting smell” of his relative’s diseased leg. This, together with 
her ambulatory disability, made the connection between the outside world and that of shows where there were 
displays for entertainment of biological malformities and rarities, which was more direct and “sublime” for him 
(Witkin, 2000, p. 95). Witkin’s (1985) first sexual encounter was with Albert Alberta who he met at a freak show on 
Coney Island, New York. This foundational experience occurred when he was assisting his brother with a painting 
that incorporated intersex other physically atypical people, including a three-legged man and a dwarf named “The 
Chicken Lady” (Witkin, 1985, p. 36). 
180 In the Hindu story of creation, the granddaughter of Brahman is Danu, meaning ‘flowing liquid’, and is 
associated with the unbroken, primordial waters that existed before creation.  
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illusionary forms have their source as a formless God and that there exists only this one thing (that 
may be arbitrarily divided).181 This concept is in the Kabbalah’s ‘yeshod hashapot’, which Witkin 
embraces in his own exegesis.182 
 
The idea that Godliness can be accessed through a special kind of “sub-sensory” state of mind, 
from which ugliness arises, is an ancient religious principle that governs practices such as 
meditations and prayer. Hui-Neng, a central figure in Chinese Chan Buddhism, refers to the nature 
of the mind as unbounded, interminable and without specific form.183 However, the idea that the 
mind is a particularly special ‘place’ in which an experience of Godliness resides is more 
distinctive. In his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), the seventeenth-century philosopher 
Descartes acknowledged this as an innate reservoir of knowledge of God.184 However, it is Jung 
(1973) who extends this personal reservoir of phantasies to the “collective unconscious”. In his 
Conscious, Unconscious and Individuation, Jung (1973) writes of archetypal memories that they 
 
… evidently live and function in the deeper layers of the unconscious, especially in that 
phylogenetic substratum which I have called the collective unconscious. This localization explains 
a good deal of their strangeness: they bring into our ephemeral consciousness an unknown psychic 
life belonging to a remote past. It is the mind of our unknown ancestors, their way of thinking and 
feeling, their way of experiencing life and the world, gods and men. The existence of these archaic 
strata is presumably the source of man’s belief in reincarnations and in memories of previous 
experiences. Just as the human body is a museum, so to speak, of its phylogenetic history, so too is 
the psyche (pp. 3793-3794, italics added).185  
 
 
181 The doctrine of monism is pertinent here, since it denies the distinction between God and the world as separate. 
182 In the Kabbalah, yeshod hashapot refers literally to the “secret of the languages”. 
183 “The capacity of the mind is as great as that of space. It is infinite, neither round nor square, neither great nor 
small, neither green nor yellow, neither red nor white, neither above nor below, neither long nor short, neither angry 
nor happy, neither right nor wrong, neither good nor evil, neither first nor last” (Hui-Neng, 2005, p. 9). 
184 Descartes’ argument is found in his Meditation III, Concerning God, That He Exists (Descartes, 1993, pp. 24-35). 
185 In lieu of contemporary neuro-psychoanalysis, that attempt to locate this “reified” mind model in the actual 
biological structure in the brain, Jung writes in The Structure of the Psyche: “The collective unconscious contains 
the whole spiritual heritage of mankind’s evolution born anew in the brain structure of every individual.” (Jung, 
1973, pp. 343-344). In Jung’s 1916 essay The Structure of the Unconscious he posits the idea of the old “collective 
unconscious”, which is thought to encompass the “soul” of humanity at large. It is considered to be an “ancient” 
store of collective, phylogenic memories: “[t]hese primordial images or “archetypes” as I have called them belong to 




Jung does not explore, at length, the possibility of having an innate memory of God himself. 
However, the geomorphological essence of ugly mysticism contains the premise that there is a 
kind of ‘underground’ recollection that is personally established as a deposit by the early infant of 
this time in which their interaction is with the primary (formless) mother or “other”. This 
intersubjective mode is a kind of ancient ‘relational space’ held in a place in the mind. Freud refers 
to this as a “prehistoric period of life”, almost as if the infant is “not yet in the living” (Rose, 2003, 
p. 117).186 For these reasons, Witkin specifies that his mysticism is his personal visual project of 
his own inner world and experience: “What I really want is this really humble, individual 
connection, not with a religious institution” (Strauss, 2003, p. 51). His artistic process is a spiritual 
event in which the task is to “see what is in [him] … to glorify God”. It leads us to see that we are 
“not alone…. We are [because God is within us] both finite and infinite and the same time” 
(Witkin, 1985, pp. 34-41).” This submergence into, and expression of, the spiritual content 
contained within the deep recesses of his mind is explicit in his reference to the way in which his 
“photography [is] a means with which to see and relive [his] fantasies” of that which is concealed 
beneath ordinary perception. As previously noted, Witkin declares that “these fantasies had no 
place in the ordinary, but only in the most secret and hidden things, the strange, the bizarre and the 
invisible” (Metaxatos, p. 60, italics added).  
 
What is the value of such a message? If ugliness gives us a vision of God and holds spiritual truths 
about ourselves and the other objects world, could this be one possible way, that following 
Beardsley’s (1982) thesis, the “ugly aesthetic” may become a form of the “aesthetically good”? 
Witkin’s message, and the process of uncovering it through a formal art-historical study of 
ugliness, may awaken us to the power of art to implant meanings in aesthetic terms at large. It 
might hereby affect aesthetic experiences of the Lebenswelt, thereby opening us to reviewing our 
programmed responses to ugliness? Witkin facilitates a mystical journey characteristic of the 
Avant-Garde during a time of resurgence of aesthetic advocates for beauty. Ugliness journeys us 
deep within what has otherwise been considered scarily “exotic”, “dark”, or charted as “unusual” 
 
186 It is the infant’s absence of language, or his “asymbolia” (inability to form symbols), it is argued, that lies at the 
root of his inability to form the concepts with which to represent or “think”, those concepts which are implicated in 
the processes identification and perception of physical objects, which are at the core the ugly-object encounter. 
Since the experience itself is pre-linguistic, it cannot be retrieved and thought about in the form of “representational 
objects” of mature perception.  
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and often avoided (Moore, 2014, para. 21). With our understanding of the texture of ugliness, it 
helps us to deal with the fear and fascination in “facing and overcoming the untoward” in the 
quotidian purview (Moore, 2014, para. 21). However, more importantly, through conferring the 
mysticism of previous religious periods onto the ugly, he encourages a numinous gaze of reverence 
to such things – respect to the mosquito, the mildew, the monster or the maimed man. Seward’s 
(1993) idea at the heart of Witkin’s message, his yearning to “love the unloved, the damaged, the 
outcast” (p. 108) resonates, for such things hold the presence of God and are inextricable from our 
own existence. The ugly fails to conform to our ideals. It leaves us to question what the object, 
what any object, including the self really ‘is’. 
 
Can such a psycho-aesthetic training have the power to combat our politics involved in looking at 
the ugly: of marginalisation, ostracisation and a visual censuring of the ugly repertoire of objects 
established by visual culture at large? Can they alter a practice of voyeuristic attraction to these 
“interesting” objects of fascination as a “stuff of spectacle”, with all the forces of “surveillance, 
objectification, fetishization, hyper realisation that such forms of looking entail” (Clark & Myser, 
1996, p. 338)? Perhaps this kind of study actualised in Witkin’s work begins the project of 
reacquainting us in our aesthetic vista, and promoting further curiosity about aesthetic varieties 
and their meaning and power. Can it thereby inspire aesthetic versatility and enrichment in art and 
life?  
 
Such questions and areas, along with many others, have not been covered in this thesis. The study 
has, been delimited to exploring the presence of the ugly aesthetic in the artworks chosen. The 
nature of the “ugly aesthetic’, for will require extensive work and continual refinement. Indeed, 
the descriptions of ugly experiences upon which the theocratisation was based, were limited.  
Pursuing empirical research into qualities of this subjective encounter would provide robustness 
to this theory of ugliness. It also acts as entry point for the study of other unique aesthetic properties 
and would enable greater theoretical organization of and engagement with aesthetic concepts—
some of which are, as of yet, ineffable.  
 
There is future work to be done to enhance our understanding and ability to identify other aesthetic 
qualities that one could apprehend in an artwork. Zangwill’s (2001) so-called subtypes of 
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ugliness—the grotesque, macabre, Gothic, surreal, uncanny— have been attributed to Witkin’s 
work. So too, has the more ambiguous category of the ‘sublime’. However, this thesis only opened 
up the possibility of fleshing out these unique perceptual-felt textures. Greater attention ought to 
be given to develop accounts of these phenomena, and to explain how and why they can be said 
to be characteristic of Witkin’s work. Such lacunae open up potential projects for future research. 
For example, they may propel us forward in our attempt to understand what features, other than 
pain, are shared by those that are ‘ugly subtypes’. We are left to consider alternative ways of 
organizing, grouping or taxonomizing aesthetic terms. Do we even need to retain the purely 
evaluative function that the aesthetically beautiful/good and ugly/bad provide and, if so, for what 
purpose? Ought we to, and how do we reconstruct, our aesthetic value system? Are beauty and 
ugliness still considered to be the two main categories according to which all aesthetic terms can 
be organized, and why? Another question that arises in this thesis includes: how are aesthetic 
qualities to be attributed to other forms of art, such as performance? This is a reminder that the 
aesthetic, is not purely visual, but sensory, and challenges us to develop theories for the ugly 
aesthetic as it manifests in sound, smell, touch, taste. 
 
The thesis provides a means by which to read the relation between ugliness and the mystical in the 
visual language of the selected paintings. This involves stipulating criteria or perceptual markers 
by which ugliness could be commonly identified. It also involved an attempt to decode the way in 
which a non-visual characteristic—the presence or feeling of God—is expressed visually over 
time. However, it is limited in its sampling of the only three art historical periods’ ugly-mystical 
relation. It is confined to a close reading of the paintings and to only Witkin’s photographic 
remakes. This means that the relationship between ugliness and mysticism has yet to be explored 
in many other areas of art: First, what is the mystical-ugly relationship in other periods in art 
history? Second, how might Witkin’s position have developed in his more recent work? Third, and 
more broadly, are there other artists whose works holds the potential to continue the exploration 
of foregrounding the importance of ‘ugliness’ in the mystical encounter. What insights might that 
work lend to?   
 
Indeed, ugliness breaks open our physical surface or conceptual semblance of our world of objects 
to make us privy to the truth of primordial indistinctness and elusiveness concealed beneath. This 
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intrinsically hidden divine revelation is further concealed in these selected paintings of art history, 
as their pictorial qualities bury the presence of ugliness with some other embodiments of the 
divine. Voros’s poem thus distils the essence of Witkin’s work as a gift of “evisceration, 
dismemberment, ravelled revelation / the world silk scarf thick of fluttering itself inside” (Voros, 
2004, p. 84 italics added). It is the reason for which Elkin’s comment that this artist is “a good 
example of cracking the shell of religion to reveal the real spirituality inside it”, strikes as doubly 
true (p. 102). Blanchot, in his Space of Literature (1982), seems to point to the experience of 
geomorphological ugly as the source of the revelatory power of art itself. As Taylor elaborates, the 
origin of the work of art is the “intimacy of [the] tear, rent, fissure”. To be opened is to be ruptured 
by the work of art to a place of non-meaning. This experience is for Blanchot:  
 
the experience of art. Art – as images, as words and as rhythm indicates the menacing proximity of 
a vague and empty outside; a neuter existence, null, without limit, sordid absence, a suffocating 
condensation where being ceaselessly perpetuates itself as nothingness. … But where [then] has art 
led us? To a time before the world, before the beginning. It has cast us out of our power to begin 
and end; it has turned us toward the outside without intimacy, without place, without rest (Blanchot, 
1982 as cited in Taylor, 1987, p. 286).  
 
Parry (1998) notes the doubly mysterious “dark poetry by which [Witkin] lives” (p. 182, italics 
added). It is ugliness and art that is ugly, that, in the words of Mandelstam, “… turns up time in 
such a way that the abyssal strata of time, its black earth, appear on the surface” (Mandelstam, 
1921 as cited in Zeeman, 1998, p. 84). Witkin does indeed, ‘rear’ the ugly head, for he affords us 
a specific spiritual task of making sense of, and confronting, a glimpse of the otherwise 
inaccessible knowledge of the ancient unfathomable origins that are at once outside and part of us. 
As this luminary puts it in his Introduction to Bone House (1998):  
 
I have consecrated my life to changing matter into a spirit with the hope of one day seeing it all. 
Seeing in its total form, while wearing the mask from the distance of death. And there, in my eternal 
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Figure 26. Witkin, Feast of Fools, 1990 (Witkin, 1998, n.p.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
